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THE CONTRIBUTORS

J. P. NETTL is Professor of Sociology and Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. His recent publications include *Political Mobilization* (1967), *The Soviet Achievement 1917-1967* (1968), and (with Roland Robertson) *International Systems and the Modernization of Societies* (forthcoming 1968). He is now writing a book on power.

HEDLEY BULL is Professor of International Relations at the Australian National University in Canberra. He has written *The Control of the Arms Race* (1961) and is at present working on a book on the problem of international order.

AMOS PERLMUTTER is presently Visiting Associate Professor at the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., directing a project on military role-expansion, a project that began in 1965 at the Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley. His book *Military and Society in Israel* will be published this fall, and two other books, *Egypt: The Praetorian State* and *Middle East Perspective*, will be forthcoming in 1968 and 1969.

ELIZABETH KRIDL VALKENIER, Research Assistant at the European Institute, Columbia University, has written several articles about Soviet theory of the national liberation revolution and is currently working on a book about Soviet policies toward the developing countries.

HAROLD SPROUT is Henry G. Bryant Professor of Geography and International Relations in the Department of Politics of Princeton University and is a Faculty Associate of the Princeton Center of International Studies. Professor and Mrs. Sprout are joint authors of books on American naval policy, on international politics, and on ecological theory. Their review article in this issue previews their forthcoming book on Britain's changing role in international politics.

MORTON A. KAPLAN is Professor of Political Science and Chairman of the Committee on International Relations at the University of Chicago. He is the editor of *New Approaches to International Relations* and the author of *Glimpses Into Political Science: Towards a Reunion of Philosophy and Science*, both to be published in 1968.

F. H. HINSLEY is a Fellow of St. John's College and Reader in the History of International Relations in the University of Cambridge. His most recent publications are *Power and the Pursuit of Peace* (1963) and *Sovereignty* (1966).

MICHAEL B. STEIN is Associate Professor of Political Science at McGill University in Montreal. He is the author of several studies for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism and for the Committee on Election Expenses in Canada, and he is completing a book to be called *The Dynamics of Political Protest: Social Credit in Quebec*. He was a Research Associate at the Center of International Studies, Princeton University, in 1967-1968.

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THE STATE AS A CONCEPTUAL VARIABLE

By J. P. NETTL

THE concept of state is not much in vogue in the social sciences right now. Yet it retains a skeletal, ghostly existence largely because, for all the changes in emphasis and interest of research, the thing exists and no amount of conceptual restructuring can dissolve it. The present article develops a conceptual approach in which no violence is done to historical or empirical fact, but which offers a means of integrating the concept of state into the current primacy of social science concerns and analytical methods. It is hoped that this approach not only will provide a convenient conceptualization, but will contribute to attacking a substantive problem of some consequence. Since the relevant area is potentially huge, no more than a brushstroke configuration can be attempted.

I

What social scientists have done is to provide a framework of analysis in which the state is one possible concretization of structures, one political dimension, or even one system of social bonds—but not the only one.[1] Systems analysis, whether sociological (structure-functionalism), political science–oriented (input-output), or even cybernetic (self-steering information and control systems), leaves open the empirical definition of goal-attaining, conversion, or regulatory structures of which the traditional state-collectivity is in any case an important part. The more traditional approaches based on power, coercion, force, authoritative allocation of values, or such use of violence still tend to cluster more closely around the central "state-area" of concerns, but nowadays certainly avoid too rigid an identification of their concerns with the state *tel quel*.[2] All this is by now so well known and professionally internalized—perhaps excessively so—that there is no need to

[1] For a sensitive and suggestive analysis of the state as a unibonded system, contrasted with language and territorial or neighborhood groups all forming a multibonded nation, see Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Society, Culture, and Personality* (New York 1962), 197-211.

[2] See, for instance, a recent definition that emerges in the context of a general discussion of social systems and revolution: "The state is the institutionalization of authority . . . a special form of power" (Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* [Boston 1966], 30).

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spell out in full detail this blurring of the edges between state on the one hand and politics or society on the other.[3]

Two factors may be briefly cited as contributing to the change. One is that nowadays the problem of sovereignty is, for social scientists, a dead duck. More than thirty years ago, Frederick Watkins pushed sovereignty to the margin of political science concerns by insisting that it be regarded as a "limiting concept"—an ideal-typical situation that had to be qualified in all sorts of ways. He qualified it with the notion of autonomy, another limiting concept that applied both to the state itself and to all the associations within or below it, and as such eroded the value of sovereignty as a unique political factor.[4] Since then we hear little of sovereignty except in the context of historical and philosophical (and, of course, legal) discussions.[5]

The other factor relates to the growing empirical difficulty of continuing to use the concept of state within the historical slot with which its development has been most closely associated—the nation-state.[6] If the entry of the third world onto the stage of modern socioscientific consciousness has had one immediate result (or should have had), it is the snapping of the link between state and nation. What were awkward exceptions before (Switzerland, the Soviet Union, empires generally, and so on) have now become almost a rule of nonnation-states. Indeed, the many pleas for central government action to attain adequate "development" (the quotation marks will excuse lack of specification, definition, or even commitment to the word) have tended to

[3] The concept of state is, for instance, one of those that Talcott Parsons has neither specifically "appropriated" nor tried to integrate into his systems analysis in any meaningful way. In general, he simply identifies the state with maximal control of resources and coercive machinery—a sort of maximization of coercive power that presumably is present in every organization, but is maximized in the political organization *par excellence*. See most recently "The Political Aspect of Social Structure and Process," in David Easton, ed., *Varieties of Political Theory* (Englewood Cliffs 1966), 83.

The concept of state lends itself only with difficulty to any anaylsis of structural differentiation—hence Parsons prefers to concentrate on generic problems of the "political" which facilitate such an approach. The essentially undifferentiated nature of the state concept is further discussed below in Section II.

[4] Frederick Mundell Watkins, *The State as a Concept of Political Science* (New York and London 1934).

[5] See recently F. H. Hinsley, *Sovereignty* (London 1965).

[6] See the erudite but wholly inconclusive discussion in Carl J. Friedrich, *Man and His Government: An Empirical Theory of Politics* (New York 1963), 547-66 and *passim*. It is probably an integral part of the difference between the epistemological structures of sociological and political theory that state and nation are empirical dimensions in the former, standing in no *a priori* relationship to each other, while for the latter they are closely interdependent, positively correlated, and fundamental conceptual givens.

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point up the need for an adequate state in nonnational circumstances.[7] It is worth pointing out, however, that in one sense the continued use of the word "state" in the context of developing countries represents a form of conceptual underdevelopment within the social sciences; far from specifically exempting such countries from the tendency conceptually to dissolve the "state" into more functionally specific or limited structures such as civil or military bureaucracies or political parties, the literature that uses the concept of state does so in the "old-fashioned" sense because it has not yet got around to applying the new terminology.[8]

II

Yet these developments or changes are neither purely a matter of fashion nor an evolution from less good to better, though they may contain elements of fashion as well as generic evolution. Conceptual changes are both ideologically and geographically conditioned. The erosion of the concept of state coincides in time with, and is clearly a functional part of, the shift of the center of gravity of social science to the United States over the last thirty years, especially the acceleration in this shift in the last fifteen years. The relative "statelessness" of American social science coincides with the relative statelessness of the United States, with the long period during which the egalitarian and pluralistic society predicted with sensitive fingertips by Tocqueville was becoming institutionalized over a vast continent. One has only to read Lipset or Mitchell to see that an American sociopolitical self-examination simply leaves no room for any valid notion of state.[9] But this only highlights a problem that is in fact much older, though it has long remained dormant owing to a lack of professionalization and to the comfortably dissensual or individualistic *Weltanschauung* of the social sciences. Thus the English tradition of political and social theory, which has after all made a substantial contribution over the last three

[7] E.g., Alexander Eckstein, "Individualism and the Role of the State in Economic Growth," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, VI (January 1958), 81-99; Karl von Vorys, ed., "New Nations: The Problem of Political Development," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCCLVIII (March 1965), 1-169. Among economists writing on problems of growth in poor lands today, references bearing this emphasis are legion.

[8] Two studies that do use the new terminology also de-emphasize the state: C.H. Moore, *Tunisia Since Independence: The Dynamics of One-Party Government* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1965); and particularly strongly marked in this direction, Jean Grossholtz, *Politics in the Philippines* (Boston 1964).

[9] Seymour M. Lipset, *The First New Nation* (New York 1963); William C. Mitchell, *The American Polity: A Social and Cultural Interpretation* (New York 1962).

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centuries, got along very well without *any* native theory of the state until Harold Laski or perhaps MacIver some thirty or forty years ago—except for the marginal intrusion of continental ideas, whether anarchistic or neo-Hegelian.[10] The reason is, of course, that England has been the stateless society *par excellence*. "It is to a great extent because of these peculiarities that, in the modern period also, the English monarchy—one hardly dare speak of 'the English state'—has followed a path that diverges from the European norm."[11]

This argument suggests that the concept of the state is and ought to be treated as a variable in social science, as a reflection of the varying empirical reality with which social science concerns itself. Insofar as social science aims at scientific reductionism and attempts to separate all epiphenomenal or occasional factors from exigencies, fundamentals, and invariants, the concept of state is at risk. But if it can be made into an operating variable that points up significant differences and discontinuities between societies, making possible systematically qualitative or even quantitative distinctions, there may be a case for bringing it back in. Several problems have however to be solved first.

What is the state, for purposes of rigorous comparative analysis?

1. In the first place, it is a collectivity that summates a set of functions and structures in order to generalize their applicability. This definition puts the concept on a peer-dimension with nation, territory, *or* sovereignty in law. The difficulty of relating state and sovereignty as a primary identification is not so much that the relationship is, in sociopolitical terms, inapplicable as that it is insufficient, both in the sense that it is too narrow by leaving out spatial and social dimensions and that it is too broad in that it fails to "prepare" the concept for the right level at which it relates to other relevant concepts. The notion of the sovereign state focuses exclusively on its superordinate status vis-à-vis inferior associations and thus obstructs the possibility of analyzing its relationship with other summating concepts such as nation, society, or territory.[12] The generalizing, or depersonalizing, component of the definition can best be grasped by appreciating that the importance of the phrase "*l'État, c'est moi*" lies in the peculiarity and oddness of the identification, not in any commonplace quality of the aphorism.

[10] H. J. Laski, *The State in Theory and Practice* (London 1935); R. M. MacIver, *The Modern State* (London 1926). The beginnings of interest in the conceptual problem in England may perhaps be attributed to H.C. Dowdell, *The Word "State"* (London 1923).

[11] Heinz Lubasz, *The Development of the Modern State* (New York and London 1964), Introduction, 6.

[12] For the difficulty for political science of the sovereignty emphasis on the state, see Watkins, 42-84.

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If the notion of state is to be at all meaningful, and not merely a ragbag synonym of government, it must be divorced from and even *opposed* to personal power—not in the legal but in the political sense. The point about the Nazi lawyer's famous statement that "the sovereign is the one who adjudicates or settles any emergency situation" is not, as some democratic commentators have pointed out, that the statement is destructive of law, but that it negates any useful concept of state as the *institutionalization* of power.[13]

Clearly this definition is merely a generic one that does not locate either particular functions or structures appropriate to the state. As will become more obvious later, it is not proposed to attempt such a locational definition precisely because this in fact is one of the variable components. The overall conceptual identification of state with law, with bureaucracy, or with government merely reimposes an artificial (and to a large extent self-defining) notion of state by grouping structures that are better particularized and that are part of the state in some empirical situations but not in many others where some or all of these structures exist and function without any valid notion or phenomenon of state at all. In fact, as we shall see, they may substitute for the state in certain cases altogether.

2. In the second place, and following from the summating aspect, the state represents a unit in the field of international relations. As Hobbes pointed out three hundred years ago, there is a fundamental difference between civil society within the purview of any sovereign's authority—the area (though *not* the situation) we would today describe as a society or a social system—and the international arena, a state of nature with often random, unsystemic relations of collision and collusion. Here the state is the basic, irreducible unit, equivalent to the individual person in a society. It is nowadays fashionable to refer to "national actors" in this role rather than states, but this is mainly to provide a tensile contrast to international and supranational units that analysis hopefully sees emerging as part of a more ordered international system—an analytical convenience rather than a genuine erosion of the state.[14]

In this international context the concept of state, in addition to being a unit, also generates the almost exclusive and acceptable locus of resource mobilization. Whatever the state may or may not be internally

[13] The statement was made by Carl Schmitt, in *Politische Theologie* (Leipzig 1934), 11. In general see Franz Neumann, *The Democratic and the Authoritarian State* (New York 1957), 3-21, 59-66.

[14] In addition, the phrase "national actor" exhibits an overtone of popular participation—a piece of conceptual clothing very suitable to a democratic age.

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(which is the subject of this article), there have in the past been few challenges to both its sovereignty *and* its autonomy in "foreign affairs." There may nowadays be growing limitations—normative, collective-integrative, pluralist-integrative—on the notionally absolute sovereignty and autonomy of states in the international field, and these will be briefly referred to below.[15] But we are here concerned with the internal or societal aspect of state, not the international one; for almost all intents and purposes the state acts for the society internationally, and internal matters relating to foreign affairs are a state prerogative (including interpretation of sovereignty-limiting norms emanating from supranational arrangements). In short, the state is the gatekeeper between intrasocietal and extrasocietal flows of action.

Accordingly, we do not propose to follow up here this aspect of the definition of a state. One point only is worth noting briefly. The fact is that this international function is an invariant; countries with a low degree of "stateness" in the intrasocietal field have to make special differentiated provisions accordingly (like the special status of the British Foreign Office vis-à-vis other governmental bureaucratic organizations, the awkward duality and conflict between interstate and inter-party relations among Communist states, and finally the very special status of foreign affairs in federal societies like the United States and Switzerland, where they are one of the primary raisons d'être for the claim for stateness on the part of the federal government). This difference between extrasocietal and intrasocietal problems of control and action is much less marked in countries with a strong state tradition, like Germany or France. Hence whatever variation we may find in the degree of stateness in the analysis offered here, and even where the notion of state is very weak, as in Britain and the United States, the effective extrasocietal or international role is not affected. Whatever reasons there may be for talking about British government rather than the British state do not affect Britain as a state (or national actor) viewed from the point of view of the international arena (or system). Coming back to Hobbes, however, the one hardly influences the other; the analysis of state as a conceptual variable intrasocietally is not influenced by recognition of the state as an extrasocietal constant.

3. Third, the state represents an autonomous collectivity as well as a summating concept of high societal generality. It is thus in a functional sense a distinct *sector* or arena of society.[16] This factor of autonomy is

[15] A recent article arguing for the reinstatement of the conceptual sovereignty of states in international relations is Paul Y. Hammond, "The Political Order and the Burden of External Relations," *World Politics*, XIX (April 1967), 443-64, esp. 462-64.

[16] For the notion of arena, see Theodore J. Lowi's review article "American Business,

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important in various ways. For one thing, it emphasizes what is in fact a limitation upon sovereignty; every association tends toward maximization of autonomy, and once we accept a pluralistic view of society, the greater autonomy of the state vis-à-vis other associations or collectivities becomes an empirical question for each individual case (not to speak of the inroads on external autonomy involved in international systems and pressures for political unification).[17] Further, the autonomy of the state is reflected by areas of exclusivity as well as primacy in all societies that have a well-internalized concept of state. This may lead to sharp disjunctions of a sectoral kind: between private and public systems of education, between private and public sectors of industry, between road- and rail-building programs, or even between competing systems of telephone networks (as in Italy). Finally, the notion of autonomy is relevant to the emphasis of structural or role specificity. This simply means that a relatively autonomous state tends to proliferate specific institutions both for the adequate fulfilment of functional tasks of primacy within society and for replicating various internal functional requirements within its own autonomous sector—such as administrative courts, offices of coordination, civil service commissions, and so on. At the role level, the autonomy of the state represents the primary role-identification of being a state official; only within this role-set are subsidiary and more specific roles evolved in turn.

4. Fourth, the state is essentially a sociocultural phenomenon. This follows from the liberation of the concept from exclusive association with particular structures, and from the emphasis on autonomy. It is also strongly suggested by the empirical evidence. For instance, what Friedrich has somewhat pompously inflated into a general law—"Such is the dialectic of the political that the state seeks and must seek to foster the growth of a nation, indeed must posit its potential coming into being"—is in fact applicable only to Europe, and a limited continental part of Europe at that.[18] What constitutes nations is surely the organized diffusion of common experience, and this may be structured and amplified by a king, leader, church, party, army, *or* state—or all of them. For us to nominate the state as the primary nation-builder

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Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory," *World Politics*, XVI (July 1964), 677-715.

[17] The uneasy conceptual relationship between sovereignty and autonomy is argued at some length by Watkins. For a relevant model of political unification, see Amitai Etzioni, "A Paradigm for the Study of Political Unification," *World Politics*, XV (October 1962), 44-74.

[18] Friedrich, 551. In fact, Friedrich has elsewhere offered quite a different definition and conceptualization of the state; see below fn. 23.

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in any empirical situation, there has to be a subjective internalization by participants as well as the objective existence of a generalized collectivity of a state before the quoted statement is valid—unless of course we lapse into the dead-end residual definition of yore which gave rise to the original social science disinclination to keep the state in its armory of conceptual tools.

What is being argued here is that the identification of state with nation—indeed, the more general recognition of the state as a significant factor in political and social life—depends not only on empirical problems relating to the activity and structure of a particular state but on the existence of a cultural disposition to allot recognition to the conceptual existence of a state at all. This disposition can be isolated in various ways. One is historical: Is there a historical tradition in any particular society for the existence, primacy, autonomy, and sovereignty of a state? Another is intellectual: Do the political ideas and theories of the society past or present incorporate a notion of state, and what role do they assign to it? Yet another approach is cultural: To what extent have individuals generalized the concept and cognition of state in their perceptions and actions, and to what extent are such cognitions salient? This last is perhaps the most important of the approaches, since it appears to be the only one that makes possible any kind of systematic ordering in what must otherwise seem to be a random proliferation of quantitatively as well as qualitatively distinct phenomena captured by the all too general notion of state.

III

It is desirable at this stage to specify and order these variable qualities of statehood or "stateness" somewhat further in accordance with the threefold division of traditions: the historical, the intellectual, and the cultural.

THE HISTORICAL TRADITION

Perhaps the most remarkable factor in the concretization of statehood in the historical experience of various countries is the apparent randomness of such development—at least as expressed in existing approaches to the analysis of the state. There is, for instance, no ready identification of any development of a historical state with ethnically homogeneous, long united, and centralized countries; if there were, we would expect to find England with a well-developed tradition of state. If anything, the evidence points the other way; often the most strongly articulated development of statehood has taken place in

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countries that were divided long after France and England had been united. Here the state has come into being either by extending its impact from one dominant geographical component to the whole eventual "nation-state" (as in the "takeover" of the Prussian state concept for the whole of Germany after 1871), or it has been a new, indeed artificial, creation following the unification of relatively "stateless" components, as in Italy. It is therefore difficult to identify the crystallization of statehood in this context as resulting from any precisely comparable historical events.

There is considerable evidence that the commitment to stateness on the part of newly united European nations or even multicommunal societies like Belgium was in part the result of deliberate borrowing from envied European leaders (and, of course, from the prevailing and quite "internationally" European literature that will be discussed in the next section). No doubt the historical experience of France since the seventeenth century was dominant in providing conscious or unconscious models for countries that underwent their national-integrative revolution in the nineteenth century, so that the state concept appeared as the most appropriate one for the achievement of integrative parity or equivalent national cohesion with Europe's most centralized and self-conscious nation-state.[19] It is almost certainly true that the first modern (or just premodern) discussion of the state as an entity and a concept dates back to the Italy of Machiavelli. But the real development of the historical tradition took place in France; it is the French state, and idea of state, that provide the basic European model—even though the philosophical and intellectual tradition of ideas about the state reached the fullness of universality and precision in German hands from the beginning of the nineteenth century onward. It is significant that the word *l'État* in French should be the only one normally beginning with a capital letter.

Yet there are a number of countries like the United States whose historical experience might suggest a similar appropriation of "statehood" but where the notion has nonetheless remained remarkable by

[19] For a discussion of the comparative effects of this integrative revolution, see S. M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction," in Lipset and Rokkan, eds., *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York 1968). The notion of modernity models and the consequent structuring of leader and follower nations in the European context is discussed by Reinhard Bendix, in "Towards a Definition of Modernity," a paper presented at the Sixth World Congress of Sociology, Evian, France, September 1966 (a preview of a lengthy forthcoming book on this subject). See also J. P. Nettl and Roland Robertson, *International Systems and the Modernization of Societies: The Formation of National Goals and Attitudes* (London and New York 1968).

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its absence—or rather has been transformed into a very different meaning, as we shall see. Probably no truly federal regime can incorporate any adequate notion of state, since both functions and powers involved in this concept are—by almost any definition—coordinate with the regional units, and the necessary overall superordination or sovereignty does not therefore exist. Autonomy in turn becomes capable of expression only in legal rather than sociocultural terms, distinguishing state sectors from one another rather than distinguishing *the* state sector from all others, as in unitary societies with a high degree of stateness. Accordingly it would appear that the historical appropriation of statehood is particularly relevant in societies that might have had an objective predisposition toward a federal structure (Germany and Italy), but where a central form of government was in the main adopted. Friedrich's proposition cited earlier about states anticipating and even predicating eventual nations thus turns out to be relevant to an important but limited set of empirical cases; instead of serving as a constituent part of the basic *definition* of the historic function of the state, it draws attention to an important component variable in the European experience. This may, for instance, help to explain the administrative and cultural impoverishment of the individual states vis-à-vis the center in the Wilhelmine Reich, as well as the simulated quality of German federalism under the Weimar Republic; with the institution of a more viable and valid federal structure since 1945, and its cultural internalization in a highly novel manner, the appropriateness of the historical German notion of the state seems to have been lost. The relative attrition of the traditional salience of the state in Germany since 1945 may be due to just this factor. Thus we find the institutionalization and clustering of "state attitudes" and the concentration of interest in state phenomena increasingly concentrated on the *Länder* rather than the federal government—even though little attempt has been made to explain and analyze the former in traditional "state" terms. We shall see below how this process of substitution has affected the intellectual attitudes to, and the function and structures of, German politics.[20]

[20] For the transfer of ideological as well as processual primacy from the center to the regions since 1949 in Germany, see in general John Brown Mason, "Federalism—The Bonn Model," in Arnold J. Zurcher, ed., *Constitutions and Constitutional Trends Since World War II* (New York 1955) 134-54; Otto Kirchheimer, "The Political Scene in West Germany," *World Politics*, IX (April 1957) 433-45; A. J. Heidenheimer, "Federalism and the Party System—The Case of West Germany," *American Political Science Review*, LII (September 1958), 809-30; Olle Nyman, *Der westdeutsche Föderalismus: Studien zum Bonner Grundgesetz* (Stockholm 1960); Theodor Eschenburg, *Staat und Gesellschaft in Deutschland*, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart 1957).

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Another approach to the historical analysis of stateness and the identification of a conceptually salient state directly concerns the problem of autonomy. As has already been pointed out, the existence of neutral and transformatory structures that merely process inputs into outputs and live up to the model postulated by certain types of social science would run directly counter to the necessary conceptual component of autonomy. Having no value or normative components of their own, the transformatory structures of the type posited by Easton and Almond cannot be autonomous in any but the most lowly structural-identificatory sense. This problem is quite separate from that of sovereignty; a state may be sovereign as well as autonomous or it may merely be autonomous. Thus the German tradition has always emphasized sovereignty, the autonomy of the state being in a sense deduced from its sovereign nature. In Italy the autonomy is, on the other hand, strongly marked, but the sovereignty is historically and empirically in considerable doubt. Whatever its formal claims, the Italian state can be demonstrated as being in effect no more than a sector of activities sharply differentiated from others but effectively sovereign only in its particular sphere. Yet a third alternative exists, namely, a situation in which the structures we would normally designate as appertaining to the state are by definition not autonomous, or are at least much less so than other, nonstate ones. Thus in the United States we have a sharp disjunction between the well-maintained autonomy of certain federal institutions such as the federal courts, regulatory commissions, and, finally, departments of the federal government; the legislative branch, however, is distinguished by its lack of autonomy and by its constitution as a reflection of cross-pressures and interests—what has been called "a government of separted institutions *sharing* powers."[21] This situation is paralleled by, though it is not necessarily a consequence of, the whole concept of the separation of powers, between center and regions as well as among the three branches of government. Hence in the United States the real boundaries of autonomy fall not between state and other institutions but within and between the complex of institutions that elsewhere could be encapsulated within the collectivity of the state. For present purposes this internalization of distinct areas of institutional autonomy is the fundamental implication of the separation of powers. One recent author, comparing the development of sovereignty and government in Europe and the United States, concludes aphorismically that "America perpetuated a fusion of functions and a

[21] Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership* (New York 1960), 33.

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division of power, while Europe developed a differentiation of functions and a centralization of power."[22] It would accordingly seem as though the ultimate identification of stateness as a historical tradition rests empirically as much on the factor of autonomy as on any concept of sovereignty.

In addition, the conceptual difference between state and government is vital here. The reason why we tend to speak of the federal government rather than the United States in this connection (see below, Section IV, Law Enforcement) is because the legislative branch has been effectively lopped off from the concept of government (the separation of "the Hill" from "downtown" Washington), whereas an adequate concept of state would have to include it. The same applies, of course, to Britain; in fact, a large part of the point of the word "state" in Europe is that it is the only concept that effectively joins government, bureaucracy, and legislature into one collectivity and thus imparts real value to the distinction between state and government.

In a limited historical sense, the identification of state with government in the work of certain writers might appear to make sense on the grounds that any other conception of the state is metaphysical and therefore valueless for concrete historical analysis. But, as will be seen below, not only is the intellectual tradition with its metaphysical component important in itself, but even on a purely empirical dimension the full identification of state with government creates great problems in the comparative analysis of Western society.[23] The problem of the

[22] Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Modernization: America vs. Europe," *World Politics*, XVIII (April 1966), 393. The contrast between functions and power, although attractive, is inaccurate, since Huntington uses functions in the Montesquieu sense of executive, legislative, and judicial only—a definition that modern systems analysis no longer finds meaningful. Nonetheless, the contrast between Europe and America in this context is striking if taken along the two dimensions of sovereignty (power) and autonomy (function). By dividing power, institutional autonomy is created automatically.

[23] Thus, for instance, Friedrich writes, "The subject and method of political science cannot easily be characterized. Its subject is naturally the 'state,' but we must not read more into this than what is meant by the English 'government.' We are here concerned with the forms of rule (*Herrschaft*). Every metaphysical attempt to absolutize the concept of state is in conflict with this approach. . . . A metaphysical absolute cannot be the object of critical empirical investigation" (Carl Joachim Friedrich, *Der Verfassungsstaat der Neuzeit* [Berlin 1953], Introduction, 1). See the similar characterization in Friedrich, *Demokratie als Herrschafts- und Lebensform* (Heidelberg 1959), 12. Here the problem is "solved" by attributing to the state the "steering and leading of the business of the community. The state is necessary, since otherwise no community can conduct its business adequately." According to the analysis put forward in the present article, however, the administration of society is precisely the type of universalization applicable to the concept of the European state; government in Britain makes far fewer claims. Even the Parsonian formulation of politics as goal-attainment is more modest than any claim to "manage the business" of society.

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traditional legislature and its role has always presented difficulties for the operationalization of the concept of state. It is probably no exaggeration to say that countries with traditions of stateness attempt, more or less adequately, to incorporate their legislatures within it, while those that settle for government naturally exclude it. This is clear when we look at the history of the German legislatures since 1871 and the extent to which they were pressured to regard themselves, and in large part did regard themselves, as a fundamental component of the state. The same problem has also existed in France, at least until 1958—though it may be argued that it still remains partially unsolved even in the constitution of the Fifth Republic. In Italy, too, the inclusive concept of state almost certainly incorporates the legislature. In England, of course, the problem hardly arises because of the curious, significant, and unique role-change involved in the transposition of elected *representatives* into members of a *government* through the mediation of party, of which we shall have more to say later.

Finally in this connection, it is worth pointing out the influence of the historical development of a strongly articulated notion of state on processes and structures of dissent. It is no coincidence that "antisystem" movements have more easily been able to develop in societies with strongly developed states—even though the basis of dissent has been as much religious and socioeconomic as merely political. Antisystem oppositions were most strongly marked in Weimar Germany, France, and Italy, both from Right and Left, and least effective or least structurally articulated in the United States and Britain.[24] The notion of state accordingly appears to provide a convenient and polarizing means of disidentification complementary to the frequently postulated Hegelian notion of identification with the state which we shall discuss in the next section. Political movements of dissent appear to focus on the state as the object of disaffection and are thus indirect evidence for the variableness of the development of stateness in different societies. The problem is well documented, not only by the actual history of extreme right- and left-wing parties, increasingly focusing on dissociation from the state while demanding incorporation in (if not, indeed, exclusive representation of) nation, but also by the difficulties experienced by Marx himself in tying in the concept of state with his class concerns. The notion that "the modern state power is merely a com-

[24] This suggests the query as to whether Neil Smelser's very American *Theory of Collective Behavior* (New York 1963), with its carefully tended "levels" of action replicating the different levels of social analysis, would be meaningful at all in a society with a strong state, whose "politicization" of action is structured quite differently and polarizes to extremes much more rapidly.

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mittee which manages the common business of the bourgeoisie" is one of the historically least adequate generalizations that Marx ever made. Moreover, he amended it later: "After every revolution marking a progressive phase in the class struggle, the purely repressive character of state power stands out in bold relief" already suggests a shift toward the recognition of greater state autonomy, while Engels' statement that "the state presupposes the public power of coercion separated from the aggregate body of its members" sounds very much more like Weber than Marx—or any modern political scientist in search of a definition of uniqueness.[25] Moreover, Marx partially lost interest in the problem of the state when he moved intellectually as well as physically from Europe to England and when, in writing *Das Kapital*, he concentrated on the much more "English" analysis of economic forces and consequent class relations rather than on the problems of ideological consciousness and revolution in a state-dominated Europe.[26] As is well known, he even went so far as to exclude England and the United States from any postulated necessity of violent overthrow of the state precisely because there was no state as such to overthrow, because of the essentially transformatory nature of the relevant institutions. When Lenin faced this problem in 1917 in *State and Revolution*, he opted for the hard and destructive path—simply because he himself was faced by a "hard" state whose autonomous power was far more real and obstructive than that of any organized class "committee" in accordance with the traditional mode of Marxist thinking.

THE INTELLECTUAL TRADITION

There is no need to trace out here the various intellectual and philosophical ideas about the state in which Germany has played such a leading part over the last 150 years. The extent of the intellectual tradition of the state in German thinking can well be summarized by highlighting the extremes of its range, its intrusion into even the most individualistic approach to social problems—that of psychoanalysis. In a discussion of Wilhelm Reich, who attempted to build a politically revolutionary system of ideas out of Freudian methods and insights, the ultimate subordination of even this position to a powerful tradition has been well captured in the general aphorism that "no German ever escapes Hegel, [even] a German Marxist is suspect of saying Marx

[25] Karl Marx, *The Paris Commune* (New York 1920), 70-71; Friedrich Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, first pub. 1884 (Chicago 1902), 115-16.

[26] For an analysis of this shift in orientation, see particularly Eugene Kamenka, *The Ethical Foundations of Marxism* (New York 1962), 38-47, 57-59, 62-69.

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when he means Hegel."[27] The importance of Hegel in this connection is not only that he summarizes as well as fathers an intellectual tradition of highly articulate and total stateness, in which the concept of state is given supreme saliency, but that he transforms the cold notion of legal and political sovereignty into a "warm"—if not "hot"—cultural concept of self-identification and, indeed, affect for the state. What Hegel did in an idealized and philosophical concept, Freud later perfected in much more personal terms. The basic power of the state for him rested on love—with hypnotic and erotic overtones. The state becomes a transfer and extension, in terms of social progress, from the relationship between children and parents in a family to the relationship of subjects and state in society. In jumping straight from Hegel to Freud, the object here is merely to short-circuit an enormous span of intellectual influences that cannot really be traced directly back to Hegel at all. The suffusion of German thinking with the concept of state, and the articulation of the state as the quintessential sociological phenomenon of modernity through the writings of historians like Treitschke and Meinecke, need not be spelled out in detail; in referring to Hegel, we are merely encapsulating a widespread and dominant intellectual tradition which by no means adopts his particular phenomenology or dialectical form of analysis.[28]

The difference as well as the logical connection between sovereignty and state takes on a very special aspect in this context. The intellectual existence of notions of sovereignty, as well as their identification with the fundamental order of any polity, is common to the whole European tradition and constitutes one of its historical-intellectual peculiarities: the idea accompanied closely by the reality. The notion of state, however, does *not* follow logically or necessarily from the notion of sovereignty. While on the European continent this identification did take place in the thinking of philosophers of politics and history, it did not do so in England or the United States. In England the intellectual tradition identified sovereignty with a particular institution—Crown, then Crown in Parliament—mediated in more democratic times by the intervention of elections at least once every five years. Thus while the locus of legal sovereignty has remained unchanged for nearly three hundred years, it has been politically challenged by the appearance of effectively institutionalized public opinion through elections and, above all, political parties. The need to pin down effective loci of sovereignty,

[27] Philip Rieff, *The Triumph of the Therapeutic* (London 1966), 153.

[28] Some of these themes are highlighted in the various contributions to Lubasz, *Development of the Modern State.*

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which still preoccupies writers and students of history and politics in England, is in itself symptomatic of a stateless society. The saliency of sovereignty problems seems to predicate a battery of legal fictions and a divorce between legal and political structures in the effective exercise of government, all of which are exorcised by the "collapse" of sovereignty into the concrete structural forms of a state where such exists. In the United States the intellectual tradition of coping with sovereignty has been to deny its existence altogether; in practice only law is sovereign, and probably the "function" of sovereignty can indeed best be taken as being fulfilled and institutionalized by the law. It is once more clear that this branching-off of various particularizations of sovereignty into different structures or concepts, of which the state is merely one, suggests a variable of greater or lesser importance in different societies. In a sense the historical development of stateness and the intellectual concern with the concept of state do not coincide neatly. There are societies with strongly articulated intellectual traditions of stateness but a feeble and ineffective state—for example, Italy.

It is here that the identification of state and nation as a historically determined phenomenon, specified and limited in time, becomes relevant. The wave of national aspirations after the First World War, by which previously submerged peoples in the last "leftover" empires of Europe attempted to gain national parity with the advanced nation-states of France, Britain, and Germany, did not follow the Friedrich rule in which existing states bring forth effective nations. Instead, these newly independent nations simply adopted the concept and practice of state to structure their newly won independence, whose main claim for existence rested on ethnic discontinuities made apparent by the collapse of the former imperial power of Russia and Austria-Hungary. If anything, the state was empirically and conceptually more meaningful in the nonnational circumstances of the old Russian Empire and the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The new *de facto* independence of the successor states was concretized in terms of an autonomous and self-sufficient government. The importance of this substantial addition to the generality of states, and hence to the stream of European state traditions and experiences, which began with the Balkan wars of 1912 and ended in 1919, is to be found not in any development of the concept of state or the practice of statehood, but merely in the synthetic or artificial appropriation of a going concept and practice for purposes of dotting the *i*'s and crossing the *t*'s of a newly realized national independence. Far from being a development and extension of an established European intellectual and historical tradition, the creation of

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these new states opened the first chapter in the decline of the usefulness of the state concept, to which we shall revert in Section V—the beginning of the end. By this time the concept of state was becoming inanimate and abstract, merely a collective noun summarizing the effective government of an independent nation and the creation of an international diplomatic persona.

We must distinguish here, however, between inanimateness and depersonalization. The concept of state in the fullness of the European intellectual and historical tradition had a life and character of its own which, as we have seen, was capable of affect as well as effect—whereas its inanimate superimposition on a nation tended to turn it into a formal abstraction, something technically necessary and no more. At the same time, however, the essence of the concept was always its impersonal nature; the state was never to be wholly identified with the individuals holding power within it. This is perhaps the most important of all the differences between those political traditions that incorporate the notion of state and those that do not. There has always been a strong element of personal identification with government in England; the notion of "the government" is only meaningful by answering the question, What or whose government?—whether this be the monarch or a modern team of party-based ministers. In the European tradition, the development of the notion of state broke the personal identification of the older notion of sovereignty. The antipolitical impact of German thinking in the context of state meant a long period of dislike and fear for the notion of a dominant political party, let alone party government, resting as this did on assumptions of partisan and electoral victories. The whole idea of the Grand Coalition, which has survived all the *political* vicissitudes of the last hundred years, is in fact nothing but a negation of party and partisanship in contradistinction to the unifying and all-incorporating concept of the state.[29]

We find a very similar notion of depersonalization in French and Italian traditions of the state, even though in the latter case the state is a different rather than a superior dimension of political life. Thus in France, De Gaulle's constitution attempted to separate the area of state

[29] The history of this view of partisan political parties in Germany and elsewhere in relation to the totality of the state is well documented in Erwin Faul, "Verfemung, Duldung und Anerkennung des Parteiwesens in der Geschichte des politischen Denkens," *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, v, No. 1 (1964), 60-80. The cutting-off of ruling groups from their political roots through the leftover demands of antipolitical universality, coupled with the decline in the meaningfulness of the traditional German concept of state since 1945, helps to explain the sense of loss and fearful isolation of the ruling elites in West Germany. For this see Ralf Dahrendorf, *Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland* (Munich 1965); and Wolfgang Zapf, *Wandlungen der deutschen Elite: Ein Zirkulationsmodell deutscher Führungsgruppen 1919-1961* (Munich 1965).

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action from the intrusive and divisive system of parties by assigning to each a separate and clear-cut sphere of action. In both France and Italy, as well as Germany, the real refuge of distinct and autonomous state norms and attitudes, as well as the growth of correspondingly distinct collectivities, has been in the development of the state bureaucracy. It is precisely in these areas that the latest generation of European states has failed to make any contribution. The 1918 successor states, with the possible exceptions of Czechoslovakia and Poland, failed on the whole to produce a superordinate state independent of factional or party politics, and even in these two countries the integrative force of nation always dominated over that of state. Second, the tentatively totalitarian systems of Germany or Italy in a sense downgraded the concept of state even more; *ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer* left no room for the state in this hierarchy of loyalties. The early emphasis on state in the Nazi period was soon quietly played down; *Reich* came to be viewed as the territorial rather than governmental complement to *Volk*, while the governmental aspect was encapsulated by *Führer*. In spite of Mussolini's more orthodox articulation of fascism as a state ideology, the fact here too is that, contrary to the now declining political science concept of totalitarianism so much in vogue ten or fifteen years ago, totalitarianism—if it means anything—has strong connotations of personal rather than institutionalized or state leadership.[30] One of the very few dictatorships that really did enhance the strength of the state as such was Getulio Vargas' *Estado Nôvo* in Brazil between 1930 and 1945.

The whole notion of rationality through which Max Weber has linked modernity and effective statehood makes sense only in the context of such depersonalization.[31] The rationality of modern bureaucracy is internally generated; insofar as it attains a level of balance or compromise between conflicting interests in the transformatory sense of American social science, such impartiality is separate from and additional to the important phenomenon of autonomy which we have already discussed. In this context Weber follows the tendency of Marx to dissociate state from class in the course of the development of his

[30] For Italy, see, *inter alia*, Giovanni Gentile, *Che cosa è il fascismo* (Rome 1925); Dante L. Germino, *The Italian Fascist Party in Power: A Study in Totalitarian Rule* (New York 1959). Some very illuminating comments on the institutional Darwinism and irrelevance of formal state structures in Nazi Germany are made by David Schoenbaum, *Hitler's Social Revolution: Class and Status in Nazi Germany 1933-1939*, (New York 1966). For the vicissitudes of the concept of totalitarianism in American political science, see Herbert J. Spiro, "Totalitarianism: Critique of a Concept," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York 1968).

[31] See Weber, *Staatssoziologie* (Berlin 1956).

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thinking. In a sense, the operationalization of Marx's idea of revolution by Lenin from 1917 onward is an implicit recognition of the depersonalization of the state and the separation of the assault on, and capture of, the state, on one hand, and the subsequent and separate destruction of the antagonistic ruling classes on the other.

THE CULTURAL TRADITION

The cultural dimension of stateness is large and diffuse, and we can do no more here than to point up some of the main features. Perhaps the most obvious is the simple linguistic articulation of personal consciousness of the state in various everyday situations. The normal language of politics—and, indeed, the expression of a citizen's cognitive experience—utilizes the word "state" in its identification and interrelation of various objects. It will readily be obvious just how variable a phenomenon this is when we remember that a frontier is a *Staatsgrenze* in German, the *confine dello stato* in Italian, but merely a frontier in English-speaking and other countries. Similarly, the official who exercises jurisdiction at the frontier is immediately identifiable as a state official in Germany and Italy, Her Majesty's Servant in England, and is without any particular identification in many other countries.

Indeed, probably the only common usage in English of the word "state" is in connection with the concept of welfare state—a recent phenomenon and one moreover that has slightly pejorative or at least ironical overtones. It implies a distinct relaxation of individual autonomy and decision-making, the acceptance of priorities and decisions on one's own behalf by an outside collectivity of which one feels not a constituent but merely a *recipient* part, by which the notion of society is partly collapsed into that of state. In any case, its use in English is in a distinctly and sectorally economic sense only; it does not replace the more deeply anchored cultural statelessness of English politics and society as a whole.

The way to approach this problem is simply to inquire to what extent notions of state have become incorporated in the thinking and actions of individual citizens in different societies. In Italy and France, the state is instantly recognizable as an area of autonomous action, parallel to other spheres of economy, religion, family, and so on. In Germany, too, there is some of this autonomy, though as we have seen, it is, as in France, strongly linked to notions of supremacy and superordination. In England, it would be on the whole difficult to find an agreed definition at all, while in the United States, the word has a

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precise but totally different meaning *in contradistinction* to its European meaning—namely, the residual area of regional government and territory. Insofar as there is any salient notion of autonomy in the area of central government, there it is sometimes characterized by the term "United States": "Governor resists United States intervention. . . ." It would not be overtly difficult to quantify the relative cultural impact of notions of state on individuals by asking specific questions cross-nationally. In all probability we would find that responses that specify "state" in certain countries would specify quite different terms and structures in others. This raises a problem of functional substitution that we shall deal with in Section IV.[32]

There is of course no need to rely only on a positive orientation toward the state as evidence of a high degree of stateness. The salient negative attitudes toward the state, as in Italy, and the whole antipathy to *étatisme* in countries like Belgium, and formerly in France among the business community, are both evidence of a high level of stateness in the individual cognition within these societies. As already pointed out, the saliency of state is positively correlated with tendencies to well-structured dissociation and is thus a distinct factor of both integration and disintegration, whereas societies that do not have a strongly developed concept of state have to manage their problems of integration and control in more informal, *socially* consensual ways. Where they succeed in diffusing a high degree of internalized norms, the articulation of dissent accordingly finds it far harder to structure itself effectively. Stateness as a sociocultural phenomenon accordingly operates as a variable in the context of formal or informal mechanisms of both nonnative control and its complement, normative dissent.[33]

The nature of the state concept, as well as its quantitative presence in any society, can conceivably be conceptualized in various ways by the attempt to develop specifically cultural variables in a political context. We have elsewhere argued for the use of the variable "constitutional-elitist." Though this analysis does not specifically deal with stateness as such, it does focus on the formalization and saliency of distinct political structures, their meaningfulness and accurate representation of cleavages and processes, on the one hand (a constitutional culture),

[32] An example of a very precise cultural internalization of the notion of state is found in Israel. Because of the intervening and unique concept of country (*aretz*) in common usage, the state (*medinat*) becomes merely the active institutionalized principle of autonomous authority, while government (*memshalah*) is the temporary, party-based incumbent.

[33] It is interesting that this problem is touched upon, but never made explicit, in the cultural analysis of Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton 1963).

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and, on the other, an informal, partly irrelevant set of political institutions that are expendable in terms of elitist domination through means other than the formal political structure (elitist culture). To some extent this is a function of the institutionalization and differentiation of subsystems in society, as opposed to the relative compression and undifferentiatedness of the social system.[34] It is clear that in the present context a constitutional culture is linked to the development and crystallization of stateness, while an elitist culture is less likely to have developed a distinct and viable state tradition.

Reference may be made in this connection to the USSR, where the Soviet state has played a very important role in the development of Soviet society. But it, too, is not in the mainstream of the European state tradition. Many of the Soviet state's apparent integrative functions were always in fact handled by the party—a distinct and autonomous structure whose subordination to the state has been strongly resisted. Insofar as the threshold of autonomy which we have specified as necessary for any adequate definition of state is met in the USSR, it is in the context of party and not state at all. Moreover, the phenomenon of the Soviet state has always been accepted as a strictly temporary, even though long-term, concession to a hostile world of other, non-socialist states. Finally, the important development of Soviet citizenship, as superordinate to and separate from ethnic communities, has not been achieved by the creation of the Soviet state as such, but, as in the American case, by the crystallization of a status, an additional factor of identification within a social system. It is as irrevocably tied to the Soviet way of life as American citizenship is to the American way of life—rather than to identification with the state *tout court*. Thus the process of liberalization in the last fifteen years has largely taken place *at the expense* of the Soviet state, while in the Peoples' Democracies it has to the benefit of the state *at the expense* of the party.

IV

If stateness, or the saliency of the state, in different societies is indeed a quantitative variable, a useful way of specifying its importance is by functional analysis: What functions does the state serve, and, in its absence, how are those functions served in other societies?

THE PROCESS OF ADMINISTRATION

In societies with a tradition of state, the provision of central administration will be carried out by the state. In England there obviously

[34] See J. P. Nettl, *Political Mobilization* (New York 1967), esp. chap. 3.

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also exists a well-developed form of central administration, but it is a much more autonomously institutionalized collectivity in its own right. Its autonomy is an attribute of a caste rather than the administrative emanation of the state. This leads to all kinds of important consequences. For one thing, objective criteria of competence have developed only very slowly in Britain, because the problem of function within any larger collectivity like the state has not been raised. Internal values and norms have not crystallized as part of any philosophy of state and have not been encapsulated within any such larger body of ideas and norms, but have been allowed to develop endogamously as it were. Whereas the countries with a high degree of stateness in Europe have regarded central administration as a sectoral, specific, even unique problem and have developed techniques for this purpose, such a problem of autonomy or uniqueness has not arisen in the United States or in Britain. In the United States, the problem of bureaucratic efficiency and rationalization has been shared between business and government; the latter has borrowed more from the pioneering work of the former than vice versa. It is perhaps significant that the flowering of American writing on problems of administration began and reached its highest development with the treatment of the business corporation. In Britain, the problem of bureaucracy has been largely ignored altogether; the self-sufficient caste of the Civil Service has been content to regard administration as an unspecific and highly pragmatic form of problem-solving which has neither required the import of techniques from the outside nor had to be related to any sectoral or unique area of concerns called state administration, as in France and Germany. Any comparative study of values and attitudes of well-developed state bureaucracies in Europe, on the one hand, and of the administration in the United States and the Civil Service in England, on the other, would highlight these differences.[35]

THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF SOVEREIGNTY

Sovereignty presents no problem in countries with well-developed traditions of state since the one is identical with the other. We have already referred to the conflict between the development of stateness and a genuinely federal system. In England, sovereignty is a problem of peculiar difficulty—hence the endless legal-political debate as to its residual locus. The point about the state in this context is that it is overt and obviates any legal fictions.

[35] For some of these differences, see the discussion in F. Morstein Marx, *The Administrative State: An Introduction to Bureaucracy* (Chicago 1957).

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In empirical terms, the existence of a strong state has considerable effect on the development of parties. It can be shown that where states exist, parties tend largely to be the institutionalization of social cleavage —and this usually means a multiparty system. Where no state exists, however, parties carry a much larger functional weight. They become engines of authority-legitimation (not now provided by the state); where this is the case the structured articulation of interests and/or cleavages in party terms is inhibited.[36] This suggests that in England we must look to parties as *substituting* for the legitimacy function of the state. The argument might be summarized by stating that the weight of legitimacy of the state falls on election-winning parties in this case, with the resultant need of a closely structured, well-disciplined, and strong party system to prevent what would otherwise be a vacuum. A similar strength is functionally required in single-party or hegemonic party systems like the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies, which claim parity with, if not priority over, the state. Accordingly, the quantitative variable of stateness has considerable influence on the form and strength of parties.

It is important, however, to avoid any simple identification between the existence of a state, on the one hand, and the development of effective and stable sovereignty on the other. In spite of the intellectual problem of identifying an adequate locus of sovereign power in societies that do not have a well-developed state, there is no empirical problem of sovereignty in most of these countries. Though the development of absolute monarchy was defeated in England, checked and stalemated in Sweden, and never took place in the United States, neither England nor Sweden has ever attempted to institutionalize any division of power, nor does government in either lack the resources of sovereign power. It is historically inaccurate to identify the development of effective governmental power with any transfer of undiminished power from sovereign ruler to state. It is equally unhistorical to correlate societies with a high degree of stateness as authoritarian—i.e., unable to develop any adequate structural means for articulating interests. On the contrary, it can be argued that precisely the absence of a state also prevents the political articulation of social cleavage, as the short history of newly independent countries clearly shows. Such articulation is one possible way of defining a parliamentary democracy. The very absence of the state has often been largely responsible for transforming parties

[36] For an extension of this argument see Nettl, chaps. 5 and 6. See also Lipset and Rokkan.

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of representation into vehicles of government in societies like England and Sweden.[37]

SECTORAL AUTONOMY

Apart from any connotations of sovereignty, we have seen that the concept of state implies a distinct tendency toward sectoral autonomy. This, too, is institutionalized in various ways. The rules of central administration, the creation of differentiated means of adjudication in matters appertaining to the autonomous areas of the state (quite distinct from any claims of *sovereignty* for centrally administered law), even the division of economic activities into distinct state and private sectors are all evidence of a high degree of stateness. It is perhaps best to highlight these problems by pointing out the manner in which they are handled in societies like Britain and the United States where no state as such has really developed.

Britain has, as everyone knows, resisted the development of any distinct administrative law. The adjudication of matters appertaining to the state is subject to the normal statute and common law. Insofar as the action of the central administration is protected from surveillance by the normal courts, it is the result of emphasis on the sovereign's *exemption* from the jurisdiction of the courts rather than of any sectoral autonomy expressed through special rules, procedures, and courts. In addition, the removal of jurisdiction from the courts in many cases of government regulation is the result of specific refusal of judicial recourse by Act of Parliament. The growing tendency to proliferate administrative tribunals of a quasi-legal kind is no exception to this rule, since such tribunals operate not as judicial bodies specializing in the application of a distinct sector of rules appertaining to administration, but merely as *ad hoc* "courts" dealing with a particular functional area of problems, in which facts are argued but decisions are discretionary and not bound by any firm set of rules. The "state" is not in itself a party to such proceedings, merely its individual agents acting as independent personae. In other words, these tribunals are more accurately organs of social interest adjudication and conflict management tacked on to the enforcement of government regulations than courts applying legal rules.

Similarly, the underlying assumptions and attitudes about many procedures in Britain show clearly the lack of sectoral autonomy as far as the government is concerned. In Germany and Italy, the autonomy of state activities has remained remarkably untouched even

[37] See Huntington, 411, for the contrary identification of *statelessness* with democracy.

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in the postwar "modernization" of society—what is now often called, in Erhard's phrase, "*die formierte Gesellschaft.*" It does not matter for this purpose whether the state sector is large or small; the point is that it is autonomous. In France, the successful extension of the spirit of *planification* since 1945 has drawn a whole series of individuals and institutional representatives from industry, the trade unions, local government, and so on, into *ad hoc* state advisory bodies; in both their function and their role these act as emanations of the state and have thus been incorporated in what has been a rapidly growing area of the state's *sectoral* concerns. In Britain, however—in spite of the very large extension of governmental initiative—the independence of the advisory or consultative bodies has remained largely untouched. These bodies speak for themselves or their interests; they are not state organizations, and *consequently* the function—and above all the role—of governmental agencies in decision-making continues largely as a negotiating and conflict-resolving rather than an initiating and autonomous one. This need not be taken as evidence that government intervention is ultimately any less effective. Procedurally, the absence of genuinely autonomous areas of state activity makes for slowness in decision-making and a tendency for a great variety of commissions and inquiries to prestructure a suitable climate of opinion. But the cohesiveness of society compensates for the lack of state autonomy. Norms of social responsibility are strongly implanted in those who are chosen to guide the government—indeed, only suitably socialized individuals are usually chosen to serve on commissions and committees, and even where the choice of representatives is in the hands of the represented body (trade associations, trade unions, and such) the role-expectations are clearly spelled out in terms of potential effectiveness (viz., the annual negotiations between the Ministry of Agriculture and the Farmers' Union over subsidized farm prices).[38]

The sociointellectual consciousness of responsibility norms, strongly marked in any elitist society, largely compensates for the absence of any accepted area of autonomous state action. Moreover, autonomy and sovereignty in this respect appear as polar opposites; as we have already pointed out, the deeply anchored acceptance of governmental sovereignty, together with the deferential class structure of society, inhibits as well as compensates for the absence of any concept of state autonomy.[39] Stateness may well be a quality developing in societies with

[38] For these negotiations, see Peter Self and H. Storing, *The State and the Farmer* (London 1962).

[39] For the dominant social model of the civil service for other institutionalized interests such as the business community, see J. P. Nettl, "Consensus or Elite Domina-

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a tradition of politically articulated class dissensus, while consensual societies do not in fact require or develop a state. "Divided societies cannot exist without centralized power; consensual societies cannot exist with it."[40] This suggests that the state may, in sociological terms, be the integrative phenomenon of sociopolitical dissensus typical for a certain period of historical development—quite the contrary of the more frequent and traditional notion of the state as the epitome of national or societal consensus.

LAW ENFORCEMENT

The way in which tradition in Britain and America diverges from the rest of Europe is well reflected in the structure of legal jurisdictions and law enforcement. In Europe, the tradition of law is essentially an emanation of the state—or rather, it became incorporated into the state when the latter institution "took over" the sovereign powers of individual rulers. Thus the law on the Continent has traditionally been the profession of the state *par excellence*. To a greater or lesser extent, judges, prosecutors, and others connected with the administration of justice regard themselves as state servants; the law they enforce is a distinct and, on the whole, narrowly defined as well as carefully codified system intimately connected with the judicial function of the state. The relationship is pointed up and idealized by the German concept of *Rechtsstaat*. Law as such has little autonomy of its own.

In Britain and America, on the other hand, the law does have a good deal of autonomy. Lawyers are a distinct caste, not primarily connected with the state (though in the United States it is probably a part of the received European tradition that training for and practice of the law should also provide a strong, if now declining, recruiting ground for the profession of government). But there is an important distinction between Europe and America: in the latter case the articulation of government finds, as we shall see, primarily legal expression,

tion: The Case of Business," *Political Studies*, XIII (February 1965), 22-44. Precisely these secondary influences, together with the ultimate threat of legislative sovereignty overriding all claims of sectoral autonomy, are typical of a no-state society like Britain.

[40] Huntington, 405. In general, much of the preceding argument is similar to that so forcefully put forward in Huntington's article. But he treats the problem of consensus and dissensus along the dimensions of egalitarian versus religiously, socially, and sectorally divided societies. In his view, England, too, qualifies as a divided society requiring the imposition of sovereign authority, while the United States is the only instance of a consensual society. This is an unwarranted inversion of cause and effect, since sociologically a case can certainly be made for regarding England as vastly more consensual than the United States. The argument in this present article suggests not that stateness is a consequence of dissensus but that in many of the early instances of strong states stateness induces dissensus. The later imposition of a state on dissensual societies has eroded the development of the classical form of stateness—as in Italy, Belgium, and many of the post-1918 successor states.

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and legal training is therefore professionally functional. In Europe the law is simply a vital part of the governmental profession; the university courses in law are sharply divided between governmental and commercial career avenues, and the former provide a legal training only in a rather special sense. Few cross-national professions have less to communicate to each other than Anglo-American lawyers and their European colleagues. What distinguishes American lawyers from European lawyers is not only that the autonomy of the former is much more firmly institutionalized in a professional sense, but that possible career identifications are not confined to government, but include business and many other activities as well. We may thus speak of a social predominance of lawyers in the United States whose self-identity is intentionally and strongly professional, rather than of an identity that results from association with the state. Where in Europe there is a very strong break between what might be described as "state lawyers" (the administration of the law, the central administration, and so on) and private lawyers, this difference is almost nonexistent, either socially or professionally, in the United States. Both in England and in America private practice leads to the bench or to government service; in Europe it does not.

There are of course important differences between Britain and the United States. In Britain, the law on the whole is an inward-looking profession whose professional autonomy has been carefully preserved at the expense of functional intervention in the structure of modern society; the law plays only a limited part in politics, and lawyers have ceased to be particularly prominent there in recent times. In the United States, the law and its practitioners have perhaps been the most important single factor making for political and social change and have time and again proved to be the normal instrument for bringing it about. Instead of demonstrating a narrow and self-sufficient interpretation of existing rules, which British law shares with that of the Continent, American law has tended to follow closely, and frequently to anticipate, major changes in public attitudes and has provided a vehicle to which a whole proliferation of social thought and action could be hitched. This is too well known to need elaboration here.[41]

[41] However, the social context of law-*making* (as opposed to law-*interpretation*) is much more clearly accepted in most continental countries. The differences might be schematized as follows:

Conscious Impact of Social Factors on Law

	EUROPE	BRITAIN	U.S.
Law-making (legislature under advice)	High	Low	High
Law-interpretation (courts)	Low	Low	High

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For present purposes it is sufficient perhaps to suggest that, if we are interested in the structural substitution of different functions in different systems, we should perhaps regard the law in the United States as a strong candidate for many of the functions of the state in European societies. The United States—as opposed to the states, the individual, and other units competing for sectoral autonomy—articulates its existence as a legal persona primarily in terms of the area of federal law. None of the transformatory models of the political system proliferated in recent years by social scientists in America applies to the law; it is noticeable that politics and law are held firmly distinct in American political analysis, while they are equally firmly merged in a conceptual sense in Europe and Britain.[42] Insofar as stateness is identifiable in terms of sectoral autonomy, it is with regard to the law in the United States. Most important, perhaps, the Hegelian perspective of incorporation and goal-setting traditionally identified with the state in Europe also falls largely into the legal arena in the United States. Where British initiatives are essentially political and party-based, their equivalent structural location in the United States is primarily legal. The proposals may sometimes originate in the political sphere but need not; their ultimate legitimation in any case is legal. Thus to a considerable extent we may regard the problem of functional equivalence in the following terms: continental Europe—state; Britain —political parties; the United States—the law.

SOCIAL GOAL-ATTAINMENT AND REPRESENTATION

Finally, following the Parsonian identification of politics as concerned with goal-attainment for the social system, and the state as the primary form of the political system, we must briefly investigate the problem of functional location in societies with more or less developed notions of state. This question is not tautological, since it may well be argued that even in countries with a high level of stateness the state does not necessarily act as the structural quintessence of the political

[42] The breaking up of a received continental European tradition of law in an unsuitable American environment, to which reference has already been made, can also be shown in this context. Law is taught separately—even contradictorily—in the United States by law schools in the autonomous, indigenous tradition and by political science departments in a vestigial form of the imported European, mainly German, tradition—much disliked by the lawyers. An illuminating discussion of ideologically conditioned approaches to the study of law outside law schools is Glendon Schubert, "Ideologies and Attitudes, Academic and Judicial," *Journal of Politics*, XXIX (February 1967), 3-40; and "Academic Ideology and the Study of Adjudication," *American Political Science Review*, LXI (March 1967), 106-29. The division is into three types of approach: conventional (law, history, philosophy); traditional (economics, political science, sociology); behavioral (psychology, anthropology).

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system and therefore does not necessarily fulfil either goal-setting or goal-attainment functions. The evidence of state conservatism in Germany and Italy is very strong; perhaps only the limited area of the autonomous sector state in these societies has facilitated the development of other political structures for goal-setting. Postwar German society may be said to have attained its desired goals of stability, prosperity, and political balance mainly through the shrinking of state initiatives since 1945; Adenauer and Erhard, like Guizot, reacted to the excessive preponderance of the state in the preceding revolutionary period with a deliberate de-emphasis of state initiatives—*enrichissez-vous!* This, of course, has left the concept of state as such unimpaired but partially incapable of finding concrete application in terms of structures or process. Recently, this very difference between the conceptual overarching quality of stateness and its limited application in practice has produced a sociocultural gap and has given rise to disquiet (hence, perhaps, the attempted Grand Coalition as a mechanism of reinforcement). In Italy, similarly, the state has ceased to provide the initiative of goal-attainment, but political tradition has tended to inhibit the development of political alternatives.[43] In France, however, the state does appear to have adapted itself, not without a near upheaval, to some of the goal-setting requirements of a modern society.

The whole concept of state might well prove to be temporally determined; the traditional European notion of state and its structural application in practice may not be adequate for the tasks of goal-setting and goal-attainment in a modern, fully industrialized society.[44] This may particularly be the case if the area of autonomy tends to remain

[43] For this see the envious discussion of possible foreign models, particularly England, in *Tempi Moderni* (published by Centro Italiano di Ricerche e Documentazione), VIII (October-December 1965), special issue on democracy and industrialization.

[44] It could be argued in this context that a distinction should be made between the notion of an industrial society, which is perfectly capable of development under the aegis of state-dominated social goal-attainment for nationalistic purposes, and a consumer-oriented society where industrialization is primarily related to, and concerned with, the satisfaction of individual consumption wants. Both are forms of industrialization, but the former is capable of being dominated by the state—indeed, the Soviet model provides the preeminent case of state guidance for industrialization without dominant consumer perspectives, and similar orientations can be deduced from the industrializing philosophy of late nineteenth-century Japan, Germany, and even Russia. But a mass consumption society—and particularly its cultural structuring right through society to the working classes—may not be a suitable or successful context for a dominant state. In societies with such goals, the state may be confined to regulating conflicting interests and possibly to the provision of the complementary infrastructure of education, road-building, nature conservation, public utilities, and so on. It is in many ways easier for a nonstate government, as in England and the United States, to intervene than it is for a strongly articulated state—especially if and when a shift in social goals toward a redistribution of resources toward the poorer classes takes place.

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frozen in size, if autonomy dominates the effective application of sovereignty, and, above all, if it inhibits the development of adequate political structures for goal-attainment purposes. The historical relationship of the political systems in Europe with the state has been that of representation in a narrow sense; the European state has lived easily with political parties only as long as these were primarily representative of particular interests and did not attempt to question or take over the legitimacy and goal-attainment functions of the state itself. Hence the development of two-party systems for authoritative goal-attainment purposes might create serious difficulties for the traditional state (Germany since 1945). It is not, of course, argued that American, British, or even Soviet de-emphasis of the primacy of the state, or even of the existence of stateness, is in itself necessarily conducive to more effective goal-attainment. It is rather that the absence of a potentially inhibiting tradition of stateness may make the development of functional political prerequisites for goal-attainment easier and more flexible.

This analysis therefore suggests that the variable development of stateness in different societies is a crucial factor in specifying the nature of those societies' politics. One fruitful way of defining politics (and, incidentally, of settling one of the most difficult definitional problems in the whole process of sociopolitical analysis) is to characterize it as the one social area of normlessness—where the very process of action is concerned not with implementation of, or deviation from, established norms but with the business of *establishing* norms in the first place. Such a conception necessarily postulates a vacuum that contenders—in the form of political parties or other groups—attempt to fill with the norms that they competitively offer as legitimate for the whole society. But if the area in question is already filled with a set of state norms or even state morality, this norm-creating function of politics is necessarily inhibited; all that can be left is the articulation of interests. This is necessarily a lower "level" of politics.[45]

Without judging preferentially between these two forms of politics

[45] The cross-cutting problem of morality in the articulation of values and norms based on different demographic, economic, and structural factors in society is well pointed up in the work of Maria Ossowska, the widow of Stanislaw Ossowski and herself a distinguished philosopher-sociologist. See particularly *Podstawa nauki moralności* [The basis of moral norms] (Warsaw 1946) and *Socjologia moralności* [The sociology of morals] (Warsaw 1964).

In a sense, similar problems are raised by Bernard Crick, *In Defence of Politics* (London 1962). Crick pleads for a normative rather than an interest-based politics, and implicit in his definition is the need to contend for the right to supply high-level normative articulation through and in the political process.

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at this point, it must be clear that any attempt to attain social goals through the development and legitimation of a set of political norms in a society raises doubts as to the possibility of developing a viable state in such circumstances. The very instability of governments in developing countries suggests that the competition for norms is very strong. A state could therefore develop only if a politically supported regime remains in power for a considerable time and is able to transpose its own norms across the high threshold of time and internalization of legitimacy into a situation of stateness, within which interests can eventually be articulated and institutionalized by cleavage structures. All the current evidence from the third world is to the contrary; the political area of normlessness is large and evident, and hence the possibility of developing states of the European type in today's new nations seems remote.

V

It is worth noting that the notion of state has not, in fact, taken root in today's developing countries. Insofar as a deliberate search for adequate political models from the experience of developed countries has taken place, it has led to the adoption of, and emphasis on, parties. Leaving aside the general question of the relevance of the European political experience for developing countries, the evidence suggests that where a state-party dichotomy exists, the emphasis is more strongly on party.[46] Even in the so-called no-party states, run largely by the military or at least subject to ultimate military control, there has been little attempt to manufacture a concept of the dominant state. Rather, the emphasis has been on nation—what might be described as the national-constitutional structure. In this regard, British experience seems to predominate over that of Europe—perhaps partly because of the preponderance of the British colonial experience. Even the high point of the French rationalist tradition among French-speaking Africans can hardly be said to have picked on the state as the quintessential form of the desirable European experience; indeed, the wave of left-wing and French-inspired political thought in Africa, which has anyhow ebbed before the hard facts of traditional social structure and political instability in the developing world, tended visibly to move at a level of abstraction beyond that of "mere" political institutions and concerned itself with the philosophical orientations of French thought rather than the concrete form of French experience.[47] In short, the

[46] The evidence for this is surveyed in Nettl, *Political Mobilization*.

[47] For this, see Aimée LeSaire, *Discours sur le colonialisme* (Paris 1955); Gabriel d'Arboussier, *L'Afrique vers l'unité* (Paris 1961). The journal *Présence Africaine* in

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tradition and ideas of the European state do not figure substantially in the ideas, programs, or concrete developments of today's third world.

Apart from the question of deliberate borrowing, which has played quite an important part in the development of sociopolitical ideas and their application in developing countries, there are probably good reasons why no idea of state is likely to develop from the increasingly unique and particular political experience of these countries. As they develop their own autonomous traditions in coping with their particular problems, which in turn are very unlike those of historical Europe, it seems improbable that any adequate concept of state will appear. The European experience of stateness was essentially the product of a particularization or narrowing of sovereignty into ethnically homogeneous or at least ethnically defined areas. The transformation of postmedieval sovereignty into stateness and nationality has, with some exceptions such as Austria and Russia, generally resulted in an overall shrinking of significant territoriality and in all cases in a narrowing of potential references—the almost boundless European horizons available to those few who broke out of the parochialism of isolated geographical communities up to the end of the eighteenth century gave way to the specificity of national references shared by all. The process can be described as an *implosion*—with all the increasing intensity implied by that word. Only the Soviet Union has been a deviant case, in that the Soviet state is essentially the product of a supranational territory, and Soviet citizenship runs counter to ethnic communalism. But, as has been argued above, the Soviet state does not have the full connotations of the European traditions, and many of its functions are vested in the single Communist party.

Developing countries, on the other hand, have in common the extension of central authority across ethnic boundaries and particular, hitherto "sovereign" communities. The colonial experience was not in itself productive of nationhood, except in a dissociative or antipathetic sense of opposition to foreign domination. The real incorporation into new units of the arbitrary areas carved up by colonial powers followed and did not precede the attainment of independence. The process here was one of *explosion,* in which the concentration of power resulting from antipathy to colonial rule, structured successfully either through political independence parties or disciplined military-political insurrectionary organizations, was then applied to the new "inherited"

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the 1950's specialized in this kind of topic. A general discussion is found in Ruth Schachter Morgenthau, *Political Parties in French-speaking West Africa* (Oxford 1964).

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territory—the *nation trouvée*.[48] The metaphor accurately directs attention to the opposing notions of inward concentration and outward extension and hence scattering of energy. Obviously the opposite movement of energy in the two experiences is hardly likely to give rise to the same phenomenon of state.

There remains only the one constant—the invariant development of stateness for each national actor in the international field. New and developing nations have sought self-definition, integration, and even domestic viability by emphasizing their international role and—they hope—status. But this hardly suggests evidence of the development of the European types of states we have been discussing. If anything, the contrary is true: while the European tradition is one of stateness both intrasocietally and extrasocietally and of the relationship between these two aspects, the development of a purely or even mainly extrasocietal form of state, which constitutes and defines itself primarily through its foreign relations, is likely to give rise to something very different from the received European tradition. For instance, *personalismo* regimes at home, such as Cuba or Egypt, are mediated in interesting ways by the intervention of stateness and its apparatus—including regional pacts or blocs, and United Nations delegations—in the international field.

VI

The concept of state, though present in more or less marginal form in nearly all sociopolitical analysis today, has not lent itself readily to adequate conceptualization in accordance with the requirements of modern theory or analysis. Apart from the fact that a host of merely definitional problems exist, attempts at universal definition such as Weber's raise the additional problem that visibly the notion of state is less evident in certain Western traditions than in others. Insofar as anyone has been aware of this fact, it has usually been treated in a footnote, or as a problem of semantics. As a rule, political scientists and sociologists have treated the state simply as the general area of central government in contradistinction to society.[49]

This article has suggested that more or less stateness is a useful variable for comparing Western societies and that the absence or

[48] For this see Nettl, *Political Mobilization*, and Part II, "The Inheritance Situation," in Nettl and Robertson.

[49] "Political science starts with a state and examines how it affects society, while political sociology starts with a society and examines how it affects the state, i.e., the formal institutions for the distribution and exercise of power" (Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Political Sociology: An Essay and Bibliography," *Current Sociology*, VI [1957], 87).

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presence of a well-developed concept of state relates to and identifies important empirical differences in these societies. First the meaning of the concept of state and of a high incidence of stateness was discussed. Then the influence of differences at various institutional, intellectual, and cultural levels was identified from certain distinct intellectual and historical traditions in Europe and America. The consequences of different levels of stateness, as well as the differential incidence of the constituting components of stateness in various societies, were pointed up. To highlight the problem, a sketch for a functional comparison between different societies with variable levels of stateness was undertaken, in which the alternative structures for meeting functional exigencies in societies of low incidence of stateness were discussed. Finally an attempt was made to put the whole concept of state in its historical setting and to examine briefly the contemporary and future relevance of the concept to modern societies and to developing countries today.

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STRATEGIC STUDIES AND ITS CRITICS

By HEDLEY BULL

THE civilian strategic analysts who now constitute a distinct profession in the Western world have from the first been subject to criticism that has called in question the validity of their methods, their utility to society, and even their integrity of purpose.[1] Some of it is directed at particular strategists or at particular techniques they employ, but much of it purports to expose deficiencies that are characteristic of the genre. Some of this is of so scurrilous a nature as not to deserve a reply, but some raises issues of real importance. What are in fact the distinguishing features of the new style of strategic analysis? What has given rise to the criticisms that have been made of it? And what substance do the criticisms have?

Strategy in its most general sense is the art or science of shaping means so as to promote ends in any field of conflict. In the special sense in which I am using it here, the sense in which "strategy" is interchangeable with "military strategy," it is the art or science of exploiting military force so as to attain given objects of policy. If we contrast the strategic thinking of contemporary military analysts with the classical tradition of strategic thought from Clausewitz to Douhet, certain of its peculiarities are at once apparent.

First, strategic thinking at the present time is no longer exclusively concerned with the efficient conduct of war. From the time of Napoleon to that of Hitler, strategy was conceived of as an aspect of war. Contrasting it with tactics, which was the art of winning battles, Clausewitz defined strategy as "the art of employment of battles as a means to gain the object in war."[2] How to gain the object in war remains a central preoccupation of contemporary strategic thinking, but it is no longer the only one or necessarily the most important. Attention has shifted away from war as an instrument of policy toward the threat of war, and studies of actual violence have given place to analyses

[1] See, e.g., James R. Newman, review of Herman Kahn's *On Thermonuclear War*, *Scientific American*, CCIV (March 1961), 197-98; P. M. S. Blackett, *Studies of War, Nuclear and Conventional* (New York 1962), chap. 10; Sir Solly Zuckerman, *Scientists and War: The Impact of Science on Military and Civil Affairs* (New York 1967), chap. 5; Irving L. Horowitz, *The War Game: Studies of the New Civilian Militarists* (New York 1963); Anatol Rapoport, *Strategy and Conscience* (New York 1964); Philip Green, *Deadly Logic: The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence* (Columbus 1966).

[2] *On War*, Book III, chap. 1.

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of "deterrence," "crisis management," "the manipulation of risk"—or, as we call it when it is practiced by our opponents rather than ourselves, "blackmail." Moreover, gaining the object in war, even when it remains the concern of strategists, is no longer always seen in Clausewitz' sense of attaining victory by imposing our will on the adversary. In discussions of the conduct of strategic nuclear war the object of victory over the opponent has in fact taken second place to that of our own survival. It has sometimes been argued that the chief mission of United States strategic nuclear forces in the event of general war is that of the limitation of damage suffered by the United States and its allies—an object that is not relative to the amount of damage suffered by the enemy, but absolute.

Second, strategic thinking is no longer the preserve of the military. The great strategic writers of the past, like Liddell Hart, Fuller, and Mao Tse-tung in our own time, were soldiers (or sailors or airmen) or ex-soldiers. They were often quite bad soldiers; and they had qualities of mind that soldiers, good and bad, do not often have. But underlying all their theorizing was the assumption that strategy was in some sense a practical business, that experience of the management of forces and weapons in war, even if it was not a sufficient condition of strategic understanding, was at least a necessary one.

The military profession today is very far from having vacated the field of strategy; in wide areas of strategic policy the chiefs of staff responsible to governments remain the preponderant influence. But in the United States and to a lesser extent elsewhere in the Western world, the civilian experts have made great inroads. They have overwhelmed the military in the quality and quantity of their contributions to the literature of the subject; no one would now think of turning to the writings of retired officers rather than to the standard academic treatments of deterrence, limited war, or arms control for illumination of the problems of the nuclear age. They increasingly dominate the field of education and instruction in the subject—the academic and quasi-academic centers of strategic studies have displaced the staff colleges and war colleges, except in narrow fields of professional knowledge. And, most prominently in the United States, the civilian strategists have entered the citadels of power and have prevailed over military advisers on major issues of policy.

A third peculiarity of strategic thinking at the present time is its abstract and speculative character. There has not yet been a nuclear war, and the possibility that there will be one has not yet existed long enough for it to have become clear how the structure of international

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life will be affected. Anyone who has embarked upon a discussion of what the conditions are under which one country can deter another from doing something, of whether or not limitations are possible in nuclear war, of whether the nuclear stalemate makes conflict at lower levels more likely or less, or of whether one country can credibly threaten to use nuclear weapons on behalf of another must have experienced the sense of being at sea in an argument in which, it seems, almost any position can be plausibly defended and almost none is safe from attack.

Strategic thinking, of course, has always been speculative. It has always had to deal with the future, and it has always involved the making of plans, the fulfilment of which depends on decisions taken by the opponent as well as on those we take ourselves. And the conditions of war and crisis under which these decisions have to be made make them peculiarly difficult to anticipate and peculiarly unlikely to follow the lines of assumed standards of rationality. The advent of nuclear and missile technology, however, has rendered strategic thinking speculative to a degree that it had not previously attained. It is not the physical effects of nuclear explosives and missiles that are speculative; indeed, in this respect war has become more predictable and measurable than before. What cannot be confidently foreseen is how statesmen, governments, and societies will behave under the stress of the use of these weapons or the threat to use them. In a period of vast changes in warfare and its place in human affairs, the relevance of history and experience, and the competence of those whose expertise is founded in them, have rightly been called in question.

A fourth characteristic of strategic thinking at the present time is its sophistication and high technical quality. Many students of strategy today take the view that until our own time military affairs escaped sustained scientific study and received only the haphazard attention of second-rate minds. Accordingly they see themselves as presiding over the birth of a new science, eliminating antiquated methods and replacing them with up-to-date ones. Some take the view that there is a close analogy between strategic studies and economics, and they hold out the hope that the former subject, when it emerges from its birth pangs, will enable us to rationalize our choices and increase our control of our environment to the same extent that the latter has done.

This view does less than justice to the classical tradition of strategic thinking, while it also fails to recognize the very slight extent to which the new scientific rigor in strategic studies has so far circum-

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scribed the domain of speculation. Nevertheless, it is clear that the intellectual resources now being devoted to strategic studies are without precedent and that this has resulted in a literature of higher technical quality and a discussion of a higher standard of sophistication than have existed before. One incidental consequence of this is the emergence of strategic studies as an appropriate subject for inclusion in university curricula. Although I do not myself believe that it is desirable to separate strategic studies from the wider study of international relations, it can be argued that it compares very favorably with some other branches of political science both in its moral and social relevance and as an intellectual discipline.

A number of factors account for the barrage of criticism that the civilian strategists have had to face. For those who feel guilt about modern war or have fear of it—and in some degree this includes all persons who are sensitive and aware—the strategists have undoubtedly provided a scapegoat. The political influence that the civilian strategists have come to command, especially though not exclusively in the United States, has caused resentment—on the one hand among the older generation of soldiers and civil servants whose influence they have displaced, and on the other hand among their fellow intellectuals who have remained outsiders. Their willingness to treat strategy as a specialist's subject, even as an esoteric one, has irritated those who are unable to understand or to emulate them. Their insistence on the complexity of the problems of strategy and arms control has been unwelcome to purveyors of simple solutions of one kind or another. Most basically, perhaps, the position of the professional strategist is and will remain controversial because the legitimacy of the question he sets himself—What shall the state do with its military force?—is itself controversial. While there continues to be disagreement in modern society as to whether or not the state should ever use military force or possess it at all, there will not be general agreement about the worth and utility of students of strategy, in the way in which there is now (although there has not always been) about that of students of medicine, architecture, or economics.

To show that the motives that underlie criticism of the strategist are sometimes discreditable is not, of course, to say that it is only from these sources that criticism arises, still less to provide a rebuttal of the criticisms themselves. Many of the criticisms are worth sympathetic consideration. In my view they do not constitute, either singly or collectively, a valid indictment of the work of the civilian strategists. But we should be grateful that they have been made, for they do

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draw attention to some false paths along which strategists might stray and sometimes have strayed. Here I shall consider five of the charges.

The first and most common complaint is that the strategists leave morality out of account. Strategists are often said to be technicians and calculators who are indifferent as to the moral standing of the causes for which war is undertaken or of the means by which it is carried on.

There is a sense in which strategic thinking does and should leave morality out of account. Strategy is about the relationship between means and ends, and an exercise in "pure" strategy will exclude consideration of the moral nature of the means and the ends, just as it will exclude anything else that is extraneous. If what is being said is that strategic judgments should be colored by moral considerations or that strategic inquiry should be restricted by moral taboos, this is something that the strategist is bound to reject. If what the critics of Herman Kahn have in mind is that he should not have thought about the unthinkable or that he should have thought about it with his heart instead of his head, then they are obstructing him in his essential task.

What can be said, however, is that while strategy is one thing and morals are another, the decisions that governments take in the field of military policy should not be based on considerations of strategy alone. If the charge against the strategists is that their advice to governments is drawn up in purely strategic terms, as if strategic imperatives were categorical imperatives, or that they themselves have no other dimension in their thinking than the calculation of means and ends, then this is a serious and legitimate complaint.

But so far as one can judge, such a charge is not true of any of the strategists. It is easy to see that their works, dealing as they do with strategy and not with other subjects, might give the impression that decisions should be determined by the logic of this subject alone, but there is no reason to believe that this impression is correct. Strategists as a class, it seems to me, are neither any less nor any more sensitive to moral considerations than are other intelligent and educated persons in the West.

Why, then, is the charge so frequently made? Can all the critics be wrong? Surely as between Herman Kahn and his critic James Newman, as between Irving Horowitz and those he calls "the new civilian militarists," or as between Anatol Rapoport and the various unnamed strategists who are his targets there is some sort of moral disagreement. I believe that there is, but that what is at issue is not whether or not moral questions should be asked before decisions are taken but what the answers to the moral questions are.

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In almost any disagreement as to whether or not to resort to war or to threaten it, or as to how a war should be conducted or what risks in it should be run, there are moral arguments to be advanced on both sides. What the critics take to be the strategists' insensitivity to moral considerations is in most cases the strategists' greater sense of the moral stature of American and Western political objectives for which war and the risk of war must be undertaken. The notion that virtue in international conduct lies simply in avoiding risk of war and never in assuming it, always in self-abnegation and never in self-assertion, only in obeying the rules a world community might legislate if it existed and never in pursuing the different moral guides that are appropriate in a situation in which it does not—such a notion is of course untenable. But it forms part of the perspective of many of the critics. What chiefly characterizes the so-called idealist school to which they belong is not (as is often said) that it exaggerates the force of moral considerations, still less that it alone is endowed with moral vision, but that it fails to appreciate the full range of the moral argument, that it embraces what Treitschke called "the monkish type of virtue" without being able to see that there is any other.

There is, I think, a related moral disagreement between the strategists and their critics, which concerns the role of the strategist as an adviser to governments. It is said that there is something unbecoming to an intellectual—or at all events to a university man, with his allegiance to the universal republic of science—in bestowing the fruits of his strategic advice upon any particular government. Since governments use this advice to further their conflicts with one another, the strategic adviser is in a different position from the scholar or scientist who gives advice about the economy or health or education, since in these fields the interests of one nation may be advanced without injuring those of others. The scholar may legitimately proffer advice, if he has any, about the conditions of peace, so the argument goes, but he is disloyal to his calling if he provides advice about war.[3]

Some of this criticism may be met readily enough. One may point out that the strategic interests of nations are not wholly exclusive of one another and that contemporary strategists have been inclined to draw attention to the common interests that nations have in avoiding nuclear war and in limiting it if it occurs. One may say that one of their contributions has been the systematic study of arms control, which may be defined as cooperation among antagonistic states in

[3] See, e.g., Max Teichmann, "Strategic Studies or Peace Research?" *Arena* (Melbourne), No. 12 (Autumn 1967), 9-16.

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advancing their perceived common interests in military policy. Arms-control policy is, I should say, subsumed under strategy as a special case. It may also be pointed out that it is facile to regard war and peace as alternative objects of policy, as if peace did not need to be enforced or war were not an outgrowth of diplomacy.

Yet it remains true that the strategic adviser does assist the government he serves to advance its objectives at the expense of those of other governments. But whether or not there is anything in the position of such an adviser unbecoming to a scholar or a scientist will depend on what we take the moral nature of that government and its objectives to be. Few of the critics would, I think, argue that the scientists who assisted the British and American governments during the Second World War, and whose position the contemporary strategists have inherited, were acting in an improper way. Not everyone will agree that the position is the same now; but at least it is not possible to maintain that there is any general incompatibility between assisting a state to augment its relative military position and remaining faithful to scholarly or scientific values.

The second criticism that I wish to discuss is that strategists take for granted the existence of military force and confine themselves to considering how to exploit it, thereby excluding a whole range of policies such as disarmament or nonviolent resistance that are intended to abolish military force or to provide substitutes for it.

It is true that strategists take the fact of military force as their starting point. The question is whether any other starting point is possible at all, whether the doctrine of disarmament that is implicit in this complaint is not inherently untenable. The capacity for organized violence between states is inherent in the nature of man and his environment. The most that can be expected from a total disarmament agreement is that it might make armaments and armed forces fewer and more primitive.

If what is meant by "total disarmament" is a state of affairs in which war is physically impossible, in which states cannot wage war even when they want to (this is what Litvinov meant when he first put forward the proposal in 1927), then we must say that such a state of affairs cannot be. If, on the other hand, what is meant is a situation in which military force has been reduced to very low qualitative and quantitative levels, then this is something that can in principle occur and may well seem worth trying to bring about. But the view that security against war is best provided by a low level of armaments rather than a high one is a particular strategic theory; the arguments

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for it and against it belong to the same mode of discourse as that we apply in evaluating any other proposition about the relationship between military force and possible ends of policy.

Either, then, the second criticism is a nonsense or it represents an attempt to contribute to strategic reasoning, not a statement about it from outside. In fact, it would seem to me, proposals for radical disarmament and for nonviolent resistance have received a fair hearing within the Western community of strategists. No doubt strategists are inclined to think too readily in terms of military solutions to the problems of foreign policy and to lose sight of the other instruments that are available. But this is the occupational disease of any specialist, and the remedy for it lies in entering into debate with the strategist and correcting his perspective.

The third criticism is that strategists are inclined to make unreal assumptions about international politics and that in comparing alternative strategies and computing their costs and benefits they make assumptions that simplify and distort political reality, that do not allow for change, and that in the course of the subsequent analysis become lost to sight.

This is a complaint that has a great deal of force. The technical rigor and precision of much strategic analysis has been achieved at the cost of losing touch with political variety and change. If the political terms in the strategists' equations were more complex and were changed more frequently, the beauty of much of the ratiocination would be destroyed.

Some of the now-classic analyses of America's problem in choosing her weapons and military posture were founded upon the assumption that there was only one significant relationship in nuclear international politics, that between the United States and the Soviet Union, and that this consisted only of hostility. Not only, as it were, was the game two-person and zero-sum, but the two persons were assumed to be identical twins, Country A and Country B. Even when these analyses were first made they were a simplification of reality, but with their survival into the age of the Soviet-American détente and of the disintegration of the Atlantic Alliance and the Communist bloc, they became dangerously unreal. The greatest absurdities of this sort in recent times formed part of the debate that took place in the United States during the Kennedy administration about the control of nuclear weapons in NATO. The various solutions were set out in programmatic form—a United States nuclear monopoly, national nuclear forces, a NATO nuclear force, a European nuclear force—and their

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advantages and disadvantages were spelled out on the basis that NATO was a single person and that the sole requirement of that person was to deter attack by the Soviet Union. Not all those who contributed to the debate, of course, formulated the problem in this way, but many a weighty treatise appeared that did so. General de Gaulle has now demonstrated what was perhaps all along clear, that Paris and London are not Washington and that nuclear forces have diplomatic functions as well as military ones; but it is extraordinary for how long, under its own momentum, this strange logic persisted.

All that one can say in defense of the strategists against this charge is that follies of this sort are not inherent in what they do, that technical precision must often be sacrificed so as to allow for political variety and change, and that enough of the strategists are aware of this to ensure that the corrections can come from inside the strategic community.

The fourth criticism is that the civilian strategists are pseudoscientific in their methods, that specialist techniques they employ—such as game theory, systems analysis, simulation, and the writing of scenarios—are bogus when used to arrive at strategic decisions and serve to give an air of expertise to positions arbitrarily and subjectively arrived at. This is the theme of the book *Deadly Logic*, by Philip Green, and it is also part of the meaning of the wrong-headed but subtle and powerful book *Strategy and Conscience*, by Anatol Rapoport.

The crux of the matter is the attack on game theory, which more clearly than any of the other techniques mentioned does represent an impressive expertise. Rapoport presents some strong arguments against the application of game theory to strategic decision-making. Exercises in game theory, he says, deal in numerical probabilities, but these cannot be assigned to unique events. Such exercises assume the unlimited ability of each party to think and compute with no limit of time—which actual decision-makers cannot do. The exercises assume that the goals of each party are single, simple, and unchanging, whereas historical individuals and groups have objectives that are plural, complex, and subject to constant revision. And so on.

This attack on the use of game theory is bewildering. As Donald Brennan has pointed out in a review of Rapoport, the great majority of civilian strategists do not use game theory and indeed would be at a loss to give any account of it.[4] There are, certainly, a number of strategists, like Thomas Schelling, who have mastered this technique, but in their work exercises in game theory serve only to illus-

[4] *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, XXI (December 1965), 25-30.

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trate points that are independently arrived at; they have not employed game theory in order to determine solutions to strategic problems. As far as I know, the only person who has claimed that game theory presents a method of solving strategic problems is Oskar Morgenstern of Princeton University. Morgenstern collaborated with John von Neumann in producing *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* and has also written a book on strategy, *The Question of National Defense*.[5] But even in Morgenstern's book, which contains much rhetoric about the value of game theory, it is not possible to find an instance in which he makes use of it. I do not despair of finding an example of what Green and Rapoport are talking about, but I must say I have not so far come across one. It may be that although game theory is not an essential or even a significantly used technique of the civilian strategists, some of the logic of game theory is implicit in the way some strategists do their thinking, and a critique of the former is a way of providing a critique of the latter.[6] The basic point of Philip Green's book, that the technique and rigor that the civilian strategists have brought to the subject do not provide a means of circumventing political choices and that they can be and sometimes are employed as a political weapon in support of one arbitrarily chosen policy or another, is undoubtedly correct. This, however, is an argument for recognizing the limits of rigor and precision and for being on guard against their misuse, not for abandoning rigor and precision in favor of something else.

Both in the domestic defense debates in Western countries today and in international rivalries over arms control or the sharing of military burdens within alliances, the strategist is constantly finding that his works are pressed into the service of political objectives that are pursued on different grounds. The army, the navy, the air force, each has its strategic ideology; the United States, France, and Great Britain, in contending with one another as to how nuclear weapons shall be controlled in NATO, as to where and in what way a war in Europe would be fought, as to what contributions shall be made to the shield forces in central Europe—each develops a strategic doctrine that points

[5] *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (Princeton 1944); *The Question of National Defense* (Princeton 1959), esp. 61, 164, 269.

[6] In his reply to Brennan's review, Rapoport says, "My complaint against the strategists was not that they use or misuse game theory (although one of my earlier articles was so entitled). On the contrary, my complaint was that they have not learned some important lessons of game theory" (*Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, XXI [December 1965], 31-36). This is a slippery reformulation that does not answer Brennan's charge, viz., that Rapoport implies that strategists use game theory, whereas they do not.

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to the end it has in view, and each is anxious to exploit the authority of studies independently undertaken and scientifically followed through.

The strategist himself, however, cannot be held responsible for the use that others make of his ideas. Moreover, the fact that strategic expertise has come to have a political function as an ideology is inevitable and, I believe, by no means wholly regrettable. Scientific expertise has become the idiom of debate, within governments and between them, not only in the strategic field but in many others. If it is pressed into service by one party, the other parties must acquire it themselves or go under. The British Foreign Office now finds it necessary to employ its own economic experts to do battle with the Treasury and the Department of Economic Affairs, its own scientific experts to deal with the Ministry of Technology and the Atomic Energy Authority, and its own strategic experts to contend with the Ministry of Defence. The governments of Western Europe in the last decade have found themselves constantly at a most serious political disadvantage in relation to the United States in defense matters because they have not had a body of strategic expertise of their own with which to frustrate American attempts to overawe them. That they will acquire such expertise there can be no doubt.

These developments are not wholly to be regretted because they do raise the standard and tone of strategic debate at the highest levels of decision; the necessity under which governments, and departments of governments, labor of developing strategic ideologies does show that somewhere in the process of decision, independent and expert studies are being carried out and that these cannot be ignored.

Is it the case that the civilian strategists in America have been consistent endorsers of the main lines of United States foreign policy and that they have hidden this policy outlook beneath a pretense of objectivity? The work of the most prominent of these persons originated in criticism and questioning of the established policies of the Eisenhower Administration. No doubt it still has proceeded on the basis of assumptions held in common with official thinking, which looked at from the outside appear as orthodox. In the writings of some of the strategists, more particularly those Rapoport calls the "neo-traditionalists," the assumptions (e.g., about the existence of a "threat," the need for military strength, the morality of providing it, and so on) are spelled out and defended. In the writings of others they are not, and in these cases it is important that critics should identify the assumptions and question them. But the shaping of United

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States military policy is not an exercise in philosophy or theology; at some point firm assumptions have to be made, and on the basis of them the costs and benefits of alternatives worked out. It is inevitable that in this process the assumptions will be taken as read and also that books and papers will be written in which the authors address themselves to others who make the same assumptions, rather than to the public at large.

The fifth criticism, although it also comes from Anatol Rapoport, is in some ways at loggerheads with the fourth. It is that the sin of the strategist, far from being his covert commitment to political purposes, is his objectivity. This is really the distinctive contribution of Rapoport's book. The strategist is detached and aloof, but he has no right to be. The effect of his cold appraisal of the world as he sees it is to perpetuate the nightmare around him or to create it where it does not exist. Given the dangers of the world as it is now, the appropriate attitude is not to describe it but to go to work on it. The strategists, who have the ear of the powerful, might accomplish great things if they abandoned the strategic mode of reasoning for the conscientious; but instead they are collaborators in the system and are speeding up its movement toward catastrophe.

If there is a kernel of truth in what Rapoport says it is that the strategist, like all students of social affairs, is related to what he studies not only as subject to object but also as cause to effect. It is always important to recognize in foreign policy, as in the conduct of Western policy toward Russia and China now, that the intentions and goals of a country, whether they are peaceful or aggressive, are not fixed and given, but are always in part the product of our own action toward them.

But this basis of truth does not sustain the strange construction that Rapoport erects upon it. There are certain things that Russia will do whatever policies the United States follows toward her, certain conflicts in the world that simply have to be taken as given. Arthur Burns has pointed out in a review that one of Rapoport's errors is to make the common American assumption of a fundamentally two-person situation.[7] From the perspective of a small country on the sidelines of the international arena, the Soviet-American conflict simply appears as a datum, something that has arisen quite independently of anything that small country did or might have done. It is, to say the least, greatly to exaggerate the influence of the strategists to hold

[7] Arthur Lee Burns, "Must Strategy and Conscience Be Disjoined?" *World Politics*, XVII (July 1965), 687-702.

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them responsible for the rise of Russian power and for the overflowing beyond Russian borders of the revolution of 1917.

But even if Rapoport is right and America, if not her strategists, has it in her power to mold the behavior of Russia or China, this does not necessarily support the conclusions that Rapoport would like to draw from this. If United States policy in recent years has contributed to the changes that have made the Soviet Union a more satisfied power and a more conservative influence in world affairs, this may have as much to do with America's strength and firmness as will her overtures of conciliation or readiness to make concessions.

The doctrines that the civilian strategic analysts in the West have evolved in the last decade are scarcely the last word on strategy in the nuclear age, but should be seen as first, faltering steps in defining a problem that will be with us for as far into the future as we can see. The three notions that have been most central in these doctrines—"deterrence," "limited war," and "arms control"—have all been elaborated chiefly in the context of the Soviet-American confrontation, and their implications for the more polycentric diplomatic field that now exists have not been thought out. They have all been put forward in relation to classical international conflict between states that are internally stable and armed with the most advanced weapons, and they have not been adapted to the different but now more prominent circumstances of civil conflicts within unstable states with primitive military equipment. Moreover, even in the narrow field in which, quite rightly, the civilian strategists have concentrated their efforts, their most fundamental assumptions are open to challenge, as the debate about ballistic missile defense is now showing.

Yet the work of the civilian strategists has at least charted some reasoned course where otherwise there might well have been only drift. It has provided some solid intellectual fare that subsequent generations, even though they reject it, are at least likely to recognize as a serious attempt to come to grips with the problem. When one asks oneself what the history of strategic policy in the West might have been in the last ten years had this influence not been brought to bear, or when one contemplates the moral and intellectual poverty of the debate about nuclear affairs (or of that part of it we are able to see) in the Soviet Union where in fact no such influence exists, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that even though the civilian strategists have sometimes committed the errors I have been exploring, they have served us well.

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THE ISRAELI ARMY IN POLITICS

The Persistence of the Civilian Over the Military

By AMOS PERLMUTTER*

THE 1967 lightning victory of Zahal,[1] the Israel Defense Forces, was the result of a philosophy that had considered military effort as an instrument of nation-building from the very beginning of the Zionist movement in Palestine. In 1948, the Israeli War of Liberation thrust the army into prominence, and from then on army leaders have been influential in the governmental and economic elites committed to rapid modernization. The Sinai victory in 1956 and the third military success in Sinai, Jordan, and Syria in 1967 further enhanced Zahal's reputation. Although Israel's standing army is no larger than 80,000 men, one-seventh of the country's total Jewish population of 2.5 million is on active military reserve. Given these conditions, it is natural to wonder what impact the army has had on the political life of Israel.

This study turns its attention to the persistence of the civilian over the military in Israel despite the extraordinary role played by Zahal. Characteristic of the persistence of the civilian over the military authority is the following incident from the recent past:

When President Nasser of Egypt, on May 24, 1967, blockaded the Gulf of Aqaba, Israel's only sea access to the Indian Ocean and East Africa, the Israeli government of Prime Minister Levi Eshkol at first met the challenge through diplomacy. The diplomatic and political action of the Western powers, however, frustrated the beleaguered Israelis. American initiative in calling upon the maritime powers to help lift the blockade finally led to what the Israelis considered a diplomatic debacle; they felt that any compromise on the lifting of the blockade would undo the Israeli achievements of 1956. Tension was high, and military action was demanded by the public and the press. These pressures prompted the Eshkol government to form a

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[1] Zahal is the popular abbreviation for Zva Ha-Haganah Le-Israel.

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coalition to broaden its base. Ten days before the outbreak of hostilities, opposition leaders and most of the Israeli press, led by the daily *Ha-Aretz*, demanded the formation of a national unity emergency government. The political opposition mounted strong pressure on the government to separate the Ministry of Defense from the office of the Prime Minister and to appoint General Moshe Dayan, "the hero of Sinai," to the office. The cabinet, the parliament, the political parties, the labor federation, and the kibbutzim debated the formation of a national unity government. Mapai, the leading party in the coalition, convened several times. Its Executive Committee, and especially its Secretary General, Mrs. Golda Meir, opposed the broadening of the coalition and adamantly opposed the inclusion of General Dayan. Mapai's younger members and the agricultural settlement bloc supported General Dayan's appointment. Finally the pressure of the opposition prevailed and forced the party leadership to form a national unity government with Dayan as Defense Minister. All this took place while Arabs massed their armies on the borders of Israel and unleashed a press and radio barrage of threats to annihilate the country.[2]

During all this time (May 15–June 15), the army—Zahal—and its General Staff made no move to challenge the cabinet, but put pressure on the Prime Minister to act. The Chief of Staff, General Yitzhak Rabin, called for general mobilization. Throughout the crisis, he and the General Staff acted on the authority of and in consultation with the cabinet, even though some prominent officers resented Eshkol's alleged lack of resolution. Only when General Dayan was appointed Defense Minister was the pressure relieved. Dayan announced that he saw his role as that of the highest civilian authority and would act accordingly.

In this review of civil-military relations in Israel and their accompanying tradition and its stresses, we shall focus on (1) the expectations and role of the military elite before and after the formation of Israel in 1948; (2) the ideology and role-expansion of the Israeli military;

[2] For complete details on the politics that led to the formation of a national unity cabinet and the appointment of General Dayan as Defense Minister, see S. Nakdimon, "The Drama That Preceded the Formation of the National Unity Government," *Yediot Aharonot* (Tel-Aviv), October 18, 20, 25, and 27, 1967; Zeev Shiff, "The Three Weeks That Preceded the War," *Ha-Aretz* (Tel-Aviv), October 4, 1967, 33-34, 43; "Interview With Prime Minister Levi Eshkol," *Ma-Ariv* (Tel-Aviv), October 4, 1967, 9-13. To corroborate the newspaper accounts, during the month of October 1967 in Israel, we interviewed members of the national unity cabinet (especially General Yigal Allon), members of parliament, and members of the high command of Zahal.

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and (3) the great influence the military has wielded in foreign affairs and security policies ever since David Ben Gurion became Defense Minister in 1948. We shall also challenge a number of hypotheses that have been advanced concerning patterns and types of civil-military relations. Our analysis of civil-military relations in Israel challenges (1) Andreski's contention that a high Military Proportion Ratio—"the proportion of militarily utilized individuals in the total population"—enhances the supremacy of the army;[3] (2) Huntington's contention that the combination of a pro-military ideology, high military political power, and high military professionalism produces military political supremacy;[4] and (3) the rigid preconception—advanced by General Von der Goltz—that the "nation-in-arms" enhances militarism.[5]

Israel demonstrates exactly the contrary of each of these three hypotheses: the role-expansion of the Israeli army—a concept that will be explained later in detail—in a nation-in-arms has played a major role in creating a predominantly civic culture. None of the hypotheses applies to civil-military relations in Israel, although the types advanced by Huntington and Andreski suggest that Israel should fit the model of civil-military relations in which the military achieves ascendance over the civilian. We shall also demonstrate that Israel has not fulfilled Mosca's prognosis that "the military predominance of the West may revert to other races, other civilizations, that have had, or will have had, different development from the European"[6]—which has proved true in numerous developing polities.

Because there is so little material in English on the subject of recent Israeli history, we have combined our analysis with some historical narrative, thus placing the discussion of the Israeli army in the wider context of Israeli politics.[7]

[3] Stanislaw Andrzejewski (now Andreski), *Military Organization and Society* (London 1954), 33-34.

[4] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (New York 1964), 97.

[5] Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class* (New York 1939), 241. See also David C. Rapoport, "A Comparative Theory of Military and Political Types," in Samuel P. Huntington, ed., *Changing Patterns of Military Politics* (Glencoe 1962), 85-86.

[6] P. 242.

[7] A brief almanac-type description of the Israeli army is Moshe Pearlman's *The Army of Israel* (New York 1950). See also Ben Halpern, "The Role of the Military in Israel," in John J. Johnson, ed., *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton 1962), 317-58; and J. C. Hurewitz, "The Role of the Military in Society and Government in Israel," in S. N. Fisher, ed., *The Military in the Middle East* (Columbus 1963), 89-104. Amitai Etzioni, "The Israeli Army: The Human Factor," *Jewish Frontier*, XXVI (November 1959), 4-9, concentrates on cohesion within the Israeli army.

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1. The Pre-Independence Defense Units and Their Political Expectations, 1909-1948

THE MILITARY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATION-BUILDING

Much of this analysis depends on an interpretation of the circumstances under which the Israeli military structures were formed and eventually consolidated. Israeli society, its political and social structures, can be explained only in terms of a constellation of factors. No single factor can explain the creation of a new social system in Israel or the development of its political structures and its army.[8]

The modern army of Israel has its roots in the security structures of the pre-independence pioneer movement of the Jews in Palestine. These defense units were created by the Socialist-Zionists, the most significant, powerful, and mobilizing elements of Jewish colonization. Socialist-Zionism—the House of Labor (HOL)[9]—embraced a wide range of men, ideas, and organizations in both the Diaspora and Palestine, but only in Palestine was it forged into a movement of great consequence. There it came to represent the interplay between socialist ideological commitments and the pragmatic considerations that modified them. The result was the gradual transformation of a colonization effort into a program for national liberation. The Socialist-Zionist movement became the chief instrument of nation-building, the mobilizer of the pioneer revolution, the creator of a new society, and the founder of the Israeli army.

The pioneer Zionists had a genius for organization which enabled them to develop very elaborate institutional frameworks prior to

[8] In Hebrew, no single study of the Israeli army exists. However, abundant historical, biographical, bibliographical, and oral material deals with events, personalities, and structures of the pre-1948 underground organizations that were the predecessors of the Israeli army. Moreover, the literature of the 1948 War of Liberation, the Sinai campaign of 1956, and the 1967 war is proliferating. The best historical analysis in Hebrew is Yehuda Bauer's *Diplomacy and Underground in Zionism 1939-1945* (Merchavia 1966). In English, a chapter of Bauer's book appeared in *Middle Eastern Studies*, II (April 1966), 182-210. Original sources and documents on the Israeli army since its official formation in February 1948 are on the whole not available. What is available has limited usefulness. For our analysis we are thus dependent on personal experience, on friends and associates in the Israeli army, on our five years' association with the Defense Ministry, and on interviews with more than one hundred senior officers who have served in the army during the period from 1948 to the present. Special appreciation is due to Professor Moshe Lissak of the Department of Sociology of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. Thanks are also due to two Israeli journalists (whose names are deliberately omitted here) who were of great help by making available to us their notes and diaries, material not published because of the authors' discretion or editorial and governmental censorship. This material was invaluable.

[9] "House of Labor" is used to denote all the efforts, organizational and institutional structures, and ideology of the Socialist-Zionist movement in Palestine.

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nationhood. To create a new society, the HOL groups consolidated an immigrant-settler movement with one of national liberation, based on a socialist and egalitarian ideology. To carry out this task they established three separate but complementary mobilization systems: the first organized workers into an elaborate institutional structure, the Histadrut, established in 1920. The second was the kibbutz movement to support the agricultural settlement system. The third structure was made up of the political parties of the HOL led by Mapai, which was created to represent Socialist-Zionist interests and institutions within the Yishuv (the Jewish community in Palestine) and in dealings with the British Mandatory Administration. These three systems were to become the most powerful organizations in Israel. The HOL fused the Socialist-Zionist ideology with its political parties, its trade union, and its kibbutz movement; and it spread this ideology throughout the Yishuv. Thus the HOL created the first comprehensive social, political, and economic structure of the Jewish community in Palestine, independent of both the Mandatory and the Palestinian Arab community.[10]

It was within this framework that the HOL created what eventually became the Israeli army. HOL leaders were especially instrumental in developing military structures, with other Zionist groups firmly implanting in the Israeli army the HOL ideology of "revolutionary constructivism"—the gradual accumulation of functions and powers for an eventual independent Jewish socialist state.[11] This ideology of nation-building was well inculcated in the army. Fraternity, cohesiveness, egalitarianism, leadership training, and subservience to national and civil authorities are the legacy of Socialist-Zionism to Zahal, now the leading bearer of national identity and pride.

THE FIRST SECURITY UNITS

Jewish defense units were organized in Eastern Europe in the late nineteenth century by the Poale Zion (Workers of Zion) party, the first Socialist-Zionist party, and functioned temporarily as guard units during pogroms. Under the aegis of the Poale Zion party, the first defense groups were also formed in Palestine. The defense society called Hashomer (The Watchman) was organized in Palestine in 1909. Originally composed of Socialist-Zionists from Poland, Russia, and Lithuania, it soon was joined by Russian Jewish Marxists, who

[10] See Amos Perlmutter, "Ideology and Organization: The Politics of Socialist Parties in Israel 1897-1957," unpubl. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1957, 147-58, for a detailed analysis of Socialist-Zionism.

[11] See Berl Katznelson, *Works*, in Hebrew, 13 vols. (Tel-Aviv 1951-1955). For an interpretation and analysis of Katznelson's ideology, see Perlmutter, 135-39.

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brought to it the sort of militance that the Iskra group had introduced into the Russian Social Democratic Labor party. Hashomer did not merely protect Jewish villages from Arab assaults, but also sought to integrate the revolutionary ideology of Socialist-Zionism with a military organization. After trials and tribulations with the HOL, it was finally dissolved in 1925. But not its legacy—defense as an instrument of nation-building.

The next effort to form defense units was the Jewish Legions. Early in World War I, Zionist leaders decided that a Jewish armed force serving with the Allies in the Middle East could prove useful in political bargaining with England for the creation of an independent Jewish national home in Palestine. The Zionist leaders also felt that such a force's war experience would create a "new Jewish soldier type," a useful instrument in an activist nationalist movement. Two legions were created, composed of Jewish volunteers from the United States, Great Britain, and Palestine.[12] The legions also formed a political structure and a base of operation for the competing factions of Zionism. Jabotinsky, a right-wing Zionist, saw the legions as the future base for a Jewish army in Palestine, but Trumpeldor, a left-wing Zionist, advocated transferring the legions into the political arena of HOL settlement in Palestine. At the war's end, despite the effort of Jabotinsky to influence the Mandatory to keep the legions as the army of occupation in Palestine, which would have given them control of the Mandatory's defense function, the legions were dissolved.[13]

FORMATION OF AN ARMED NUCLEUS

Beginning in 1920, the catalytic forces for maintaining an independent Jewish defense organization in Palestine were Arab nationalism, the reluctance of British occupation forces to protect Jewish settlements, the kibbutz movement, and the rise of a militant Zionist movement founded by Jabotinsky.[14] From the beginning of Zionist settlement in Palestine, the local Arabs were opposed to Zionism. Anti-Jewish Arab activity began in northern Galilee late in 1919, when the settlement of Tel-Hai was attacked but successfully defended by Hashomer and the demobilized legions led by Trumpeldor. The Arab riots in Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv in the 1920's indicated that the

[12] Ben Zion Dinour and others, eds., *History of the Haganah*, in Hebrew (Tel-Aviv 1956), Vol. I, Part II, 425-51; Bracha Habas and Eliezer Schohet, *The Book of the Second Immigration*, in Hebrew (Tel-Aviv 1947); John H. Patterson, *With the Judeans in the Palestine Campaign* (London 1922); David Ben Gurion, *Works*, in Hebrew (Tel-Aviv 1949), Vol. I.

[13] See Dinour and others, 517-20, 535, 549.

[14] J. C. Hurewitz, *The Struggle for Palestine* (New York 1950), 55-60.

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Jewish community in Palestine, especially in the cities, was not ready to defend itself; without the support of veterans of the legions the cities would have been prey to Arab riots and abuse. But these veterans hardly represented a permanent defense organization. By contrast, Hashomer had successfully defended Tel-Hai and the Galilean agrarian settlements.[15]

In their drive to consolidate and institutionalize the organizational structures of the House of Labor, the leadership of the HOL had overlooked the importance of security. Only the militants in the kibbutzim recognized the necessity for maintaining a permanent defense organization. While the attack on Tel-Hai awakened the HOL to the significance of a defense capability, the leadership was slow to assume this responsibility, and its efforts to wrest control of this function from the leftists were sporadic. Eventually, however, the leadership of the Histadrut accepted the recommendation of its committee for defense that it organize the Haganah, the first Jewish underground in Palestine. Thus it could be said that the Haganah, as an organization, came into being on June 25, 1925.

For the Jews in Palestine, the years 1925-1929 were relatively peaceful and prosperous. With large-scale Zionist immigration and negligible Arab nationalist activity, the Haganah had little need to grow. The situation took a turn in 1929, however, when the Arabs attacked Jewish communities in Hebron and Safad and Jewish businesses in Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv. The Mandatory was caught unprepared and the Haganah was not sufficiently developed to defend the Jews effectively. This set of circumstances brought the Haganah into the spotlight of Zionist politics. As David Ben Gurion has reminisced, "I told Dr. Weizmann [in 1929] that the Jerusalem riots of April 1920 and the Jaffa massacre of 1921 would be as nothing compared to what we would face in the future." Ben Gurion adds that Dr. Chaim Arlozoroff (then head of the political department of the Jewish Agency, a quasi-governmental body representing the Yishuv advising and cooperating with the Mandatory) said, "In view of the present circumstances [1930], there is no way to fulfill Zionism without a transition period in which the Jewish minority takes over control of Palestine as an organized revolutionary elite."[16]

[15] Moshe Braslavsky, *The Palestine Labor Movement*, in Hebrew (Tel-Aviv 1955), Vol. I, 227-31. See also Dinour and others, 639-67.

[16] Historical Branch of Zahal, *The History of the War of Liberation*, in Hebrew (Tel-Aviv 1959), 13. See also David Ben Gurion, *In the Battle*, in Hebrew (Tel-Aviv 1955), Vol. I, 473-510; M. Burstein, *History of the Labor Movement in Palestine*, in Hebrew (Tel-Aviv 1955), Vol. I; and Braslavsky.

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The issuance by the Mandatory of the Passfield White Paper, in 1930, marked the end of the period of relative tranquillity and prosperity in Palestine. The Mandatory became more precise regarding its attitude toward the emergence of a Jewish national home and recommended stricter land transfer and immigration controls. This was interpreted by the more militant Jewish leaders, especially Jabotinsky and his followers, as reneging on the Balfour Declaration, Britain's earlier declaration of sympathy with Zionist aspirations. This change in the Mandatory's attitude came at the same time that the Arab nationalist movement in Palestine picked up momentum as it was radicalized by the fundamentalist and extremist al-Hajj Muhammad Amin al-Husayni, the Mufti of Jerusalem. Both developments constituted a formidable challenge to the Yishuv's aspirations to nationhood.

The turn toward extremists and desperadoes by the Arab nationalist movement in Palestine can be attributed to several factors: the feudal and transitional nature of the Arab community, the growth and success of the Jewish community, and, above all, the Arab opposition to the Mandatory.[17] The Arab revolt (1936-1939) began with a general strike that quickly collapsed, continued with riots and terrorism directed against Jewish settlements, and ended as a furious but futile revolt against Great Britain. This first large-scale all-Arab nationalist insurrection ended in despair because of fratricidal rivalries among several Arab nationalist leaders. Its failure must particularly be laid to the Mufti, whose personal ambition to dominate the Arab community in Palestine entangled this fragile Arab nationalist movement in a hopeless struggle against the powerful resources of the Mandatory.[18]

Although these were years of growing strength for the economic, social, and political efforts of the Yishuv, the Arab revolt and the concurrent British withdrawal of support for the principles of the Balfour Declaration divided the Yishuv on the issue of self-defense. The problem was twofold: what form of resistance should the Jews adopt against the Mandatory and what type of war should they wage against the Arabs?

[17] Yehuda Bauer, "Riots or Revolt," *Ha-Aretz*, April 15, 1966, 9, 12.

[18] This is not the place to analyze in detail the Palestinian Arab nationalist movement. To date there are no full-length, serious studies of this aspect of Arab nationalism. For an outline, see Hurewitz, *Struggle for Palestine*, 51-80, 112-123; for an Arab nationalist interpretation, see George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (New York 1946), 387-412; for a Jewish interpretation, see Michael Assaf, *The Arab Awakening and Departure*, in Hebrew (Tel-Aviv 1967), 123-53. Two outstanding essays are Bauer, "Riots or Revolt," and Ya'aqov Shimoni, "The Arabs and the Approaching War With Israel," *Hamizrah Hehadash* (Jerusalem), No. 47 (1962), 189-211, English summary, i-ix. The Afro-Asian Institute of the University of Tel-Aviv is now engaged in a large-scale study of the Palestine Arab nationalist movement.

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For the duration of the Arab revolt, the biggest bloc within the Yishuv—the HOL, led by David Ben Gurion—pursued a policy of restraint (*havlagah*) toward both the Arabs and the Mandatory. Realizing the futility of the Arab revolt, the Jews sought to turn it to their advantage. The Jewish leadership knew that if they adopted the same strategy as the Arabs against the Mandatory the effort would end in catastrophe, for once the Mandatory was overthrown they would be left alone to face the Arabs, which at that time would have been disastrous. Thus they followed a course of moderation which dictated cooperation with the Mandatory and defense against the Arabs.[19] The reaction to the policy of restraint exercised by leaders of the Yishuv was the formation of another camp, not as politically powerful, represented by members of the younger generation, especially those born in Palestine, who advocated active resistance (*maavak*).[20] These young rebels were found in the Haganah, in the kibbutz movement, within the Socialist-Zionist youth movement, and within Jabotinsky's youth movement.

For the Yishuv, the Arab revolt worked as a catalyst. The advocates of a permanent defense organization now had more of a case to convince the Yishuv's highest authorities and the leaders of the World Zionist Organization of the need for a Jewish army, independent of the Mandatory and ready to meet the Arab challenge. While conditions favored the development of a strong Jewish defense force, they left the Arab community impotent and unprepared to meet the double challenge it had set for itself, the ouster of the British and the surrender of the Jewish community in Palestine.

The fruits of a policy of restraint eventually matured. But the policy created a division within the Haganah. The first break with the official policy came when a militant group, called Haganah B, was formed in the early 1930's. Its leadership did not want to support any political party, but could not maintain a neutral position in such politically explosive matters. Its leaders were inclined toward Jabotinsky's Revisionist Zionist party (a militant splinter of the World Zionist Organization formed in 1925). After a series of schisms and splits, Haganah B and Jabotinsky's youth movement united into a terrorist organization called the Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military Organization—NMO), led by David Raziel.[21] By 1940 an independent

[19] Even the militant Jabotinsky was at that time willing to accept some *modus vivendi* with the Mandatory and supported restraint.

[20] Bauer, *Diplomacy and Underground*, 95-105.

[21] Dinour and others, Vol. II, Part I (Tel-Aviv 1959), 574, 585, Vol. II, Part II

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Revisionist and the leader of Jabotinsky's youth movement, the poet-intellectual Avraham Stern, took over the NMO. Under his leadership the organization adopted the doctrine of total military struggle with the Mandatory.[22] Within the House of Labor, the advocates of an independent Jewish military force came from the Palestinian-born members of socialist youth movements. Here the United Kibbutz movement (Ha-Kibbutz ha-Meuchad), which had been formed in 1927, played a key role. It gave protection, guided, and supported the advocates of resistance, who were to become the next generation of Haganah leaders and the elite of the Israel Defense Forces.

If the years 1937-1939 in Palestine formed a period of incubation for Jewish efforts to create an independent Jewish military force, the year 1939 brought to an end the policy of limited cooperation between the Haganah and the Mandatory. The White Paper issued by the Mandatory in the middle of 1939 seemed to go a long way toward recognizing the basic claims of Arab nationalists. This was the end of active cooperation between the Jewish community and the Mandatory, and the Colonial Office turned openly against the Jewish community's military preparedness. This trend, like most policies of that fateful year, lasted only until the British-French declaration of war against Germany on September 1, 1939. On September 3, 1939, President Chaim Weizmann announced the support of the Jewish people of Palestine for the war effort.[23] This move opened another fruitful era for the Jewish defense forces. Ben Gurion and the Jewish Agency called upon Jews to enlist in the British army, and eventually more than 30,000 volunteered to serve with the Allied forces. The United Kibbutz movement and its rebel leadership, however, were concerned lest the Arabs take advantage of the war to improve their position in Palestine. General Yigal Allon argued: "A force protecting the Jewish community in Palestine is necessary. The Jewish community's best men are fighting on a variety of fronts far from home, and protection of the Yishuv may not be forthcoming since the Mandatory has not relinquished its White Paper policy."[24]

(Tel-Aviv 1964), 1053-72; David Niv, *Battle for Freedom*, in Hebrew, Vol. II (Tel-Aviv 1965), 74-119, Vol. III (Tel-Aviv 1967), 43-52, 161-82.

[22] On Stern and the National Military Organization, see Menachem Begin, *The Revolt* (New York 1954); Niv, *Battle for Freedom*; Ya'aqov Banai, *Unknown Soldiers*, in Hebrew (Tel-Aviv 1958); Nathan Friedman-Yellin and Israel Eldad, eds., *The History of Lehi*, 2 vols., in Hebrew (Tel-Aviv 1962).

[23] See also Bauer, *Diplomacy and Underground*, 265-83. Only Stern's group refused to join in the declaration of war. In fact, they tried to make contact with the Axis powers, according to former Stern leader Friedman-Yellin, in an interview in 1965.

[24] "Deeds and Determination," in Zrubavel Gilad, ed., *The Book of the Palmach*, in Hebrew (Tel-Aviv 1955), Vol. I, 248-49.

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In May 1941, the Haganah created a commando force, the Palmach.[25] This new group, which was dominated by the United Kibbutz movement,[26] set for itself the task proclaimed by Allon: the formation of an independent Jewish military force.[27] The Palmach was the first full-time, professional, elite military unit of the Haganah, which, except for its General Staff, had been composed of part-time volunteers. The importance of the Palmach as the intellectual and organizational training ground for the future elite of the Israeli army can be seen in the later careers of its members.[28]

The war years, especially 1941-1945, transformed the Haganah from a decentralized, voluntary, and part-time organization into a structure with a permanent headquarters, a general staff headed by a chief of staff, centers for officer training, an organized clandestine supply and purchasing operation (Rechesh), a far-flung and efficient network for gathering intelligence and information (Shay), an organization for clandestine immigration (Ha-Apala),[29] and, of course, the Palmach.[30]

II. The Formation of the Israeli Army[31]

THE FRAMEWORK OF ZAHAL

The single most important development in civil-military relations

[25] For the historical development of the Palmach, see, in addition to *The Book of the Palmach*, Zrubavel Gilad, ed., *Hidden Shield: The Secret Military Effort of the Yishuv During the War, 1939-1945*, in Hebrew (Jerusalem 1952), 14-20, 74-166.

[26] In 1942, forty-one percent of the Palmach were from the United Kibbutz, which particularly dominated the Palmach headquarters: the commander, his deputy, and the entire General Staff except for two officers all came from the United Kibbutz movement. Out of the twenty-eight Palmach bases, seventeen belonged to the movement. See Bauer, *Diplomacy and Underground*, 160-61, 260-64.

[27] The first program for training an officer corps for the Haganah had actually been the special night squads organized and led by the British officer Captain Orde Wingate. Wingate, an adventurer of the same stripe as "Chinese" Gordon and Lawrence of Arabia, conceived of himself as something of a modern Gideon. Although serving the Mandatory, he urged the case for a Jewish army under Zionist leadership. After great hesitation, some official of the Mandatory accepted the idea. Wingate met with Haganah intelligence officers and proposed the formation of the night squads, whose function would be to train Palestinian youth to destroy centers of Arab terrorism and to create the nucleus of a future Israeli army. His recruits came chiefly from the agrarian collectives.

[28] Of the twelve brigadier generals on the General Staff during the War of Liberation, three were from the Palmach: Allon, Ratner, and Sadeh. Out of some forty-five colonels of that period, twenty were Palmach officers. More than forty percent of the majors and lieutenant colonels were Palmach officers. Since 1948, three Palmach generals have become Chief of Staff: Moshe Dayan, Yitzhak Rabin, and Chaim Barlev. Eleven of the eighteen General Staff officers in the 1967 campaign were former Palmach officers, as were the three key front commanders: Generals Narkiss, Gavish, and Elazar.

[29] The Ha-Apala was to grow into a large-scale network illegally bringing shiploads of immigrants to Palestine between 1945 and 1948.

[30] The Palmach grew from about 900 members in 1942 to over 2,000 by 1945.

[31] Many of the materials offered here which deal with the Israeli army since its

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in the new state of Israel was Ben Gurion's takeover of the defense structure. "With the end of the Second World War," writes Ben Gurion, "it became clear to us that Britain would not and could not uphold the mandate, and that it could not participate in the creation of a Jewish state, even in that part of the country allotted to the Yishuv under partition."[32] This meant that political solutions to the Palestine problem were to go hand in hand with military preparedness and that, to create a unified military command, Ben Gurion found it necessary to bring all military structures under the direction of one political headquarters, the Jewish Agency for Palestine. The years 1945-1947, preceding the establishment of the state of Israel, were thus crucial for the future of the armed forces and their role in the campaign for independence. The Haganah headquarters was assailed by an intensified conflict over the destiny of the military structures and their relationships to society and politics. While some Palmach leaders foresaw the Palmach as the cadres that would produce Israel's people's army, the NMO advocated the formation of independent military and terrorist organizations to end British rule in Palestine.

Left-wing Socialist-Zionists and right-wing Revisionist Zionists clashed at this time, with the aid of the military structures at their disposal. The United Kibbutz movement, which controlled the Palmach General Staff, considered the struggle against the Mandatory imperative. However, despite its militant and ideological inclinations, the Palmach demonstrated an unusual discipline by accepting the leadership of the Haganah and the Yishuv as final arbiters of the policy toward the Mandatory.[33] But it relentlessly opposed the partition of Palestine, cooperation with the Mandatory, and, above all, cooperation with British Intelligence in its campaign to annihilate the "terrorist organizations."[34]

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formation in 1948 are of a nondocumentary nature. Two important factors have hampered research: first, the unavailability of documents deposited with the Ministry of Defense and still sealed from researchers, as mentioned earlier (fn. 8); second, David Ben Gurion. This political figure was the central architect of Israel's defense and army policy from 1947 to 1963. Neither he nor his biographers have revealed the innermost decision-making processes and factors in important defense issues. The key, of course, is Ben Gurion himself, not his biographers. He has written a great deal on these issues in the press and in Mapai, Haganah, and Ministry journals and publications and has issued public statements as well. Yet he has not attempted a fully detailed account of factors and motives affecting important security decisions. Most of Ben Gurion's explanations have been offered during controversy and under pressure, which has produced fragmentary, inaccurate, cloudy statements that have often been misconstrued. Ben Gurion's own archives at Sdeh-Boker are available only with his permission.

[32] *In the Battle*, Vol. V, 135-37. [33] Bauer, *Diplomacy and Underground*, 260-63.

[34] The Jewish Agency and the majority of the HOL leaders—among them David

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Ben Gurion had by then come to believe that in the struggle for statehood, which meant struggle against the White Paper policy and against Arab political opposition, the role of the military would be decisive. The army would become the "mailed fist" of the Jewish state. Thus, by October 1947, a month before the United Nations proposed a partition of Palestine that the Arabs rejected, Ben Gurion was ready with an armed Jewish force.

On May 15, 1948, when the mandate expired, the Jewish forces met the invading forces of five Arab states. The Palmach, numbering just over 4,000 men (including reserves), absorbed the first Arab offensive in northern Galilee and in Jerusalem. Palmach units participated on all fronts (it had three battalions in Galilee and three in Jerusalem) and led the major counteroffensive of the liberation campaign, which began in the south in late June 1948. The forces on the southern front were led by Palmach's chief, General Allon, and the main thrust of the Negev campaign, which repulsed the Egyptian army (the largest organized Arab force), was made almost entirely by Palmach divisions. By January 1949, the Palmach was in Egyptian territory, and in March the new Israel Defense Forces, led by the Palmach, conquered the southernmost tip of Palestine and the port of Eilat. By that time, the political struggle for control of the army had become inevitable.

Already, in late June of 1948, Ben Gurion had ordered a Palmach battalion stationed in Tev-Aviv to destroy the "Altalena," a ship commanded by the NMO, which was attempting to distribute arms to its independent troops waiting on the shores of Natanya on the Mediterranean coast between Haifa and Tel-Aviv.[35] After this showdown, the NMO was dissolved. Further, after taking steps to bring military policy under the control of a unified political leadership, on October 29, 1948, the Chief of Staff, General Ya'aqov Dori, had issued an order that Palmach headquarters also be dissolved and that General Allon serve only as commander of the southern front.

Ben Gurion and Moshe Sharett, the leaders of Mapai—felt that NMO-Stern terrorism endangered the chances of Jewish statehood and independence. The Haganah established a special force to combat the "terrorists," with the help of the Mandatory.

[35] Had an internal war occurred—and the "Altalena" affair could have turned into one—it would have curtailed the immense defense effort necessary to win against the Arabs. Menachem Begin, facing some opposition from other NMO leaders, played a key role in bringing about the NMO's acceptance of the national authority of the Jewish Agency. Recent literature modifies the actual threat presented by the "Altalena." See Eliahu Lankin, *The Story of the "Altalena,"* in Hebrew (Tel-Aviv 1967). General Yigael Yadin considers the fall of the Old City of Jerusalem and other military failures to have been caused by independent NMO activities in 1948 in Jerusalem. See the "War of Liberation" interview in *Ma-Ariv*, May 14, 1967, 9-11.

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The framework for the transformation of voluntary military forces into compulsory military structures was set by Ben Gurion during the debate on the Defense Service Bill in the first Knesset (parliament) in 1949 after his successful nationalization of Zahal.[36] He proposed that the army should be small and professional, with a large reserve system, and that it should adopt the most recent scientific and technological innovations, inculcate the spirit of the Haganah and the Palmach in the new conscripts, act as a citizen-maker and aid in the integration and Israelization of the new immigrants, pay close attention to agriculture and participate in agricultural settlement efforts, serve as a model of fraternity, and associate itself with the youth movement. In short, a nation-in-arms must mobilize the public to civic action. These functions of Zahal were conceived after much heated debate in the Knesset and within Zahal's high command. Only when General Dayan assumed the post of Chief of Staff in November 1953 did Zahal combine the traditions of the Haganah and Palmach with the demands of a highly professional force.

FORMALIZATION, PROFESSIONALIZATION, AND DEPOLITICIZATION

The Haganah, as one of the major Jewish national institutions in Palestine, reflected the patterns of a community that was politically very active but, because of the conditions of the mandate, had no formal state structure to formalize practices (although formal Jewish national institutions—such as the National Committee, the Jewish Agency, and the World Zionist Organization—did exist). The most significant change in political institutions and practices in the new state was the growing formalization and bureaucratization: voluntary civil action gave way to formal compulsory units.[37]

The formalization and professionalization of the Israeli army reflect the fact that the practices, institutions, and behavior of this colonizing political community were being transformed into a formal political system. The creation of Zahal out of the Haganah illustrates this basic change that turned a colonizing movement and a society of social mission—predominantly maintained within primary, nonformalized groups—into formal bureaucratic structures.[38]

[36] Debate on the Defense Service Bill of 1949 in *Divrey Ha-Knesset*, in Hebrew, Parliamentary Debates, 68th Meeting, August 15, 1949, 1336-41.

[37] See S. N. Eisenstadt, "Israel," in Harold M. Rose, ed., *The Institutions of Advanced Societies* (Minneapolis 1958), 417-30.

[38] We are indebted to Eliezer Rosenstein for some of these ideas. See his "Social Change in the Israeli Society," Department of Sociology, University of California, Berkeley (1965), 3. See also Eisenstadt, 422.

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Ben Gurion's efforts as Defense Minister to nationalize the army, i.e., to dissolve and remove the political and ideological aspects inherited by Zahal from the Haganah, Palmach, and NMO, ran into formidable opposition. Even those officers who favored depoliticization of the army were reluctant to abandon the Haganah and Palmach legacy. A group of Palmach officers, including their most prominent officer and former commander, Yigal Allon, resigned from the army as soon as the armistice with the Arabs was concluded in Rhodes in 1949. These officers on the whole advocated the formation of a people's army, and many argued that the professionalization of the army and the "isolation" of its officer corps would undermine the pioneer egalitarian spirit of the kibbutz and, further, that it could also undermine the commitment to service of Israeli society. On the whole, this group advocated political functions for the army and especially for its officer corps. But Ben Gurion and some senior officers strongly believed that the army's major task (although not its only one) was on the battlefield and that, as in other democratic societies, its main function was to serve as a combat unit in time of war. Thus, in their view, a small but highly professional army was desirable.[39] The military was to be limited to its essential function—protecting the state from external aggression and war.

And yet, the process of formalization in the army after the integration of the Palmach-NMO into Zahal could not proceed without the legacy of the past. The tasks of modernization, rapid integration of mass immigration, and functional proliferation imposed upon Zahal a new role—the maker of citizens, the inculcator of virtue and nationalist culture into rapidly changing social and economic structures. Here the tradition of the Haganah and Palmach again became of great service—not as a component for the accumulation of political, social, and economic power, but as an instrument of the state in advancing the aims of national integration, political mobilization, and economic modernization, by means of the army.

III. Role-Expansion of Zahal

The army's involvement in extramilitary functions—those going beyond immediate professional duties connected with warfare—is crucial in determining the nature of civil-military relations. In the developing states, breakdowns in modernization, uneven rates of social and political mobilization, and inadequate integration often have

[39] Debate on Defense Service Bill, 1338.

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created situations in which the army intervenes to become active in management tasks, direct economic enterprises, run state farms and schools, and assume other duties. In such situations, the army intervenes because other elites are absent, impotent, or indifferent; it improvises and expands its role to carry the burden created by a modernization crisis.[40] In Israel, however, there has been *no* such modernization crisis. The modernizing elites have been able to perform the mobilization and integration tasks; thus the army has only filled in the gaps, while other national organizations have carried the major share of the burden. Nevertheless, the army's role-expansion has had significant consequences.

In briefly identifying the areas of the army's extramilitary functions and analyzing their political consequences, we shall distinguish two types of role-expansion: (1) role-expansion whose political consequences do not significantly affect the civil-military relationship—for example, in the areas of education and career orientation; and (2) role-expansion whose political consequences are potential constraints on civil-military relations—the influence of Zahal's high command in foreign affairs and security policy, for example, is affected by the ideology of Zahal, as well as by the relationship between Zahal and the Defense Ministry, a relationship that provided the background for the Lavon affair, which we shall discuss later.

ROLE-EXPANSION WITH POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTING CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

The weekly journal of Zahal, *Bamachane*, once expressed the motive of role-expansion in this way: "The involvement of Zahal in activities that are not purely military is no function of any particular ideology. It is not the desire on the part of Zahal to be an innovator, but a condition of Israeli reality. The circumstances surrounding Israel demand a *pioneer army*—not an army bound by routine military functions but an army fulfilling nation-building functions. The army in a nation committed to gathering in the immigrants must participate in this effort."[41]

1. *Education.* The Israeli army has been constantly concerned with raising the educational standards of its officers and enlisted men. Immigration has changed the social and educational structure of the army.

[40] See Moshe Lissak, "Modernization and Role-Expansion of the Military in Developing Countries: A Comparative Analysis," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, IX (April 1967), 233-35.

[41] *Bamachane*, February 15, 1951, 16.

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The level of education, and especially that of the officers, is a continuing matter of great concern. To close the educational gap within the officers' groups and between officers and conscripts, Zahal has established special schools and courses to teach Hebrew to newcomers. Here the role of the women in the army first became prominent. The army thus has moved into educational areas that the civilian authorities had neglected in geographically remote territories and among the lower classes. Special attention also has been given by the army to the educationally deprived, the school dropouts, and the "late bloomers": a special army educational center, Camp Marcus on Mount Carmel, was established in 1948 and trained 4,830 soldiers between 1948 and 1950.[42] The drive to eliminate illiteracy in the army began in 1955. Elementary education—compulsory in Israel—was provided for 6,500 soldiers in 1966.[43]

The most controversial educational effort of Zahal was the proposal, in 1952, for military specialization complementing the existing humanistic, scientific, and agricultural specialization in the high schools. This effort was to be accompanied by the formation of a military academy connected with one of Israel's foremost high schools, the Reali Gymnasium in Haifa.

The supporters of this proposal, led by General Yadin—then Chief of Staff—argued that the function of Israeli high schools was to train not only future scientists but also officers, that lifting the educational standards of officers was, in fact, a proper task of the civil authority.[44] The antagonists, especially those in the kibbutz movement as well as senior high school teachers, argued that such a system would create an army elite, a special officer class, and that this was contrary to the ideals of Israel. The controversy was resolved by a compromise: the proposal for a military specialization in high school was dropped, while the academy was established, but in conjunction with the Reali Gymnasium so that the future cadets could mix with the civilians.

2. *Nahal.* Another special army unit, Nahal (Fighting Pioneer Youth), was created during the War of Liberation in 1948 and involved Zahal in agricultural settlement work. Many Nahal leaders were former Palmach members who continued the legacy of farmer-soldiers working in border kibbutzim while serving in the army. Some kibbutzim are Nahal creations (Nahal-Oz, Almagor, and others). After brief but intensive military training, Nahal groups are assigned

[42] *Ibid.*, July 20, 1950, 7-8.
[43] *Ibid.*, October 29, 1966, 10.
[44] For the views of General Yadin and others on the controversy, see *Bamachane*, February 28, 1952, 3, 16. Also see especially the issues of *Ha-Aretz* for this period.

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to agricultural settlements (usually at the most sensitive spots on the Syrian or Egyptian borders). Nahal also conducts special courses for agricultural instructors who will assume leadership positions in new immigrants' settlements.[45]

In this program, the army, true to its Haganah-Palmach heritage, has assumed the task of building a nationalist ideology. The vision of the army as a citizen's academy, the inculcator of virtue, has been put by Ben Gurion in this way: "The primary function of Zahal has been to safeguard the state. This, however, is not its sole function. The army must also serve as an educational and pioneering nucleus for Israeli youth—for both the native-born and the newcomer. It is the duty of the army to educate a pioneer generation, healthy in body and spirit, courageous and loyal, which will weld together the exiles and disparate elements and prepare them to fulfil, through self-realization, the historic tasks of the State of Israel."[46]

3. *Career orientations.* Zahal has established special technical schools and courses connected with industry, designed to create a technologically skilled cadre to aid industrialization processes. The army also has a special office (in connection with the Defense Ministry) for career development after service and for occupational placement of skilled servicemen and officers. This office facilitates the absorption of army veterans into civilian society. In 1966 the Air Force opened the Air Force Technical High School in Haifa. The Air Force had been training technicians and laboratory men since its formation in 1948, but the opening of its own school attracted volunteers and guaranteed them a career after their service.

The expansion of the military to include education and career orientation has maintained the legacy of the Haganah and Palmach, but without the political intensity that encouraged nonbureaucratic practices prevalent in the pre-independence political system. This type of role-expansion, however, has enhanced the effectiveness of the army elite as a pressure group, in the same way that it would enhance that of civilian elites. These changes in the structure and the activities of the army elite in Israel have effected a remarkable change in its ideology. No longer does this elite entertain the political expectations

[45] *Bamachane*, May 5, 1955. In 1966, Nahal organized its first industrial cadre to work in the newly built Negev city, Arad. On the relations between the army and the youth movements, see Etzioni, 6-7. Zionist movements often began as youth movements in the Diaspora. In Palestine both Socialist-Zionists and Revisionist Zionists established elaborate youth movements. These youth movements served as reservoirs for Palmach and NMO recruits.

[46] "The Structure and Ways of Zahal," in Ben Gurion, *Vision and Ways*, in Hebrew (Tel-Aviv 1951), Vol. I, 306. See also Debate on Defense Service Bill.

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of the Palmach or the NMO. It acts as one elite among others—an elite whose organizational abilities have been recruited for nation-building, economic modernization, and national integration.

ROLE-EXPANSION WITH POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES CONSTRAINING CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

One of Ben Gurion's most remarkable achievements, and possibly one of his greatest contributions to the formation of a stable Israeli polity, was the nationalization of the army. Here he brought to an end the rivalry of the feuding paramilitary and semimilitary cliques that were interfering in the making of a responsible, unified Zahal.

However, in his monumental effort to nationalize Zahal, and by virtue of his charismatic and dominating personality, Ben Gurion also weakened the political institutions and procedures, well established before 1948, which were responsible for defense policies. While the Defense Ministry was in an embryonic stage, Ben Gurion spared no effort to establish himself as a powerful Defense Minister. This power gave him a freer hand to purge the army of men, practices, and cliques that stood in the way of creating a new officer corps. To establish his position of power, he frequently failed to inform party leaders and the cabinet on matters of defense and military policy—or he overruled their decisions. Key defense functions were allocated by him and placed under his direct supervision and command. This institutionalization of defense functions by one person, reigning from 1947 to 1963, left its stamp upon the Ministry and upon Zahal's high command.

1. *The nationalist ideology of Zahal.* Nationalization produced within the army its own nationalist ideology. This is not to argue that Zahal developed an *independent* nationalist ideology separate from Zionism, but that the elite of Zahal, especially the high command during Ben Gurion's term as Defense Minister, selected *aspects* of the nationalist ideology and identified them in contexts differentiated from those in other formal and informal political institutions and structures in Israel. Dedication to its ideology has received highest priority in Zahal and has strengthened its elite, which is now seen as the heir of the pioneer Zionists.

It is true that in any garrison state whose national safety is constantly threatened, a dynamic and victorious army has an ideological momentum and identification of its own. Our aim, however, is to identify the specific nationalist ideology of Zahal (reflected also in its role-expansion efforts) which emerged immediately after the army's

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nationalization and formalization. We shall forgo an analysis of the bureaucratic and professional ideology of Zahal—after all, that was the purpose of formalization. We shall instead identify and discuss the cases in which the high command, convinced of its exceptional role in the implementation of the nationalist ideology and guided and encouraged by David Ben Gurion, has exerted pressure on the persisting civilian domination over the military, especially in the realm of foreign relations and defense. The two men who, more than any others, have shaped Zahal and its ideology are David Ben Gurion, Israel's first Prime Minister and Defense Minister, and his disciple, General Moshe Dayan, Chief of Staff from 1953 to 1958 and Defense Minister since the Aqaba crisis in June 1967. Although Ben Gurion's conception of Zahal was always in conformity with his efforts toward nationalization and formalization, this does not mean that he did not institute nonbureaucratic and personalistic practices of his own, as we shall show later.

Zahal's nationalist ideology has been closely tied to the development of the defense and foreign policies of Israel. Thus, intense political struggles over these policies have always been linked to the destiny of Zahal and to Israel's security. In the years 1948-1955, the protagonists in the formation of Zahal's nationalist ideology and Israel's defense and foreign policies were Ben Gurion and Zahal's high command. Zahal was assigned operational responsibility for many crucial policies, and therefore in its successful pursuit of its operational goals, Zahal could determine to a large extent the course of Israel's foreign relations.

In Israel, military power has been viewed as an important factor in the state's protection and modernization. While immigration and settlement systems were being firmly established, and while Zionist diplomacy sought to influence world public opinion, the Haganah was the mailed fist making Israel victorious in its struggle for independence. Ben Gurion's career was interwoven with the development of this complex of state-making activity. The 1948 War of Liberation was conducted on principles designed by him, and the Defense Ministry was patterned to fit his ideas and purposes. Ben Gurion's vision was of the nation, not of a class or interest group. He considered the House of Labor an instrument to strengthen the state, not particularist interests. He argued that the leadership of the HOL, trapped by its socialistic preconceptions, was stifling the processes of modernization so vital for the future of Israel. He also felt that Mapai, that complex and overinstitutionalized (he sometimes even termed it petrified) structure, had lost its former vision. Thus he was determined

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to turn the institutions of the new state—the government and especially Zahal—into carriers of the lost vision he sought to restore. Zahal, in contrast to the voluntary military institution of the pre-independence period, became one of the most prominent and prestigious compulsory institutions. The army, united and under civilian control, played a special role in Ben Gurion's vision of the future polity.

1*a. The theory of Arab encirclement.* The issues of war and peace and of policy toward the Arabs—from 1948 to the 1967 war—have commanded the highest priority in the ideology and practices of the political institutions of Israel and, above all, of its military. Thus activism and alertness have been pursued on behalf of defending the encircled state. Zahal has become identified with national security. National security has become defined by Arab encirclement. The theory of an Arab encirclement was prepared under Ben Gurion and has become the basis of a Zahal doctrine for the future survival of Israel.

Ben Gurion's position was that so long as Israel maintained military superiority (which he preferred to call military balance) over the combined forces of the Arab states, and so long as it could successfully preserve and rectify its borders by retaliatory raids, it would be safe. This defense posture was based on more than minimal considerations of national security; it was intended to permit flexible military maneuvering on the borders, so that any attack could be met on Arab territory. Retaliation was to establish peace through strength. Ben Gurion's position was soon adopted as Zahal's.

This concept of Arab-Israeli relations, according to Dayan, stems from the assumptions that (1) "the entire country is a frontier"; (2) the State of Israel "lives under a shadow of imminent destruction"; (3) the Arab policy of infiltration is "guerrilla warfare" against Israel; (4) the policy of Israel is to turn the armistice into peace; (5) the purpose of punitive military raids is to alert the great powers so that they will bring pressure on the Arabs for peace with Israel; and (5) meanwhile *only* Zahal can defend Israel's security.[47] This theory of Arab encirclement was transformed by Ben Gurion's disciple, Dayan, into the operational policy of Zahal, which, perfected by the organized raids between 1953 and 1956, culminated in the Sinai invasion of 1956.[48] It is this doctrine that moved Zahal to war on June 5, 1967, when Dayan became Defense Minister. It is this doctrine that now

[47] "Israel's Border and Security Problem," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXIII (January 1955), 250-63.

[48] An analysis of this period is found in Shimon Peres, *The Next Phase*, in Hebrew (Tel-Aviv 1965), esp. 9-15.

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dictates the stubborn position Israel has maintained since its decisive military victory in 1967.

The interrelationship between the theory of Arab encirclement, as developed by Ben Gurion and Dayan and accepted as doctrine by Zahal's high command, and the efficiency of the Israeli army ensures that military preparedness, if pursued vigorously, will have political consequences reaching far beyond immediate political goals. To illustrate this point, we turn to relations between the Minister of Defense, the Defense Ministry, and Zahal—the background for the Lavon affair.

1*b. The Defense Ministry and Zahal.* With the formation of Zahal, the Defense Ministry was cast in a role secondary to that of the army.[49] Zahal was the true heir of the Haganah, from which it inherited many functions and roles. The Ministry of Defense was relegated to the function of procurement. Zahal officers tended to regard the Ministry as a cluster of clerks and merchants.

While Zahal received the best of intellectual, organizational, and functional attention, the Ministry of Defense suffered from the absence of equal attention and thought. The Ministry in its early days was composed of such ranking politicians and technocrats as Levi Eshkol (its first Director General and now Prime Minister), Pinhas Sapir (its second Director General, now Minister of Finance), Israel Galeeli (First Deputy Minister of Defense, now Minister of Information), and Shaul Avigor (head of the Haganah). All these men left the Ministry after only a few years. Sapir left because of disagreement with Ben Gurion; Galeeli left for this same reason, as well as for other political reasons. It became apparent to ambitious politicians that the Ministry, thus shorn of its first-rank leadership, was under the full control of Ben Gurion. Ben Gurion, who claimed to have strengthened the civilian arm of defense, had actually, by his charisma as well as by his policies and his close personal associations with the senior officers, elevated the role of Zahal over that of the Ministry. Except for supreme political decisions, Ben Gurion left day-to-day direction of the army and the Ministry to their leaders. With the army Ben Gurion established a special type of relationship, and during Dayan's tenure of office (1953-1958), especially close relations developed between the Minister and Zahal senior officers who reflected the views of Ben Gurion and Dayan.

Officially, the army was responsible to the government of Israel—a coalition government composed of Mapai and the small socialist,

[49] Zeev Shiff, "Lack of Balance Between Zahal and the Ministry of Defense," *Ha-Aretz*, August 12, 1966, 3.

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religious, and liberal parties. In reality, however, neither Mapai nor Mapai ministers in the cabinet had very much influence over the army. The smaller parties in the coalition were hardly consulted on military matters. The Knesset's Committee on Defense and Foreign Affairs was a docile, *pro forma* group. Some influence from the outside was still wielded by the United Labor party, mostly because of its strong historical involvement with defense. Galeeli, as former Deputy Minister of Defense (1948-1950), Allon, and the Palmach commanders were consulted on defense matters, but beyond this their influence declined. The kibbutz movement still conducted defense seminars (organized by former Palmach officers) and offered criticism, but to little effect.

For practical purposes, then, the army remained under the jurisdiction of Ben Gurion, as Minister of Defense (after the initial purge of politically minded officers, especially Palmach commanders). Ben Gurion did not deal with such matters as professional training or the improvement of personnel and equipment; these he left to the bureaucracy. His control was exerted in two areas: (1) foreign policy and matters of war and peace; and (2) the appointment and promotion of top-level army officers.

As we have said, Ben Gurion saw Israel with its back to the sea, surrounded by hostile Arab governments. Matters of war and peace were decisive, and he saw that the army was in a position to determine the fate of the nation. All matters of foreign policy were thus brought into relation with the defense function. The defense function, however, was complex, as it had been since the pre-independence era, and to exercise control over it Ben Gurion decided to place himself in the role of supreme commander.

One of his efforts to make this role operational was to create an unofficial cabinet within his Defense Ministry. It was composed of a few personal advisers, one or two favorite cabinet members, Mapai's "army specialists," several senior civil servants, the army's Chief of Staff and Chief of Intelligence, and a few selected senior officers. This group met on an *ad hoc* basis, at Ben Gurion's request; its influence varied depending on circumstances and personalities, but its unwritten code was unswerving loyalty to Ben Gurion. It discussed not only military strategy and doctrine, but also foreign policy. This arrangement, emerging from political conditions of permanent crisis, engendered a controversial and still unresolved political issue, which we shall discuss in the next section.

Ben Gurion's other main effort was to keep the army from engaging

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in party politics. To make Zahal professionally effective, he assumed the power to approve all appointments and promotions, from Chief of Staff down to lieutenant colonel. A candidate for Chief of Staff was recommended by the *ad hoc* inner cabinet; the outgoing Chief of Staff also had considerable influence on the recommendation; and before making a final decision Ben Gurion usually consulted others of his chief informal advisers. In the recommendation of appointments and promotions of other senior officers, the Chief of Staff was the most influential member of the Ministry. For that office, Ben Gurion chose Dayan, a most loyal Ben Gurionite, dedicated to civilian control of the high command.[50] Ben Gurion's power of approval was particularly important because of his insistence that a citizens' army composed mainly of reserves must have a youthful professional leadership, and one in which rank could shift rapidly to allow the emergence of new talent.[51]

As this would suggest, promotions to levels beneath the high command were based mainly on merit, and on the whole a suitably apolitical and professional atmosphere was maintained. And yet, as we shall see, this political democracy surviving as a garrison state could not, despite Ben Gurion's efforts, prevent its powerful defense establishment from intervening in politics.

Under Dayan the powers and prestige of Zahal's Chief of Staff became far superior to those of the Director General of the Ministry. But this superiority was not only Ben Gurion's work. Nor was it caused by strong personalities in Zahal and weak ones in the Ministry. The differences between the Chief of Staff and the Ministry's Director were many. The army was the incubator of its elite. It had tradition and continuity. Although the turnover of the army elite was faster than that of the Ministry, the prestige, cohesion, and purpose of the army were superior to those of the Ministry, which was a newcomer that had not distinguished itself—nor had it been given the brilliant opportunities that Zahal was given in the War of Liberation in 1948, during the border raids of 1951-1956, in the victorious Sinai campaign of 1956, and in the triumphant campaign of June 1967.

Thus in this crucial period of transition from voluntary to com-

[50] This judgment of Dayan's views on civilian control is based on interviews with most members of Dayan's General Staff of the years 1953-1958; these interviews have convinced us of Dayan's clear understanding of the line between military and civilian responsibilities.

[51] Between 1948 and 1967, the army had seven chiefs of staff; all but two were less than forty years old when appointed. Among senior officers the mobility was similar, and the average ages proportionately low: 40-44 years old, for brigadier generals; 35-40, for colonels; and 30-35, for lieutenant colonels. These averages are as of 1966.

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pulsory political associations, Zahal practices and behavior toward the Ministry were established. The chiefs of staff of Zahal between 1950 and 1953 tended toward the aggrandizement of the army, firmly institutionalizing its practices and especially its Haganah legacy of role-expansion.[52] The directors general of the Ministry between 1948 and 1953 could not, on the whole, avert these tendencies. Nor did they demonstrate an effort to do so. Those politicians who tried, as Galeeli did, resigned. The prestige of Zahal and its elite was enormous while the "clerks and merchants" of the Ministry were viewed by Zahal as a necessary evil, "a second-rate bunch."

1*c*. *The Lavon affair*. The Lavon affair resulted from Ben Gurion's special treatment of the Defense Ministry. During his tenure, the division of power among the military, bureaucratic, and political structures remained largely undefined, although the preeminence of Zahal over the Ministry was tacitly understood. When, in November 1953, Pinhas Lavon took over from Ben Gurion as Defense Minister and attempted to transfer military policy-making from Zahal's high command to himself, he upset the unofficial balance Ben Gurion had established and stirred up a nest of hornets in the process.

The Lavon affair is chosen here as the most conspicuous representative series of events affecting civil-military relations in Israel.[53] But this affair also demonstrates an underlying restraint: the political rivalry between Defense Minister Lavon and Zahal's high command was resolved not within the military establishment but within the higher political order, the civil organization comprising the HOL, the cabinet, and the public. The affair, which rocked Israeli politics and aroused the most vigorous private and public criticism of Ben Gurion's and Zahal's defense ideology and policy, was in the end resolved by civilian authorities, the Mapai and Histadrut higher councils and the cabinet. The political struggles over the Lavon affair were fueled by other

[52] It is interesting to observe that three former chiefs of staff—Yadin, Makleff, and Laskov—while in office advocated the enlargement of Zahal's budget. Since their retirement, they have held no political office.

[53] For sources, see *Ha-Aretz*, June-September 1955 and June 1960-April 1961; *Ma-Ariv* and *Davar* (Tel-Aviv), the Histadrut-Mapai daily, of the same periods; Ben Gurion's statement in *Ha-Aretz*, January 13, 1961; and Lavon's Histadrut farewell speech, *Ha-Aretz* and *Davar*, February 5, 1961. Interviews with Lavon and his colleagues and with members of the Ministry of Defense who prefer to remain unnamed provided us with further material. Information from friends among senior Zahal reserve officers has also been used. See also three controversial volumes on the affair: Ben Gurion's apologetic *Things As They Are*, in Hebrew (Tel-Aviv 1965); Y. Arieli's *The Intrigue*, in Hebrew (Tel-Aviv 1965), written in defense of Lavon; and Hagi Eshed's article "The Affair," *Ha-Aretz*, February 19, 1965, written in defense of Ben Gurion. For a general description and analysis of the 1954 affair, see E. Hasin and D. Hurvitz, *The Affair* (Tel-Aviv 1961).

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longstanding disagreements on such matters as the dissolution of the Palmach, rivalries within the HOL, and earlier manipulations by Ben Gurion. The dynamics of nationalization and formalization posed a challenge to many of Israel's pioneer founders, who sought to infuse the ideology of pioneer Zionism into the institutions and practices of the state. From their institutional strongholds—Mapai and the kibbutz movements—they struggled for influence and position and opposed Ben Gurion's nationalization efforts with ideological protests against "bureaucratism," "the desertion of pioneer values," and "the betrayal of socialism." Zahal's formalization was seen by the Left as a victory of the statist ideology.

In the controversy over defense, Ben Gurion's position failed to trap him into a potentially damaging ideological campaign. In large part, this was because changes in Middle Eastern politics in the early 1950's gave unexpected strength to Ben Gurion's position. These changes included Nasser's assumption of full power in Egypt in 1954, after two controversial years; the acceptance of Western aid by Iraq and the conclusion of the Baghdad Pact in the same year; the increased flow of Western arms into Iraq; and the military support offered to Egypt in 1955 by the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. These events were enough to suggest that it was possible that the Arab states, led by Egypt, would mount a new assault against Israel. The moderates argued that such an attack was not probable, but nevertheless, the possibility of attack gave strength to the argument that the army should be used to ensure peace through the judicious use of force—which meant retaliation and increased readiness for war. The years 1954-1955 were therefore critical for Israel's defense and security systems. These were years of great personal and institutional changes in Zahal and in the Ministry, which took crucial political decisions determining Israel's defense posture for a decade.

In November 1953 Ben Gurion had resigned. On the seventh of December he had left for his newly adopted Negev kibbutz, Sdeh-Boker. To the position of Defense Minister he had appointed Pinhas Lavon, a man known as a brilliant Mapai-Histadrut theoretician and orator, but having little previous connection with defense matters. One day before his resignation, Ben Gurion had appointed General Dayan to become Zahal's Chief of Staff. At the time Lavon was named Defense Minister, Shimon Peres was appointed Director General of the Ministry. Thus Lavon was flanked by two "old defense hands." Moreover, Dayan was the most politically conscious of Zahal's commanders since 1949.

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Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett, the leader of the moderates in Mapai and of the small coalition parties that opposed the Defense Minister's border-raid tactics (arguing that the raids limited the flexibility of Israel's foreign policy), was appointed Prime Minister. Ben Gurion hoped that this trio could successfully isolate his opposition in the cabinet and carry the ideology based on Arab encirclement into operation. Thus a new era was launched. Each of the three, competent in his own realm, was also a strong personality and an ambitious politician. Each was jockeying for position.

At first both Dayan and Peres catered to Lavon, but soon they discovered that an alliance between them, a division of labor of their offices (probably inspired by Ben Gurion from Sdeh-Boker), and adherence to Ben Gurion's policy could isolate Lavon, whose daily interference in their offices they resented.

When he was in office, Ben Gurion had viewed with sympathy the actions of "his boys" and had given the Chief of Staff a virtually free hand in determining Zahal's actions. He had let the high command handle such questions as the rectification of borders, the pressure on Arab armies, and world public opinion (especially the West's) about Israel's border and security problems. Dayan and Zahal in turn had left the economic, supply, and financial matters to the Ministry.

In 1954, it appeared that the leadership of Zahal and of the Defense Ministry had finally reached a stage of effective cooperation, based on a common desire to isolate Lavon. Peres bowed to Dayan's primacy. While Dayan added to Zahal's prestige by the border-raids policy, Peres reorganized the Ministry and expanded it to meet the needs of rapid rearmament in preparation for the "second round" with the Arabs which culminated in the Sinai campaign. The cooperation of Dayan and Peres enhanced both Zahal and the Ministry at the expense of Lavon.

Pinhas Lavon, meanwhile, had not been a man behind the scenes. He was a strong and ambitious politician in his early fifties, a former leader of the Mapai youth movement, Gordonia, and prominent in the settlement movement and Histadrut. His appointment had been made by Ben Gurion, who saw in him a true defender of both his conception of Zahal's role and his defense policies. Lavon indeed began his tenure as a militant, but he faced great difficulties from the beginning.

In his desire to carry further the Ben Gurion activist policy and to outdo his former master, Lavon not only intensified the policy of retaliation but added a new dimension to activism. The chief tech-

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nician of the policy of retaliation, General Dayan, resented this newcomer's attitude toward the execution of what he considered to be purely army business. Dayan insisted on separation of the civil and military realms. Lavon persisted in pursuing Ben Gurion's vision of bringing military policy under the control of the Minister of Defense. Lavon also antagonized the loyalists by failing to "consult" Ben Gurion's experts on tactical matters and, in fact, interfered in military details. He thus encouraged—although he did not necessarily sponsor—the internal intrigues among civilians and officers of both the Ministry and Zahal. Lavon also meddled with military policy by demanding that army intelligence officers present for his inspection various sabotage files prepared by the army. Although most of these files had been prepared by army "experts" under Ben Gurion, now the experts were not only disregarded but, on behalf of a "new policy," supplanted. By thus intervening in the day-to-day affairs of the army, Lavon hoped to gain control over the Ministry, Zahal, and Ben Gurion's group.

The fifteen months of Ben Gurion's retirement (December 1954-February 1955) were thus characterized by a growing estrangement between Lavon and Zahal's high command. Further, the deep division in the cabinet concerning the course of defense and foreign policies, which had culminated in Ben Gurion's resignation, was now widened. The trio of Lavon, Dayan, and Peres accelerated Ben Gurion's militant policies, while Sharett and the cabinet opposed the policy of retaliation and border raids. Lavon made no attempt to share the functions of defense with the cabinet. His desire was to follow the pattern of Ben Gurion and act as the only authority in security matters. Here Lavon remained isolated both from the cabinet and from Zahal. Zahal's senior officers, to a man, were unswervingly loyal to Ben Gurion and Dayan. While Dayan, with the support of Peres, carried out a retaliation policy, Lavon could not count on Sharett's support or that of the cabinet since he was well known as a member of the "hawkish" clique. Pressing for direct and daily coordination between Zahal and the Ministry, Lavon further antagonized the Chief of Staff who threatened resignation.

Lavon's failure to ally himself with the army, his estrangement from the Ministry experts and bureaucrats (tacitly organized by Peres), and his lack of cabinet support forced him to more radical courses than he would have charted otherwise. When he did not resign, he became embroiled in security misfortunes, not of his own doing, which in the end cost him his career.

Sometime in 1954, a series of Israeli espionage and sabotage opera-

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tions in Arab countries (Egypt and Syria) collapsed, thus bringing an end to one of Israel's greatest spy rings in Egypt. This collapse has since been called the Fiasco (Ha-Esek ha-Bish). A secret *ad hoc* committee was appointed by Prime Minister Sharett to investigate the espionage debacle. This committee was established with the active support of Lavon. The tense relations between Lavon on one hand and Dayan and Peres on the other, growing out of the lack of coordination on the retaliatory policy, reached a new phase, this time concerning the Fiasco.

Lavon's independent investigations in preparation for the *ad hoc* committee hearings were resisted by the intelligence division of Zahal, whose efforts under the leadership of Colonel Benjamin Jibly, Chief of Army Intelligence, were devoted to saddling Lavon with the responsibility for the Fiasco. Some intelligence officers even forged documents and testified against Lavon, attempting to incriminate him before the committee. At the same time, Shimon Peres, in his own testimony before the committee, concentrated on Lavon's incompetence as Defense Minister. The hearing now turned from a challenge to the army intelligence division's competence into Lavon's trial. In the interest of preserving national unity and the good name of the Zahal officer corps, the committee reached no official conclusions and condemned no one, although it noted that some documents submitted were forged and that one of the intelligence officers had lied to the committee. The last straw for Lavon came when the Prime Minister refused to implement his plan for reorganizing the Ministry and was unwilling to fire Peres and the intelligence officers implicated in the Fiasco. Finally, Lavon resigned and on February 22, 1955, Ben Gurion returned as Defense Minister, while Sharett remained as Prime Minister. All this time, the Israeli public was unaware of the Fiasco, which was classified as top secret until 1960.

Late in the summer of 1960, Lavon approached Ben Gurion on the 1954 matter, claiming that he had gathered "fresh" information that would prove his innocence and requesting that Ben Gurion publicly exonerate him. Ben Gurion ordered his adjutant to investigate Lavon's new information and the veracity of the testimony of an unnamed intelligence officer. In September, Ben Gurion said that he was unwilling to reopen "the wounds of 1954," but offered to investigate the question of who gave the order for the "disastrous action" that year. He thus ordered the Chief of Staff, General Chaim Laskov, to investigate the charges against several intelligence officers. Ben Gurion initiated this new investigation without Lavon's knowledge or con-

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sent. Later, after public announcement of the appointment of Laskov's committee had been made, Lavon met Ben Gurion again; he repeated that in view of his "new findings" there was no need for another investigation, and he requested that the committee be dissolved and an announcement of his exoneration be made.

It now became evident that the issue was going beyond demands for personal exoneration. Both Ben Gurion and Lavon opposed trying to solve the issue of exoneration within the party. Lavon continued to demand a public announcement of his innocence from Ben Gurion. Ben Gurion claimed that he was not a judge or a prosecutor and said, "I have not implicated Lavon and it is not my duty to exonerate him; if somebody else implicated him, his rehabilitation is not within my authority." Now the Fiasco, the workings of the inner sanctum of the Defense Ministry, and Ben Gurion's system of political control all became topics of public discussion; the politics of defense, but not its ideology, became a national controversy.

On December 25, 1960, a cabinet committee that was also formed to investigate the Lavon affair submitted its report, which offered three basic opinions: (1) Lavon had not "given the order"—the sabotage action had been executed without his knowledge or authorization; (2) the committee could not determine what the exact working relations were in the Ministry of Defense in 1954; and (3) the committee accepted the Attorney General's report that certain documents presented before the 1954 committee were false.

The government accepted the cabinet report. No minister opposed acceptance, although some did not vote (Ben Gurion did not participate in the meeting; Dayan, the Minister of Agriculture, abstained). Ben Gurion announced that he would not accept the cabinet committee's opinion as binding on him and would accept only the decision of a judicial hearing.

Public concern now culminated in the formation of an Intellectuals' Committee, composed of Hebrew University professors in Jerusalem, led by Professor Jacob Talmon (author of *The Rise of Totalitarian Democracy*) and Nathan Rotenschtreich, a philosopher, Mapai intellectual, and Lavon's former colleague in the youth movement. This committee protested against public character assassination and against the "personality cult" prevailing in Israel, which, it said, posed "a growing and disturbing threat to the Israeli democracy." Professor Talmon wrote a two-page article in *Ha-Aretz* analyzing the affair and concluding with a call for "greater public moral responsibility."[54]

[54] March 18, 1961, 3-4.

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Ben Gurion threatened resignation, which could have thrown Mapai into new national elections only two years after the bitter campaign of 1959 in which it had lost more than five percent of its previous majority. A serious party split could bring an end to the unchallenged supremacy the party had held since 1935. As the ruling party, Mapai now concentrated on unifying itself and on preserving its domination of the coalition government and its control of the Histadrut.

For the first time since 1935, a major political realignment seemed possible. Nation-building processes, previously delegated to the Histadrut-Mapai combination, shifted, as they gained definition, away from the structures of the House of Labor into the structures of the bureaucracy and the departments of the new state. The struggle for power between the institutional leaders, who were the founders of the state and its ideology, and their most natural successors, the army elite and the modernizing corporate bureaucracy, gained momentum.

In this struggle involving the whole state apparatus and its power elite, especially Mapai, Lavon was doomed. It became clear to the Mapai elite that Lavon could cause the party to suffer heavy electoral losses and even to lose its control, should Ben Gurion resign. In this situation, Mapai's Executive Committee in the cabinet decided to act against Lavon and protect the party by pacifying Ben Gurion. On February 5, Mapai's Central Committee passed a resolution to remove Lavon from his position as Secretary General of the Histadrut. The vote was 159 for Lavon and 96 against, with 5 abstentions; Mapai's Executive Committee, acting on the advice of the Central Committee, mustered a 28-to-11 majority in support of Lavon's ouster. Lavon, now defeated, resigned.

Ben Gurion returned to the helm, but much bruised. In the famous "five thousand words" speech, he called Lavon's challenge "an open war against defense, a profane attack on the holy army of Israel." The speech ended with an admission of what had been the crucial issue, Mapai's maintenance of power: "The unity and purity of our party and the future of the state of Israel are interdependent. And I hope that you [members of Mapai] remember to keep the two always in your minds."[55]

IV. The Israeli Solution of the Civilian-Military Conflict

It would be pointless to pretend that Zahal's elite is in any simple sense a political group. It has no political aspirations as a group. But we

[55] *Ha-Aretz*, January 13, 1961, 1, 2, 6, and 12.

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hope to have marshalled enough evidence to have demonstrated that in defense and foreign affairs, Zahal's elite wields an enormous influence. The very fact of this influence is dictated by Israel's situation as a garrison state, struggling for its physical survival for the last two decades in a fiercely hostile environment; it is due as well to Ben Gurion's legacy of dominating defense and the army. Now, it may be tempting to advance the argument a step further and contend that at times, especially during General Dayan's tenure as Chief of Staff, Zahal's elite has attempted to dominate Israel's foreign and defense policies. But the real truth of the matter lies in precisely the opposite direction: Ben Gurion, as Defense Minister, chose his chief aides from among those he could count on as devotees of his own conception of Israel's defense posture. He especially chose those he could trust to operationalize his security concepts successfully. Also this very Defense Minister did not hestitate to "retire" before their time some of Israel's most capable senior officers, including three chiefs of staff—Yadin, Makleff, and Laskov—when they sought greater independence for the military in security matters.[56]

General Dayan certainly proved to be one of Israel's most loyal officers—which is to say, most dedicated to his civilian chief. And now, surely no one intimately acquainted with the policies of Zahal will propose that General Rabin or his successor would remain long in his position if he manifested any serious opposition to Dayan in his new civilian role as Defense Minister. To argue that Dayan represents the so-called "military clique" is no more true than to claim that Ben Gurion or Eshkol—or Eisenhower, as President of the United States—represents the same; the "hard line" of Ben Gurion and Dayan does not reflect the will of any behind-the-scenes defense establishment, but rather the realities of Israel's predicament as a garrison state, as well as the sentiment of the Israeli electorate.[57] An awareness

[56] On the average, the tenure of Zahal's chiefs of staff has been three to five years. Yadin resigned after two years, Makleff after one year, and Laskov just when his third year of tenure had expired.

[57] Our investigation into the reign of Eshkol as Defense Minister (1963-1967) leads us to conclude that, in fact, Zahal was aggrandized considerably during his regime. The high command secured the best and most expensive weapons in Zahal's history. Even allowing for general weapons development and the Egyptian military buildup, it is clear that Eshkol complied with most budgetary requests of his chiefs of staff. On the other hand, when Ben Gurion served as Defense Minister, he encountered opposition from the then Finance Minister, Eshkol, when requesting higher budgets for Zahal. Moreover, Dayan recently admitted to some members of the high command that he intends to cut the "lavish" expenditures on defense.

It is also well known that Ben Gurion opposed the 1967 war, fearing Russian intervention and Israel's political isolation. Eshkol, on the other hand, who openly admits that he is no military expert, in the end supported the war, accepting the

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of these distinctions, coupled with all the varied evidence we have brought forward in the course of this article, leaves no grounds for the argument that Zahal's elite seeks domination of the government or that the army dictates the political, economic, and social destiny of Israel, as is the case in numerous new countries. For Zahal to be able to distribute political offices and welfare, it would have to have achieved the following: the formulation and promotion of an alternative to the national ideology; domination over economic policies; control of the process of modernization; demonstration of its legitimacy through some type of an autonomous political organization.

Typically, in new nations, the army moves to power because it has lost its confidence in the "corrupt politicians." That is, of course, conspicuously not the case in Israel, where Zahal's high command and officer corps are loyal to civilian authorities. We know of no instance in which Zahal's elite has demonstrated lack of confidence in the Israeli political system, although as bureaucrats and citizens, Zahal officers may doubt the political vision of some of Israel's civilian leaders. The power of those who have control over Israel's army does not derive from that control, but rather from their dominant positions in the HOL and Mapai. Thus, despite Ben Gurion's extraordinary influence over Zahal, when he formed the splinter Rafi party in 1965 he lost control over defense and the army. Levi Eshkol, as incoming Defense Minister, assumed full and *firm* control over Zahal, even though some officers' private opinions of his capabilities as Defense Minister were not high. General Dayan was appointed Defense Minister in the crisis of June 1967 not because he had control over Zahal but because of the wishes of Israel's electorate.

Any contest between military and civilian authorities thus has been resolved in favor of the civilian. In fact, conflict clearly has not been based on a civilian-military rivalry for political supremacy. The underlying factors in the rivalry have been a consequence of the asymmetry between voluntary and compulsory institutions, structures, practices, and procedures in Israel's political transformation.

The conflict between civilian and military groups in the case of the Lavon affair was waged first within the cabinet and the inner councils of the HOL and Mapai. Only after 1960 did the public become active. Yet even after it became a public issue, the Lavon controversy was resolved within the HOL, Mapai, and the civil government. The Lavon affair changed the nature of Mapai's coalition structure, giving

judgment of the army's chief intelligence officer that the Soviets would not directly help the Egyptians.

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weight to new groups, but it did not enhance Zahal's power over that of the party or the government.

Formalization and bureaucratization have brought along changes in structure and activities of elites and in the formation of nonpolitical elites, a rare phenomenon in the pre-independence era.[58] Zahal is such a group. The political consciousness of Zahal junior officers is rather low. The whole spectrum of ideological intensification and pressure has diminished and in some areas has been eliminated. We would venture the hypothesis that the political consciousness and ideological inclinations of Israel's junior officers (with the exception of those who come from the left-oriented kibbutzim) are much lower than those of civil servants, legislators, and students.[59]

The political ambitions of the senior officers are also restricted. Only a few senior army officers have joined a political party (in fact, most of those who have joined were affiliated with a party before Zahal was established) or have become active political figures, manipulating their war exploits and their charismatic appeal. Among these few are Generals Dayan, Allon, and Carmel (the Minister of Transportation).

Zahal's elite veterans do play a key role in the industrial and bureaucratic complex in Israel. Many have become prominent in the Israeli civil service, especially in the foreign service, and have important positions in Israel's foreign aid system in Africa and Latin America. This "smooth" integration of the Zahal elite is crucial for civilian-military relations in Israel. On the whole, because of the diverse needs of the Israeli economic and bureaucratic structures, the absorptive capacity of the society has been adequate and the integration of Zahal veterans has been satisfactory.[60]

Israel, in contrast to the other states in the Middle East—and, in fact, to most newly emergent countries—is not a praetorian state.[61] A

[58] Eisenstadt, 427-29.

[59] We are now designing a study of the political ideology of the Israeli army officers. See also Alan Arian, "Ideological Change in Israel: A Study of Legislators, Civil Servants, and University Students," unpubl. diss., Michigan State University, 1965.

[60] We have initiated a further study of the absorptive and integrative capabilities of the Israeli economy and bureaucracy as they relate to Zahal's elite. This study of the absorption of Zahal veterans of all ranks, but especially of noncommissioned officers, indicates successful efforts to integrate the trainees of military technical schools. Zahal's armored divisions prepare technicians so they later can be integrated into private or public industry. In particular, the large-scale armament, air, and electronic industries under the control of the Ministry of Defense absorb skilled Zahal veterans. The Atomic Energy Commission, also under the Ministry's supervision, is engaged in programs of integrating Zahal's skilled technicians into Israel's atomic industries and firms.

[61] Amos Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations," Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley (1967).

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praetorian state is one in which the political system favors the development of the army as a core group and as a ruling group; a state in which political leadership (as distinguished from bureaucratic, administrative, and managerial leadership) performs the most crucial political functions and is mainly recruited from the army; a state, in short, in which the army serves as a reservoir for recruitment to political leadership.

Among the political conditions contributing to praetorianism are these:

1. An ineffective and army-sustained civic culture. In Israel, the civic culture has been long established, and the persistence of the civilian over the military has been successfully pursued both before and after independence. Civilian supremacy has not been challenged since 1948—despite twenty years of security and border tensions, constant military preparedness, and three major wars.

2. A low level of political institutionalization and a lack of sustained support for political structures.[62] Israel is one of the most politically complex and institutionally well-established of the developing or newly developed states, demonstrating a high level of political institutionalization and sustained support.

3. Weak and ineffective political parties. In Israel, highly cohesive stratified classes, groups, and political parties prevent the predominance of one political section. Mapai and the Histadrut are themselves confederations of interests, sections, political cleavages, and persons.

4. A lack of common purpose and of ideological consolidation. In Israel, practically no gap exists between the ideology of Zahal and that of the state or its major political forces. The universality and identity of values between civilian and military sectors make a common effort inevitable. The army's role-expansion is no more threatening to civilian supremacy over politics than is that of the Histadrut or settlement systems. This does not mean absence of constraints, but, since the formation of the Yishuv, the history of Israel has involved role-expansion—the accumulation of many functions to establish an independent Jewish state. Of course, role-expansion also means that each group naturally will take political advantage of its power, position, and influence.

5. A lack or decline of professionalism because political considerations win out over those of internal organization and career concerns. In Israel, professionalism and depoliticization have been on the rise. Depoliticization does not, of course, mean that the army elite has no

[62] See Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, XVII (April 1965), 394; and Perlmutter, "Praetorian State."

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political influence or that the army could not serve as an avenue for attaining political leadership, but only that the army's functions are not to be determined by the internal and parochial politics of labor or any other political organization. The officer corps could not become an ally of one political faction or another, as occurred in the Egyptian army before 1952 and is occurring in the Syrian and Iraqi armies today. The policy of depoliticization restrains the Israeli army and its officer corps from becoming a vehicle for political power.

The maturity of Israeli political structures, especially the highly complex and institutionalized political parties, the kibbutzim, and the Histadrut, would present a formidable challenge to the army if it were to choose to play independent politics. The identification of the most powerful and popular party, Mapai, and the kibbutz movement with the state leaves no room for army officers' maneuvers of the type that can occur in praetorian states. The army could not claim that the politicians had "betrayed" the nation. No civilian politicians, either as individuals or as organized groups, have meddled in the politics of the army since the dissolution of the Palmach and the NMO in 1948-1949. If some former military men, such as Generals Dayan and Allon, play a key role in Israeli politics today, it is only because they have resigned from the army and sought power through civilian political parties. The reputations they gained in the army may have enhanced the political chances of these prominent army commanders, but did not guarantee their political success. An attempt on their part to influence politics while in uniform would have been crushed with little effort. In fact, if army officers desire to become successful in politics they *must* channel these ambitions through civilian political procedures.

A comprehensive study of the political articulation and commitment of Zahal's officer corps is as yet not available. It has been suggested, however, that the political articulation is correlated with the educational level of the officers: those Israeli officers who were born in the Arab countries and who have achieved only a low level of education are low in political consciousness. The better educated are politically articulate but also highly professional.[63] Politically conscious to a high degree are young officers from the kibbutzim, especially from small socialist collectives. On the whole, the social isolation (not to be confused with a societal isolation) of today's professional officers—their tendency to keep to themselves and their

[63] Zeev Shiff, "The Young Officers of Zahal: Education and Political Consciousness," *Ha-Aretz*, January 23, 1963. We plan to investigate Shiff's assumptions.

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apolitical attitude—has been greater than that found among the Haganah-Palmach and 1948-1950 Zahal officer corps. In fact, this type of corporate and professional separation has become the mark of the professional soldier.[64] Because Zahal has been a people's army and a reserve organization, its barracks life is short, its officers are permanently integrated with society, and the chances of the officers' becoming ideologically or professionally independent of the society are meager. A long military career in Israel is unlikely because the officer corps is being continuously rotated by putting an age limit on service in the army.[65]

Under present conditions in Israel, a highly professionalized army dependent on a reserve system, with an unusually rapid turnover of officers and men, acts by virtue of its formal status and is harnessed to civilian control, as are the armies of the United States and Western Europe. The chances for military coups, therefore, are nonexistent; the chances for political support for the army from the powerful political parties and the effective kibbutz and Histadrut systems are nil. The officer corps as a professional group is removed from politics. Officers are prohibited from actively participating in politics and so far have shown little interest in politics after retirement. This again does not prevent army elite veterans from actively pressing for and seeking managerial, economic, and administrative positions. Neither the size of the Israeli army nor the enormous defense budget (during Sinai, 13.1 percent of the total national budget; now estimated at 8.1 percent) dictates the political and attitudinal behavior of the Israeli army and its high command.[66] Size and budget of armies are determining factors in praetorian states. In nonpraetorian states, the size of the army and the defense budget affects the economic structure, which in turn may bring about structural changes in society and politics but will not lift the army into the most prominent position as the political ruling group, as is the case in praetorian states. Nor does Israel fit the thesis that in a garrison state the army is prone to forgo the principle of professionalism or political nonintervention, as was the case with the Prussian army from Bismarck to Hitler.[67] The values and the ideology of Zahal stem from the permanent Arab threat, and Zahal is committed to the nationalism espoused by most Israelis. The army elite is differentiated from the social structure in

[64] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 1-19.
[65] With Professor Lissak, we are now studying the mechanism of officer rotation in Zahal.
[66] Andrzejewski, 75-116.
[67] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, esp. 97.

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a manner not unlike that of other elites; it is not a politically privileged group.

Thus, the absorptive capacity of the economy, the rapid turnover of officers, the successful integration of Zahal veterans, the army's dependence upon the reserve system, the identity of military and national political goals, and Zahal's professionalism preclude the army's active intervention in politics. In addition, the institutionalized legitimacy of independent civilian political structures furnishes an effective guarantee of civilian control. However, the military in Israel—as a pressure group similar to those in other nonpraetorian states in which the civilian authority is formally and informally supreme—will continue to challenge the civilian, especially in the realm of defense and foreign affairs.

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Research Note

RECENT TRENDS IN SOVIET RESEARCH ON THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

By ELIZABETH KRIDL VALKENIER*

DURING 1954-1955 the Kremlin initiated a radical change in its policies toward the newly independent countries. The rigid emphasis on the "inevitability" of Communist takeovers gave way to the acceptance of non-Communist regimes as potential political allies. A comparable shift in Soviet Asian studies from a narrowly conceived ideological basis to a more pragmatic and tolerant approach took almost ten years to evolve. While the Soviet state busily courted the middle-class nationalist governments with diplomatic moves and economic aid, the academic community neglected the serious study of non-Communist forces. Not surprisingly, Anastas Mikoyan charged at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956 that the learned institutions concerned with research on the East "slumbered" while the contemporary world passed them by.

Reorganization

After the Congress, the regime carried out various organizational changes to achieve expanded and more detailed research. An Institute of Eastern Languages was set up in September 1956 at the University of Moscow. It offered instruction in the modern languages, as well as interdisciplinary training in area programs. In the same year the Institute of World Economy and International Relations was launched by the Academy of Sciences to deal exclusively with contemporary problems, one of its sections being concerned with "liberated and dependent countries."

Traditionally, all the non-European areas had been lumped under the term "the East," the preserve of the Oriental Institute of the Academy of Sciences. It too was reorganized after the Twentieth Congress and in 1960, after the formation of the separate Africa Institute,

* I should like to acknowledge a travel grant to the USSR from the European Institute at Columbia University and to thank Professor Philip Mosely for his helpful and penetrating comments.

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was renamed the Institute of the Peoples of Asia. Another institute devoted solely to the study of Latin America was set up in 1961.

Organizational changes continue, indicating a growing specialization and sophistication in approach. There are plans to have three separate scholarly publications on Asia, Africa, and Latin America, instead of the single bimonthly *Narody Azii i Afriki*, published by the Institute of the Peoples of Asia.[1] The current organization of the section of the Institute of World Economy concerned with the newly independent states suggests that practical questions of economic development have come to predominate over the earlier preoccupation with social classes and their political role. The section is now subdivided into five groups dealing with socioeconomic problems, industrialization, agriculture, foreign economic relations, and planning. Such issues as the worker-peasant alliance or the role of the national bourgeoisie no longer merit separately organized subsections.

Similar trends can be observed in the refurbished teaching of modern Asian and African history, a compulsory course for all university graduates in history. As a result of public discussion initiated by *Narody Azii i Afriki* in June 1965, the Ministry of Higher Education worked out a new syllabus and ordered new texts, as well as refresher courses for the instructors. The new syllabus is arranged by countries and not by problems; i.e., it is concerned more with the historical development of Asia and Africa than with "the influence of the October Revolution on the oppressed nations of the East."[2]

Even though there is a pronounced division between the Academy's institutes, which devote all their efforts to research, and the universities, which are concerned with instruction, professors publish substantive works on the developing countries. Also, the traditional distinction is fading between Moscow's academic community, with its concentration on modern times, and Leningrad's, with its emphasis on investigating earlier periods. For example, a group of scholars at Leningrad University is working on the theoretical problems of noncapitalist development, and the university has held conferences on the prospects of the third world.

[1] The monthly *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* (*MEMO*) reflects the broader scope of its publisher, the Institute of World Economy. Unlike *Narody Azii i Afriki* it deals exclusively with contemporary problems, and it covers the whole world.

[2] Professor G. V. Efimov of Leningrad University, under whose guidance the revised syllabus was prepared, advocated in the public discussion that teachers occupy themselves more with facts and scientific objectivity than with sweeping generalizations, as only a thorough knowledge of events would lead to an understanding of "key problems" (*Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 1 [January 1966], 83).

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The important pace-setting conferences at which new interpretations are publicly aired and sanctioned are held under the auspices of the institutes and their journals. The first one of these—on socialism, capitalism, and the underdeveloped countries—was organized in early 1964 by the editorial board of *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*. It was a veritable landmark in that it offered a public forum to a group of specialists who for some time had been individually advocating a less stereotyped approach. Since then other meetings, notably those on industrialization and the food problem, have heralded explicit departures from various traditional interpretations.

Discussion

There is a new spirit in Soviet academic polemics. They differ markedly from earlier exchanges that did not go beyond vague references to "mistaken views" held by "some authors." Now there is outspoken, detailed criticism of attempts to impose preconceived patterns. Individual writers are taken to task for specific opinions, and erroneous assertions are confronted with facts, regardless of what the official policies may happen to be.

Two articles printed by *Narody Azii i Afriki* in 1966 illustrate the range and the method of current discussion. In one, A. N. Goldobin took issue with R. G. Landa's optimistic evaluation of the Algerian and Egyptian economies.[8] Goldobin asserted that the fact that management by workers and peasants was a progressive form of economic organization did not mean, as Landa maintained, that the economies of the two countries faced smooth sailing. Citing data, Goldobin showed to what extent the public and cooperative sectors had been plagued by low profits, low output, and lack of adequate personnel. His article was a plea for a forthright discussion of the economic problems facing the new nations, for a sober assessment of actual difficulties instead of an embroidering of the assumption that the choice of a noncapitalist course by itself provided all the answers.

The other scholar writing in the same journal was against tampering with the basic tenets of Marxism. N. A. Simoniya criticized V. L. Tiagunenko's book *Problems of Contemporary National Liberation Revolutions* and his other numerous writings for the assertion that

[8] Goldobin, "Nekotorye voprosy nekapitalisticheskogo puti razvitiya Alzhira i OAR" [Some problems of the noncapitalist path of development of Algeria and the UAR], *ibid.*, No. 5 (October 1966), 49-51; Landa, "Rabochee i krestianskoe samoupravlenie v Alzhire" [Workers' and peasants' self-management in Algeria], *ibid.*, No. 5 (October 1965), 11-12.

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these revolutions were entering a new socialist or protosocialist stage.[4] Marx, Simoniya pointed out, had postulated leadership by the working class as a prerequisite for advancing a revolution from the democratic to the socialist stage, but no working class leadership was as yet in evidence in the third world. Significantly, Simoniya argued for a closer adherence to Marxism not because of any need to observe orthodoxy but out of respect for facts. In the same spirit, he pointed out that there was no basis for Tiagunenko's claim that the non-capitalist path was gaining ground among the new nations, since so far only five out of the thirty-eight independent African states had chosen it.

Simoniya's article should not be considered a reflection of disillusionment in party and government circles with the course of the liberation revolution after the fall of such radical leaders as Nkrumah and Ben Bella.[5] Its thrust is quite different and more significant when seen in the context of polemics now animating Soviet Eastern studies.

The functional reorganization and the more objective approach are reflected in a broader and deeper range of Soviet research on the developing countries. New aspects of development, such as acculturation, are being taken up and old themes, such as industrialization, are being given a fresh and fuller interpretation.

Industrialization

The prominent economist, V. G. Solodovnikov, complained in 1961 that Soviet views on industrialization had been distorted in the West. He averred that Marxists wanted a "harmonious development of all the branches of national economy" and not an "exaggerated development of heavy industry alone," regardless of a country's size and resources.[6] Solodovnikov's remarks were more an indication of things to come than an accurate description of opinions already prevalent, for at that time Soviet economists, in their public pronouncements, still tended to stress fundamental differences between capitalist and socialist industrialization. In general, the former was pictured as based on light and processing industries and aimed at keeping the new countries economically dependent, while the latter was said to involve heavy industry and aimed at economic liberation from the West.

[4] "O kharaktere natsional'no osvoboditel'noi revoliutsii" [Concerning the nature of the national liberation revolution], *ibid.*, No. 6 (December 1966), 3-20.

[5] *Mizan*, IX (March-April 1967), 41-42, 48-49.

[6] *Burzhuaznye teorii i problemy ekonomicheskogo razvitiya slaborazvitykh stran* [Bourgeois theories and problems of the economic development of the underdeveloped countries] (Moscow 1961), 68-70.

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A book on Africa's economy by A. Yu. Shpirt can serve as an example of the exclusive concern with industrialization and the easy optimism that used to prevail.[7] The discussion of industry was more than twice as long as that of agriculture and naively concluded that the continent had all the prerequisites for industrial expansion. Adverse factors, such as lack of capital and trained personnel, were treated in one short paragraph. But other works displaying more awareness of realities were soon to appear. Writing in 1965, S. V. Baskin treated industrialization as an effective lever of development but cautioned against its uniform and blind application. Sparsely populated countries should start with processing raw materials for export and the production of consumer goods for the domestic market. Moreover, he pointed out that successful economic development required simultaneous and balanced growth of industry and agriculture.[8]

The conference on industrialization, convened in 1967 by the Institute of World Economy, offered an excellent panorama of the range of views and interests that are now current. In a significant departure from earlier practice, industrialization was discussed primarily as a factor in economic growth and not as a means of economic liberation. There was a dispassionate consideration of different growth models—the classical English one and the American and German experiences, in addition to the Soviet pattern. There were suggestions that the development of countries like Turkey, Brazil, and Pakistan be studied thoroughly for still other models.[9]

In another departure, the participants stressed what was economically feasible rather than what was politically desirable. There was discussion of prerequisites, stages, and interrelationships with other branches of the economy, as well as with the social structure. Creating an infrastructure and fostering light industry were no longer viewed as abandoning the goal of industrial expansion but as essential steps in a continuous and complex process. Regional cooperation and integration were advocated in preference to autarkic development since the size of the home market in most cases precluded the effective functioning

[7] *Ekonomika stran Afriki* [The economy of the African countries] (Moscow 1963).

[8] In N. I. Gavrilov, ed., *Nezavisimye strany Afriki: ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nye problemy* [Independent countries of Africa: economic and social problems] (Moscow 1965), 54-89.

[9] *MEMO*, No. 4 (April 1967), 106-27, and No. 5 (May 1967), 93-108. M. Ivanov's "Tendentsii razvitiya ekonomiki Irana" [Tendencies in Iran's economic development], *ibid.*, No. 12 (December 1967), 105-13, is an example of work implicitly acknowledging that there are also nonsocialist methods of development. The article holds that Iran is carrying out serious reforms aimed at changing the economic structure of the country and at overcoming backwardness.

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of enterprises.[10] There was disagreement about the creation of import-replacing industries, with most economists opposing this policy on grounds of economic inefficiency.

And finally there was a highly critical assessment of economic progress achieved thus far. Participants pointed to various disproportions that had arisen, to deficit operations of plants, to inflationary trends, slow rates of growth, and low productivity of labor. With all these difficulties fully acknowledged, one economist questioned whether it had been right to regard industrialization as the key to development. Evidently, the days of easy optimism are gone.

Agriculture

Until recently, the search for revolutionary potentials and radical solutions tended to predominate in Soviet analysis of the agrarian situation in the developing countries. Thus, at the December 1958 conference on current land reforms in the East these reforms were interpreted as benefiting the urban and rural bourgeoisie and therefore as a factor sharpening the class struggle.[11] Agrarian specialists stressed the inadequacy of partial measures previously undertaken and argued that the needs of the masses, as well as many other problems, would be best taken care of by a general distribution to landless peasants and those with medium-size holdings.[12]

The CPSU's recognition in late 1960 of a noncapitalist and transitional stage in the evolution of the former colonies toward socialism opened the way for a more penetrating and understanding treatment of current reforms and existing conditions. In contrast to the 1958 gathering, a 1964 conference on the agrarian problem agreed that the partial reforms had benefited the peasants. Moreover, there was even discussion of the need to alter the classic Marxist-Leninist position on the land question in the East so as to permit the gradual limitation of capitalist relations in preparing the ground for a socialist transformation of the countryside.[13]

[10] Regionalism is currently much in favor. The African Institute has organized a research group on this question and has published a book on the subject: E. N. Korotkova, *Ekonomicheskoe sotrudnichestvo nezavisimykh stran Afriki* [Economic cooperation among independent African countries] (Moscow 1966). In late 1966, the Institute of Geography sponsored a large conference on economic regionalism in the third world, with some thirty institutions participating. See *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 4 (August 1967), 226-28.

[11] *MEMO*, No. 3 (March 1959), 150-52.

[12] M. Maksimov, A. Maslennikov, V. Rastiannikov, "Agrarnyi vopros na Vostoke" [The agrarian problem in the East], *ibid.*, No. 5 (May 1959), 28-41.

[13] *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 5 (October 1964), 209-22. Since then books have ap-

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After 1960, some new books began to deal with technical aspects of agriculture, leaving aside the whole problem of "agrarian relations." V. Rymalov's and V. L. Tiagunenko's work on the role of the developing countries in the world capitalist economy confined the chapter on agriculture to a detailed and factual description of farm productivity.[14] A book on the agrarian problem in Africa included a substantive analysis by I. A. Svanidze of the prospects for the reconstruction of agriculture through various technical improvements.[15] And in his book on Guinea, A. Firsov wrote of increasing farm output by introducing new methods of cultivation, not by changing land ownership.[16]

Lately, farm productivity and the role of agriculture in the overall process of economic development have been under much discussion. At a conference on the food problem in the developing countries, held by the Institute of the Peoples of Asia in June 1966, the opening address by V. G. Rastiannikov was largely devoted to the catastrophic food situation. Alarmed by endemic low productivity, Rastiannikov cautioned against the hasty introduction of anticapitalist measures lest the output of food and cash crops fall even further. Cooperatives and state farms should be set up, he advised, only when adequate machinery and trained personnel were available to assure their success. As this was not yet possible in most new states, the emphasis at present should be on increasing output on individual peasant farms.[17]

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peared giving dispassionate and detailed descriptions of land reform in various countries without reference to the ideal, Marxist solution. Thus, A. I. Demin's *Sel'skoe khoziaistvo sovremennogo Irana* [Agriculture in contemporary Iran] (Moscow 1967) treats the 1962 reform as a progressive, beneficial measure without going into the question of the "proper" solution.

[14] *Slaborazvitye strany v mirovom kapitalisticheskom khoziaistve* [Underdeveloped countries in the world capitalist economy] (Moscow 1961), 142-62.

[15] I. I. Potekhin, ed., *Agrarnyi vopros i krestianstvo v tropicheskoi Afrike* [The agrarian problem and the peasantry in tropical Africa] (Moscow 1964), 266-94.

[16] *Ekonomicheskie problemy Gvineiskoi Respubliki* [Economic problems of the Guinean Republic] (Moscow 1965), 53-93. Writing in a collective volume—*Nekapitalisticheskii put' razvitiya stran Afriki* [The noncapitalist path of development in African countries] (Moscow 1967), 324—Yu. G. Spichak stated that the radical African states understood that land reform by itself, no matter how sweeping, could not solve all the agrarian problems, notably the establishment of highly productive farms supplying food and raw materials for the domestic market and for export. Like many others he favored reform initially through the gradual and voluntary introduction of marketing cooperatives and government assistance with credit, technical information, and so on.

[17] *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 1 (January 1967), 28-42, 219-23. It is instructive to compare Rastiannikov's 1966 views with those expressed at the 1964 conference on socialism, capitalism, and the developing countries. He was then also interested in releasing the productive forces in agriculture and also favored the small producer. But he justified these opinions in political and not in economic terms: ". . . In most Asian countries today the development of bourgeois relations among small commodity producers does not broaden the base of the ruling strata of the national

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There is a trend away from the earlier conviction that in order to modernize and develop a nation must favor industry while ignoring agriculture. Firsov's book, for example, postulated that for a long time to come Guinea's foremost problem would be the development of agriculture. He believed that only well-developed and highly productive farming could supply the processing industries that were eventually to be built, as well as finance imports of capital equipment. At the 1967 conference on industrialization many economists drew attention to the importance of agriculture. E. Bragina argued that the slow reconstruction of the agricultural sector of the economy was responsible for the failure of many newly independent states to attain fast tempos of growth. She held that India's example showed convincingly that the buildup of heavy industry, when unaccompanied by measures to develop agriculture, resulted in serious consequences for the entire economy.[18]

Planning and Mixed Economy

E. A. Utkin's 1965 book on planning in the developing countries was the first book on the subject to appear in the USSR. Its premise was that the goal of planning should be to broaden the public sector because only state ownership assured effective organization and management. The presence of private local and foreign capital created the most serious obstacle to planning.[19]

Since then a less rigorous approach has emerged. The introduction to a collective volume on planning in the non-Communist Asian countries accepted it as a positive factor in development, even though in most cases the aim of planning was to aid the private sector and not to break the colonial structure of the economy. The book included excellent chapters on Afghanistan and Iran, as detailed and informative as anything written in the West.[20]

Soviet scholars are now showing a serious interest in the study of

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bourgeoisie . . . but narrows it. From the class struggle point of view it means wider opportunity for a broad front of democratic forces capable of isolating and weakening 'top-level' capitalists . . . and creating the opportunity for noncapitalist development" (*MEMO*, No. 6 [June 1964], 77). An abridged translation of materials on this earlier conference was published as a special issue of the *Mizan Newsletter*, VI (November 1964).

[18] *MEMO*, No. 4 (April 1967), 116-17.

[19] *Problemy planirovaniya v razvivayushchikhsia stranakh* [Problems of planning in the developing countries] (Moscow 1965).

[20] A. Z. Arabadzhian and A. I. Medovoi, eds., *Plany-programmy ekonomicheskogo razvitiya stran Azii* [Plans-programs of economic development in Asian countries] (Moscow 1966).

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planning for a mixed economy. At the 1967 conference on industrialization B. Sobolev argued that the existence of a mixed economy in the new states must be accepted and such planning devised as will control and utilize the private sector.[21] And indeed detailed studies of actual plans, as well as of their performance, are being carried out at the Institute of World Economy under the direction of a very capable young economist, V. Kollontai. Alternate models that are economically and administratively feasible are then worked out on the basis of this material.

Specialists are now more concerned with the economic results than with the extent of state interference. E. A. Utkin, who in 1965 advocated expanding the public sector, turned his attention the following year to its efficiency. While holding that profitability should not be the chief criterion for assessment, he nevertheless discussed eleven steps that could raise profits in state enterprises and increase contributions to national revenues.[22] Other economists tend to be even more exclusively concerned with efficiency. At the conference on industrialization, O. Ulrikh contrasted without comment the deficit operations in the public sector in the UAR with economic gains made in Pakistan through state interference on behalf of private capital.[23]

Economic Relations With the West

In their recent comments and research many specialists no longer seem exclusively concerned with the negative aspects of the West's economic presence. A highly provocative and well-documented book on Western aid by V. Rymalov and L. Stepanov made a decisive break with the old sterile approach.[24] It argued cogently against oversimplified treatment that saw every aid-dollar as undermining the independence of the recipient and directly implementing the nefarious plans of the imperialist donors. The authors held that, though weak, the new states could enforce their own wishes through controls, thereby

[21] *MEMO*, No. 5 (May 1967), 99. Sobolev pointed out that the NEP period served to restore the Soviet economy. In general, the significance of the early Soviet experience with a mixed economy is being now appreciated as possibly having more relevance for other countries than the subsequent period. The CPSU theses for the fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution described NEP as an advance on the road to communism with special potentialities for other countries (*Pravda*, June 25, 1967).

[22] "Effektivnost' gosudarstvennogo sektora v osvobodivshikhsia stranakh" [The effectiveness of the state sector in the liberated countries], *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, No. 9 (September 1966), 86-92.

[23] *MEMO*, No. 4 (April 1967), 113-15.

[24] *"Pomoshch'" osvobodivshimsia stranam v politike i strategii imperializma* ["Aid" to the liberated countries in the policy and strategy of imperialism] (Moscow 1964).

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turning Western aid to good advantage. Moreover, the socioeconomic changes generated by Western aid, including as it does industrial and technical expertise, could in the long run build up forces that could turn against the outdated pro-Western regimes.

The problem that now interests many Soviet experts is not how the liberated countries should act about liquidating all dependence on the West, but rather how they can best take advantage of the relationship. Outright nationalization of foreign companies is generally recognized as harmful. What is favored is imposition of state controls that increase the contribution of these firms to domestic accumulation. In this vein, M. Andreev's book on Indonesian oil advocated the 60-40 profit split, rather than full state ownership, as the most effective national control over the production and sale of petroleum.[25]

For similar reasons mixed companies have been receiving increasingly favorable attention. Theoretical works condone them somewhat grudgingly as a means for easing out foreign capital.[26] But monographic works are more apt to recognize their contribution to economic development. Thus N. I. Gavrilov described the benefits the Ghanaian regime had derived from the operations of the Ghana-Italian Petroleum Company (half of the company's profits go to the state budget) and concluded that "its activity at the present stage conforms with the country's interests."[27]

It is still rare to find in print a statement that directly acknowledges the contribution of Western investment to economic development.[28] However, Western capital tends to be increasingly accepted on pragmatic grounds. Some, like V. L. Tiagunenko, while fully realizing the need of the backward states to utilize all means at their disposal, nevertheless stress the need for controls.[29] But others look askance at the

[25] *Budushchee indoneziiskoi nefty* [The future of Indonesian oil] (Moscow 1964).

[26] V. L. Tiagunenko, *Problemy sovremennykh natsional'no-osvoboditel'nykh revoliutsii* [Problems of contemporary national liberation revolutions] (Moscow 1966), 67.

[27] In Gavrilov, ed., 157.

[28] This was done in the opening report by G. P. Kolykhalova at the conference on the role of private investment in former colonies, sponsored by the Institute of the Peoples of Asia. But the moderator insisted in the traditional manner that the West exported capital in order to fight the national liberation movement, not to foster economic development (*Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 1 [January 1964], 223-26). But indirect acknowledgements are frequent enough. For example, it is admitted that, at this stage, developing countries consider the complete elimination of foreign capital harmful to their economic development (*Nekapitalisticheskii put' razvitiya stran Afriki*, 299).

[29] "The countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America . . . have to satisfy a considerable part of their needs through the imperialist countries. Thanks to the support of the socialist countries, they now have the opportunity to act as independent and equal partners in their relations with the imperialist states. . . . The economically backward countries can now set the conditions and utilize the means thus received to

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unnecessarily harsh local policies toward foreign investment. At the October 1965 Leningrad University conference on the future of the new states, the Mali investment code was criticized because it frightened prospective investors away and created additional difficulties for the country's already shaky economy.[30] Such criticism recognizes that the developing countries cannot really dictate the conditions of investment, having to depend more or less on whatever Western capital comes their way. And V. Rymalov's latest book showed with extensive documentation that Western investments flow much more readily to other industrialized countries than to the former colonies.[31]

Economic Relations of the USSR With the East

A more realistic approach to the Soviet Union's economic relations with the third world is also evident in a sober and factual book on the subject that appeared in 1966.[32] Instead of the customary paeans to ever-expanding and mutually advantageous exchanges, it gave an unadorned picture of trade subject to fluctuations, and with a growth rate that was by no means rapid. Aid projects were not described as bringing unlimited benefits to the recipient, but were discussed in terms of their capacity to bring solid returns to the USSR. According to this study, trade with the third world could be put on a stable and expanding basis if it were utilized to replace commodities that were more costly to produce in the Soviet Union and not merely to supplement various domestic shortages.

The book was a result of researches conducted by a small group of economists at the Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System. Since 1962 this group has been working on indices of the effectiveness of economic relations with the newly independent states. Prior to the publication of the book, members of this research group, G. M. Prokhorov, L. Zevin, and N. P. Shmelev,[33] had been advocating in

speed up their development" ("Aktual'nye voprosy nekapitalisticheskogo puti razvitiya" [Current problems of noncapitalist development], *MEMO*, No. 11 [November 1964], 17).

[30] *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 5 (October 1966), 229.

[31] *Raspad kolonial'noi sistemy i mirovoe kapitalistichekoe khoziaistvo* [The collapse of the colonial system and the world capitalist economy] (Moscow 1966), 447-56.

[32] G. M. Prokhorov, ed., *Problemy sotrudnichestva sotsialisticheskikh i razvivayushchikhsia stran* [Problems of cooperation between the socialist and the developing countries] (Moscow 1966).

[33] See especially L. Zevin, "Vzaimnaya vygoda sotrudnichestva sotsialisticheskikh i razvivayushchikhsia stran" [Common benefits in the cooperation between the socialist and the developing countries], *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 2 (February 1965), 72-80.

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scholarly articles that the USSR stop striving for self-sufficiency in all branches of production and that it take advantage of the international division of labor and base its economic relations with the third world on the principle of comparative advantage.[34] They had suggested basing the Soviet bloc's aid and trade on the joint production of such items as petroleum, iron ore, cotton fiber, and ferrous metals. Such cooperation, to be arranged through contracts, technical aid, long-term trade agreements, and coordinated planning, would be beneficial to both sides. It would give the USSR and Eastern Europe a stable (and at times cheaper) supply of needed raw materials, fuels, and some industrial products. As for the new states, it was assumed that production for the foreign market and expanding the output of traditional products would spur economic development more than aid projects designed to produce for the home market alone.

Population

Overpopulation is now acknowledged in the USSR to be a factor impeding economic progress in some parts of the world.[35] Abandoning the view that demographic controls were a form of neo-Malthusianism designed to keep the former colonies in check, scholars began in 1965 to discuss publicly the problem of population pressure.[36]

The Institute of World Economy is currently sponsoring research on population problems in the third world under the direction of Y. Guzevatyi, who is about to publish the first Soviet book on the subject. The March 1967 conference on the immediate problems of the national liberation movement (sponsored by the editorial board of *International Affairs* and the CPSU Academy of Social Sciences) was the first such general gathering to include a lecture on the effects of population growth on the economies of the developing countries.[37]

[34] Even though the advantages of the international division of labor were under consideration in the Soviet Union prior to the 1964 UN Conference on Trade and Development, the Soviet position in Geneva did not show it. Foreign Trade Minister Nikolai Patolichev did mention in passing his country's readiness to cooperate and specialize in certain lines of production through the conclusion of long-term agreements and contracts. But his proposal was not mentioned in the Soviet memorandum submitted to the conference, nor was it further elaborated by the Soviet delegation. This vagueness contrasted sharply with the keen interest in and specific proposals for the international division of labor on the part of the Rumanians, Czechs, and Poles.

[35] A change of official attitude on this question was heralded at the April 1963 UN Economic and Social Council meeting when the Soviet delegation agreed that high birth rates were an urgent issue for the developing countries and announced that the USSR would be willing to provide technical assistance in the demographic field.

[36] See the articles by B. Urlanis and Y. Guzevatyi, *Literaturnaya gazeta*, November 23 and 30, 1965.

[37] B. Urlanis, "Population Growth in the Developing Countries and Its Influence

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Soviet demographers do not tend to be as alarmed about overpopulation as some Western specialists are. To some degree they all caution against treating the problem separately from other necessary reforms. While acknowledging the seriousness of the situation, most experts argue that the solution lies in a series of measures—especially, accelerated economic development—and not just in birth control.[38] Y. Guzevatyi is more inclined to lean toward demographic solutions. Though recognizing the importance of radical social and economic reforms, he does not credit them with the capacity to provide a rapid solution of that pressing problem.[39]

Social Classes

Much of the recent work on social structure has moved away from the mechanical application of conventional Marxist generalizations. The trend is away from the deductive assignment of definite political behavior to "peasants," "workers," and "national" and "compradore" bourgeoisie and toward detailed studies of the actual social composition of a country or of a social stratum peculiar to the third world. Predictions about a group's possible role are then made within the limits imposed by the local context. By now the trend is so pronounced that the new, interesting interpretations are readily distinguishable from the pat, traditional ones.

G. Mirskii, now director of sociopolitical research in the section on the developing countries at the Institute of World Economy, has been prominent among those who have looked afresh at the class structure in the third world. As early as 1962 the first of his numerous articles described the variety and fluidity of social groupings. Mirskii disputed the facile assumption that the entire big bourgeoisie were pro-imperialist while the petty and middle bourgeoisie were nationalisti-

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on the Economy of the Third World," *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 5 (May 1967), 68-70. Naturally, the issue had been discussed prior to this at specialized meetings dealing exclusively with demographic problems, such as the first all-Union symposium on population held in November 1966. See *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 1 (January 1967), 159-60.

[38] A. Ya. Kvasha, "Nekotorye problemy narodonaseleniya stran Azii i Afriki" [Some population problems in countries of Asia and Africa], *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 6 (December 1965), 48-56; D. Valentei, "Vykhod iz prochnogo kruga" [Escape from the vicious circle], *Aziya i Afrika segodnia*, No. 8 (August 1965), 2-4.

[39] "Population Problems in Developing Countries," *International Affairs*, No. 9 (September 1966), 52-58. A later article of his, "Population and World Politics," *ibid.*, No. 10 (October 1967), 59-64, discusses with a note of real urgency the threat of population explosion in the third world to domestic and international stability.

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cally minded. He held that a careful analysis of each country and particular situation was necessary before any meaningful generalizations could be made.[40]

In view of arguments such as these, it is interesting to observe the evolution in the published writings of one research team. In early 1962, L. A. Gordon and L. A. Fridman examined the position of the working class in Asia and Africa. Using India and the UAR as examples, they concluded that the situation (as well as the role) of the working class in the developing countries was approximating that of the industrial West.[41] Four years later, they concluded that the situation in the third world differed markedly from that in the West. With extensive statistics they demonstrated that only ten percent of wage labor was employed in heavy industry, while the bulk consisted of hired peasants and small craftsmen. The authors warned that since wage earners were not synonymous with the proletariat no sanguine predictions about the leading role of the workers in the national liberation revolution could be made.[42]

Books glossing over what is different in the new states still appear.[43] But there are scholars who with increasing precision investigate the unique and the novel aspects of class formation in the third world. G. Mirskii is about to publish the first Soviet book on the role of the military in the new countries. N. Savelev is studying the petty urban bourgeoisie, trying to differentiate it from the amorphous and all-inclusive term "middle class."[44] And V. Iordanskii is investigating the multitude of social problems resulting from rapid urbanization.[45] Work of such scholars is distinguished by careful factual research and by terminological precision that avoids the easy assignment of historical and predestined roles to certain social groups.

[40] With R. Avakov, "O klassovoi strukture v slaborazvitykh stranakh" [On class structure in the underdeveloped countries], *MEMO*, No. 4 (April 1962), 68-82.

[41] "Polozhenie rabochego klassa v Azii i Afrike" [The condition of the working class in Asia and Africa], *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 1 (January 1962), 30-48.

[42] "Rabochii klass osvobodivshikhsia stran" [The working class of the liberated countries], *MEMO*, No. 12 (December 1965), 75-87, and No. 1 (January 1966), 27-39.

[43] See, for example, I. P. Yastrebova, ed., *Rabochii klass Afriki* [The African working class] (Moscow 1966). Although it provided much factual information to the contrary, it examined the working classes in Africa in terms of their approximation to Marx's prognostications.

[44] "Gorodskaya mel'kaya burzhuaziya v razvivayushchikhsia stranakh" [The urban petty bourgeoisie in the developing countries], *MEMO*, No. 11 (November 1966), 60-71.

[45] "Tropicheskaya Afrika: o prirode mezhetnicheskikh otnoshenii" [Tropical Africa: on the nature of ethnic relations], *ibid.*, No. 1 (January 1967), 47-51, and No. 2 (February 1967), 41-51.

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Acculturation

A broader, less mechanistic approach to studying the process of development is evident. While some scholars, clinging to conventional historical materialism, ignore the role that cultural traditions and mental attitudes can play in perpetuating economic backwardness, others are devoting increasing attention to these factors. Some mention them in passing, others stress the need for detailed investigation.

In his latest book, V. Rymalov discussed industrialization as a socio-economic process and drew attention to the importance of popular attitudes, though without going into any detail.[46] The Director of the Africa Institute, however, pointed out to the March 1967 Conference on the Problems of the National-Liberation Movement that "the contradictions between the traditional African way of life and progress have become a serious obstacle to economic and social development." And he indicated that this was one of the aspects of the African scene meriting "deeper and more concrete studies."[47]

Recent monographic research by political scientists and sociologists takes into account the receptivity of traditional cultures to innovation. G. Mirskii has discussed the propensity of the bourgeoisie in the third world to sink capital not into productive enterprises (as did the nineteenth-century middle class in the West) but into real estate, a "psychological factor" that has to be taken into consideration.[48] Concerned with the power and survival of the past, V. Iordanskii has investigated the recurrence of tribalism in African cities, indicating that the move to town does not necessarily result in an automatic formation of national consciousness.[49]

It is significant that these new trends in research are being given an organizational basis. Until recently the cultural section of the Africa Institute was occupied with philology, art, literature, and religion. Now, under the direction of a very capable scholar, L. Ye. Kubbel (who has done substantial work on the early history of West Africa), it has also embarked on new investigations of the problem of acculturation. Monographic works devoted exclusively to this issue probably will not appear for a while, for it is a venture into a new field still poorly supplied with qualified specialists.

[46] *Raspad kolonial'noi sistemy*, 75-85.
[47] *International Affairs*, No. 5 (May 1967), 68.
[48] With T. Pokataeva, "Klassy i klassovaya bor'ba v razvivayushchikhsia stranakh" [Classes and class struggle in the developing countries], *MEMO*, No. 2 (February 1966), 40.
[49] "Tropicheskaya Afrika"; and "Sotsial'nye sdvigi v gorodakh tropicheskoi Afriki" [Social mobility in the cities of tropical Africa], *MEMO*, No. 10 (October 1967), 81.

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Conclusion

The range of new interpretations and themes indicates that the developing countries are being increasingly studied within the context of their own specific requirements and possibilities rather than according to preconceived dogmatic theories. At one point, realizing that the existing theoretical framework was inadequate, Professor G. A. Dadashev of Baku University proposed a new, third section of Marxist-Leninist political economy devoted exclusively to Afro-Asian states.[50] But public discussion of this proposal petered out inconclusively and the issue has remained unresolved.

The conservative elements continue to recognize the possibility of only two political systems and treat the developing countries as in the process of transition from precapitalist or early capitalist forms to socialist ones. The more venturesome scholars tend to regard social, political, and economic developments in this part of the world not as emanations of either capitalism or socialism but as peculiar local mixtures of their own.

Occasionally there is mild criticism from supporters of the more orthodox tradition. Thus, V. L. Tiagunenko has complained that too many authors have recently been analyzing the new countries exclusively in terms of their level of development while forgetting about Marxist classification into either one of the two systems.[51] Nevertheless, the trend away from deductive research continues strong. The undogmatic approach has won for itself a place in terms of cadres, achievement, organizational facilities, and recognition. The more conservative scholars may still object, say, to the exclusive concern with the technical rather than sociopolitical aspects of agriculture. However, they certainly recognize the need for such studies, for, paradoxically, they point with pride to the appearance of such specialized works in the USSR.

[50] "Marksistskaya politicheskaya ekonomiya i razvivayushchiesia strany" [Marxist political economy and the developing countries], *ibid.*, No. 2 (February 1965), 84-90. Among Polish scholars the view that the developing countries represent a new and different set of problems, separate from both capitalism and socialism, is generally accepted. It is interesting to note that the specialized Soviet journals only recently began referring to Polish researches. Some Polish works are being translated. One of them, Jerzy Kleer's *Analiza struktur społeczno-ekonomicznych trzeciego świata* [Analysis of the socioeconomic structure of the third world] (Warsaw 1966)—a highly original discussion of new social groups that are without precedent in history—was criticized in a review for not having differentiated between "radical leaders" (in countries like the UAR and Burma) and conservative rulers (as in the Ivory Coast and Thailand) in its analysis of ruling groups (*MEMO*, No. 1 [January 1967], 146-50).

[51] "Razvivayushchiesia strany i mirovoe khoziaistvo" [Developing countries and the world economy], *ibid.*, No. 6 (June 1967), 70.

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Review Articles

THE DILEMMA OF RISING DEMANDS AND INSUFFICIENT RESOURCES

By HAROLD AND MARGARET SPROUT

C. J. Bartlett, *Great Britain and Sea Power, 1815-1853*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963, 364 pp. $6.40.
Gerald S. Graham, *The Politics of Naval Supremacy*, Cambridge, The University Press, 1965, 132 pp. $6.00.
Sir Peter Gretten, *Maritime Strategy: A Study of Defense Problems*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1965, 210 pp. $6.75.
L. W. Martin, *The Sea in Modern Strategy*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1967, 190 pp. $5.00
William P. Snyder, *The Politics of British Defense Policy, 1945-1962*, Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1964, 284 pp. $6.25.
R. N. Rosecrance, *Defense of the Realm: British Strategy in the Nuclear Epoch*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1968, 308 pp. $7.50.

SEVERAL years ago we reviewed in this journal a collection of books dealing with various aspects of Britain's role in international politics.[1] In the opening paragraph of that review article we observed that "these writings can be viewed simply as discrete accounts of a single nation's unique experience. But one can also view such literature from a broader perspective. Particular cases are always unique in their totality. But they may be exhibits of more widely encountered types of phenomena. It is always possible, and it may be interesting and fruitful, to formulate general comparative questions about particular cases, and to derive hypotheses which could be tried out for credibility in other cases."

This is the perspective from which we approach another collection of books about Britain—this time six books on various aspects of military power and policy. We shall summarize briefly some of their main themes. We shall then view them in the light of relevant British and international history. Finally, we shall abstract some of the salient issues to form a model of possibly wider relevance and applicability. We suggest calling this model "the dilemma of rising demands and insufficient resources."[2]

[1] "'Retreat From World Power': Processes and Consequences of Readjustment," *World Politics*, XV (July 1963), 655-88.

[2] An alternative label might be "dilemma of resource allocation." However, that label would be somewhat less expressive of the phenomena with which we are pri-

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One dictionary defines a dilemma as either (1) "a situation involving choice between equally unsatisfactory alternatives" or (2) "a problem seemingly incapable of a satisfactory solution." The dilemma examined in this review article exhibits both facets. It arises from the following conditions: In every political community there is, in any specified period, a certain aggregate of disposable goods and services, an aggregate that varies through time, generally though not necessarily expanding. All such communities exhibit a congeries of ongoing commitments, contractual or customary, that likewise tend generally to proliferate and enlarge through time. In most communities new demands for goods and services also tend to arise. With few exceptions ongoing commitments and new demands exceed, often greatly exceed, disposable resources. The chronic gap between commitments and demands, on the one hand, and disposable resources, on the other, poses the dilemma that our model is intended to identify and illuminate. From the perspective of governing, the severity of the dilemma depends on various conditions. These include, among others, (1) the degree of consensus within the community regarding goals and (2) the level, or quality, of public order that prevails. Communities exhibit wide differences with respect to consensus and public order, with deterioration of one or both likely to accompany stresses set up by rapidly changing conditions.

This dilemma is not a new phenomenon. Resources available to rulers have rarely seemed adequate for the rulers' felt needs and those of their constituents. Allocations have just as rarely satisfied all claimants within the body politic. Moreover, the elements of the dilemma are familiar to political theorists as well as to politicians and administrators and are implicit in numerous models and theories.[3] However, it seems to us timely and useful to restate and reexamine the dilemma

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marily concerned. "Dilemma of resource allocation" connotes to us a pattern more characteristic of authoritarian and centralized political systems, in which initiatives are observed mainly near the apex of the political pyramid. Our model is intended to include, in addition, a wide variety of situations in which the essence of the dilemma is the thrust from below, even from traditionally repressed and inarticulate sectors of the political community.

[3] One thinks immediately of the ongoing work of James N. Rosenau; among other items that could be cited is his symposium *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* (New York 1967). The dilemma of insufficient resources is implicit in David Easton's concept of "input overload" (*A Systems Analysis of Political Life* [New York 1965], 58-59). The dilemma is likewise implicit in Harold Lasswell's "distributive" concept (*Politics: Who Gets What, When, How* [New York 1958]). The dilemma lurks in the cliché "revolution of rising expectations." It informs Paul Y. Hammond's essay "The Political Order and the Burden of External Relations," *World Politics,* XIX (April 1967), 443-64. It enters into certain chapters of Samuel P. Huntington's *The Common Defense* (New York 1961), esp. chaps. 14-19; and into still other theoretical writings.

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more explicitly and to suggest certain relatively new dimensions that may be clothing it with considerably greater salience for both domestic and foreign politics.

I

The six books considered here span the century and a half from 1815 to the 1960's. Some of them deal specifically with naval power and policy; others, more broadly with military problems in the context of parliamentary and bureaucratic politics and the national economy. All of them set the stage for examination of the dilemma of rising demands and insufficient resources. They do so because the escalating costs of Britain's military power and military-related foreign commitments conflict head on with concomitant rising domestic demands and programs designed to promote the welfare of the whole British population, not just a privileged minority as in earlier times.

Bartlett's book, *Great Britain and Sea Power, 1815-1853*, is a narrative history of British naval *policy* from the defeat of Napoleon to the Crimean War. The author's stated objective is to provide a "synthesis, not of all naval history for the period, but of the main forces determining British naval policy. Essentially this is a survey of the debate, in the Cabinet, the Admiralty, and to some extent in Parliament and beyond, of the size and type of navy that Britain required, and of the uses to which it should be put" (p. vii). The main themes include the conflict over priorities between domestic and external goals; the parsimony of politicians; the conservatism of bureaucrats, especially toward technological innovations; the effects of recurrent diplomatic crises; and the achievement, despite difficulties, of a post-Napoleonic navy adequate to sustain the prestige won in the French wars, and withal at a price that seems incredibly small in comparison with the wealth poured into major military establishments today.

Bartlett's text is well documented from archival and secondary sources. There are several useful appendices showing the condition of the navy at different dates. There are a comprehensive bibliography and a good index. However, this book is decidedly not bedtime reading for casual students of international history. Though well enough written, it suffers from the chronic disease of traditional diplomatic and political history, presenting a tree-cluttered landscape, with but rare glimpses of the forest. For lay readers the advice is, *Caveat emptor*. For serious students of British and international history, the book is a genuine contribution.

Graham's book, *The Politics of Naval Supremacy*, is as easy to read

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as Bartlett's is difficult. His focus is on the role of naval *power* in British statecraft rather than on factors contributing to the pattern of policy: "By the end of the Napoleonic Wars the world position of Britain was unchallenged and almost unassailable. As a consequence of winning an overall naval supremacy [Britain] had attained a political and military predominance that no country had hitherto reached or is ever again likely to reach" (p. 96). Hence, "in the nineteenth century . . . such phrases as 'the struggle for command of the sea' had lost all meaning" (p. 105). The thrust of Graham's argument, in short, is that throughout the century of comparative peace, recollections of Trafalgar and other exploits in the French wars exerted a large if intangible influence on the minds of statesmen throughout the world.

Graham builds mainly upon concepts and hypotheses formulated over half a century ago by Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Halford Mackinder. But he has his own interpretative insight. His historical judgment is sure, and his synoptic achievement is noteworthy. It is rare to find such a historical panorama packed into 125 pages of readable, occasionally elegant prose.

The book by Sir Peter Gretten (a retired British admiral) is written from a different perspective. *Maritime Strategy: A Study of Defense Problems* presents a manifestly conscientious, if rather severely professional, effort to identify a significant role for the British navy in contemporary international politics. His argument is based upon technical military concepts and reasoning. His analysis is conservative and leads him to the conclusion that the British Government should continue doing pretty much what they have been doing in recent years (p. 190).

What he prescribes would entail expenditures at least as large as, and perhaps larger than, those that have been allocated to military purposes during the past decade. There are a few sentences about Britain's relatively limited economic capabilities and the recognition that Britain can no longer go it alone (p. 57). But Gretten gives no attention to the domestic social pressures that have contributed to recent British military retrenchment. And his tacit assumptions about future international politics seem to us much too static. In fairness, however, it must be said that Gretten has done precisely what he set out to do; and those who share his political and other presuppositions will find his book convincing as well as thoughtful.

The Sea in Modern Strategy, by Professor Martin of the University of Wales, deals with Britain only marginally. Martin's focus is on the entire spectrum of functions of seapower in contemporary international politics. His synoptic overview is lucidly presented, a work of genuine

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value to lay readers as well as to professional students of international politics. With specific regard to Britain, Martin concludes that significant seapower has passed beyond the reach of British resources and that the Royal Navy has become little more than a status symbol that (in his judgment) the British polity can ill afford. It is notable that Martin rests this conclusion mainly upon economic premises. He too is silent on the *politics* of British military policy (p. 171).

In the books by Colonel Snyder, an American army officer, and by Professor Rosecrance of the University of California at Berkeley, British naval policy merges into the large issues of military power, *political* economy, and domestic politics, as these have become interlocked since the Second World War. Snyder's book, *The Politics of British Defense Policy, 1945-1962* (an outgrowth of his Princeton doctoral dissertation), sketches the efforts of British policy-makers (both civilians and military professionals) to define a viable defensive strategy for contemporary Britain. But the book's greater contribution (at least for students of politics) derives from Snyder's description of the processes by which the British military establishment's share of the national product has been determined in recent years, and of the further processes by which that share has been allocated among army, navy, and air force. This is an excellent introduction to the study of military policies *in the context of British politics as a whole.*

In *Defense of the Realm*, Rosecrance deals with some of these issues, but his perspective is different. He is more concerned with the continuing debate over military strategy. He devotes much attention to the efforts since 1945 to define a military role congruent with the policy-makers' images of what is needed and at the same time feasible within the limitations imposed by the British economy. Plans, projects, and strategic arguments are reviewed skillfully and in as much detail as available sources permit. Anyone who reads this book will learn a good deal about the public debate over military objectives and strategies that has continued in Britain during the past twenty years.

Despite these unquestionable merits, the book suffers, in our judgment, from deficiencies of style and taste[4] and, more important, of

[4] The book is written in a didactic style that occasionally comes close to telling Britons what is good for them, a matter that most Americans would surely prefer to leave for Britons to decide for themselves. The writing is cluttered with banal platitudes: e.g., "Countries do not lightly resolve their own annihilation, and strategies which cause them to do so are vain and inefficacious"; and again, "Since economic strength is more than ever regarded as precedent to military strength . . . British retrenchment and economic growth may yet reveal semblances of grandeur" (pp. 24, 32). Reifying rhetoric, a practice to which we are perhaps more allergic than some, pervades the prose.

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substantive fact and the interpretation thereof. Rosecrance covers the economic limitations on British military spending, but says very little about other salient limitations, especially those deriving from various social demands and programs—and what he does say on these issues is not entirely sustained by evidence we shall review later on.[5]

A common theme runs through all six of these works, especially those by Snyder and Rosecrance: the generally adverse effects of changing conditions on Britain's power, influence, and prestige in international politics. The books by Bartlett, Graham, Snyder, and Rosecrance all contribute to better understanding of historical events.[6] But as indicated at the outset, it is profitable to view British military power and policy in the light of a still larger historical background.[7]

II

A convenient point of entry is 1815, the year the French wars finally ended, though, as Graham suggests (chap. 1) and others have demonstrated in detail, the roots of Britain's nineteenth-century naval primacy reach back at least to the reign of Elizabeth I.[8] In the generation of nearly continuous conflict with revolutionary France, the British navy had achieved a fairly comprehensive command of the sea. Specifically, British forces had prevented invasion of the home islands, protected movements of troops and matériel to foreign battlefields, maintained the flow of essential supplies into Britain, and driven enemy fleets and

[5] The format of the book, too, is open to criticism. The work is presented as serious scholarship and is published by a leading university press. The text is buttressed by footnotes, but there is no collected bibliography or bibliographic essay nor are there index references to sources cited. These deficiencies (for which the publisher may be more responsible than the author) make it difficult to use the book for reference and make it even more difficult to visualize the scope of the materials used in its preparation.

[6] Others have dealt in greater depth with some of these issues: among them, DeWitt C. Armstrong, Jr., "The Changing Strategy of British Bases," unpubl. diss., Princeton University, 1960, summarized in "The British Revalue Their Strategic Bases," *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, CIV (November 1959), 423-32; also William J. Crowe, Jr., "The Policy Roots of the Modern British Navy," unpubl. diss., Princeton University, 1965. Various aspects are covered in William Strang, *Britain in World Affairs* (New York 1961); F.S. Northedge, *The Troubled Giant: Britain Among the Great Powers, 1916-1939* (New York 1966); and Northedge, *British Foreign Policy: The Process of Readjustment, 1945-1961* (New York 1962).

[7] Some of the themes discussed in the following pages have been previously developed in our earlier writings: in particular, *Toward a New Order of Sea Power* (Princeton 1940), chaps. 1-2; *Foundations of National Power* (Princeton 1945), chap. 6; "Britain's Defense Problem," in *Britain Today: Economics, Defense and Foreign Policy*, a collection of papers delivered at a conference sponsored by Princeton University, 1959; and "'Retreat From World Power,'" our review article in *World Politics*, cited previously.

[8] See Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History* (Boston 1890); also Strang, chaps. 1-6.

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merchant shipping from the main sea routes, thereby cutting Napoleon and his satellites off from essential supplies and assistance.

As the French wars receded, the Royal Navy's presence (often only a token presence) in foreign ports and upon the high sea served to keep memories of British naval prowess alive and to foster in other people's minds a presumption that the Royal Navy could again close the main seaways to its enemies in case of war. This thesis is implicit throughout the books by Bartlett and Graham.

No one can possibly know for certain how much political leverage British diplomats derived from this source. The materials for solving that riddle vanished with the men who dealt with Britons during the nineteenth century. However, from scattered and inconclusive clues in the surviving records, it seems credible that throughout most of that century, the legend of British naval invincibility, firmly rooted in historic achievement, exerted a strong psychological influence both on Britain's adversaries and on British statesmen themselves.

It is clearer in retrospect than it was to most contemporary observers that Britain's historic (and presumptively continuing) ability to set the terms of access to the high sea in time of war derived from a rather extraordinary combination of environing conditions. And so pervasive was the myth that it diverted attention from changes—technological, economic, and broadly political—that gradually and insidiously eroded the foundation of British seapower during the later nineteenth century and thereafter to the present day.

Britain's influence on other nations reached its peak in a period when all the Great Powers were European states—the period when the expression "European states system" was nearly synonymous with international politics. It was also a period when overland transport was everywhere slow and costly. For most of the continental countries, access to the ocean and connecting seas was a condition of high priority, nearly as essential as for insular Britain. The bulk of their maritime traffic had to pass through one or more constricting seaways—the Channel, the North Sea, the Strait of Gibraltar, and (after 1869) the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. By occupying shore positions near those bottlenecks and by maintaining even nominal naval forces in the vicinity, British statesmen kept their continental adversaries perpetually reminded of the Royal Navy's presumptive ability to deny access to the oceans and lands beyond. Under conditions prevailing until near the end of the nineteenth century, presumptive control of the narrow seas of Europe entailed political effects felt around the world. "From home ports, or from advanced bases on the fringe of Europe . . . Britain

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could in a sense isolate Europe, and yet, almost automatically, maintain naval superiority in all the seas of the world" (Graham, p. 23).

The global effect of presumptive local control of European waters was buttressed by ancillary geo-military patterns in the Indian Ocean and in other distant seas (Graham, chaps. 2-3). By mid-century Britain held strategic shore positions close to all the passages into and from the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific oceans. Nearly all of those established (or potential) naval stations were located either upon an island or at the foot of a peninsula or promontory or upon an isolated coast backed by desert, jungle, or mountains.[9] Before the spreading railway grids reached deeply into Africa and across Eurasia and North America, before the days of motor vehicles rolling along all-weather highways, above all before the advent of submarines and aircraft, neither the British Isles nor the bases overseas could be taken from an unprotected flank or rear. As long as the British navy retained control of the water's surface, all were secure. And the same forces that secured the empire provided, in Graham's metaphor, the "cutting edge" of British diplomacy (p. 81).

All this was accomplished without the financial burden of a large military establishment on land. A relatively small army, manned by volunteers, garrisoned the colonies and naval bases and provided a nucleus for greater forces if required in case of major war in Europe or beyond the oceans. Thus, "the purposes of offense and defence could be fulfilled in the exercise of one instrument—a preponderant navy" (Graham, p. 118).

In contrast to the astronomical cost of large military establishments in our time, the price of Britain's nineteenth-century global primacy seems incredibly cheap. From the 1830's until the end of the century, the combined cost of army and navy in time of peace varied between two and three percent of the national income.[10] At the peak of British power and influence, the decade of the 1860's, total expenditures for military purposes averaged less than £30 million per year. Adjusting for inflation and changes in the dollar price of sterling, this works out to something in the range of one to two percent of average U.S. military

[9] A partial list of British strategic positions overseas includes, besides those mentioned above, the Cape of Good Hope, the Falkland Islands, Ceylon, Singapore, Hong Kong, Jamaica, Trinidad, Halifax, Vancouver Island, and several positions within the Mediterranean. In 1904, Admiral Lord Fisher penned the often quoted epigram, "Five keys lock up the world! Singapore, the Cape, Alexandria, Gibraltar, Dover. These five keys belong to England . . ." (quoted by Arthur J. Marder in *The Anatomy of British Sea Power* [New York 1940], 473).

[10] B. R. Mitchell and Phyllis Deane, eds., *Abstract of British Historical Statistics* (Cambridge 1962), 366-67, 396-97.

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expenditures in the 1950's and early 1960's. In short, mid-nineteenth-century British governments policed a worldwide empire and a global net of seaways and exerted on other nations an influence as great as, if not considerably greater than, that the United States can achieve today at a real cost fifty to one hundred times larger.[11]

This is the thrust of the story, told by Bartlett in detail but with insufficient generalization (for the period ending in 1853) and by Graham with impressive generalizing skill but less supporting detail (for the century as a whole). Graham says virtually nothing about adverse developments toward the end of the century and later that progressively undermined the Pax Britannica. That phase of British and international history lies beyond the scope of his book and has yet to be analyzed and synoptically synthesized with comparable thoroughness.[12] But at least a sketch of that long drawn-out process is necessary background for writings on Britain's present-day military policies and role in international politics.[13]

III

As the nineteenth century drew to a close, a few observers were beginning to perceive, albeit dimly, that the British political community was the legatee of a depreciating estate, so to speak. In a slightly different metaphor, PEP (a British planning group active since the 1930's) characterized Britain at the end of the century as "in the position of a patentee whose patent is running out."[14]

[11] This estimate is derived from the price indexes in *Abstract of British Historical Statistics*, 476; and in Alan T. Peacock and Jack Wiseman, *The Growth of Public Expenditure in the United Kingdom* (Princeton 1961), 153-54. Our estimate may be considerably in error, but is probably on the conservative side. In any case, the general order of magnitudes is all that matters.

[12] There are numerous histories of British naval policy covering the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The most detailed are three massive volumes by Arthur J. Marder, who covers the period 1880-1916: *The Anatomy of British Sea Power*, cited earlier, and *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow*, 2 vols. (London 1965, 1966). For some of the consequences for Britain of the German naval program in the early 1900's, the standard work is E. L. Woodward, *Great Britain and the German Navy* (Oxford 1935); also the recent work by Jonathan Sternberg, *Yesterday's Deterrent: Tirpitz and the Birth of the German Battle Fleet* (London 1965). These works are superior specimens of a considerable literature, mostly in the style of narrative diplomatic history, in which events are reconstructed and arranged with minimal synthesis and often with insufficient attention to changing conditions, technological and economic in particular.

[13] A synoptic sketch of the erosion of the Pax Britannica was presented nearly thirty years ago in chaps. 1-2 of our *Toward a New Order of Sea Power*. A fuller and more mature synthesis will be included in our forthcoming work on Britain's changing role in international politics.

[14] Political and Economic Planning, *Planning No. 24*, quoted by Stephen King-Hall, in *Our Own Times* (London 1935), Vol. I, 25.

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Historians may disagree as to just when British statesmen began to be consciously aware of this erosive trend—when a sense of security and adequacy (with only occasional lapses into anxiety) gave way to chronic anxiety (relieved only sporadically by short intervals of relaxation). Lord Strang, a lifelong diplomat, has suggested that the turning point came between 1887 and 1897, the dates of the Golden and Diamond Jubilees of Victoria's reign.[15] Professor Graham is less specific, saying simply that "the margin of security was far greater during the first half than at the end of the century . . ." (p. 110).

In any case, it is now possible, in longer historical perspective, to identify relevant antecedents of the change well back in the nineteenth century. These include technological innovations of many kinds, changes in the geopolitical structure and scale of international politics, erosion of Britain's industrial, commercial, and financial primacy, and profound stirrings within the British nation and in the colonies overseas.

The technological revolution included radical changes in the design, propulsion, and armament of naval ships—the transition from sail to steam, from solid shot to explosive shells, from smoothbores to rifled guns, from "wooden walls" to heavily armored steel decks and hulls; the invention of the automotive torpedo; and many other innovations—a transformation described with authority and in detail in Bernard Brodie's *Sea Power in the Machine Age*.[16]

Officers and seamen of the period of Elizabeth I could have "sailed and fought . . . with considerable efficiency" the ships of Lord Nelson's navy 250 years later. But "Nelson's men . . . would have been utterly bemused if called upon to go forward only a quarter of that period."[17] Naval ships in the 1830's were still in essence similar to those of the Napoleonic wars. But those of the 1880's had become much more like the ships that fought the Battle of Jutland in 1916.

Other facets of the technological revolution entailed consequences no less destructive of the old order of seapower. The building of canals and railways, with improved roads to follow and, eventually, motor vehicles to travel upon them, made continental countries progressively less dependent upon seaborne transport. Improved overland transport was part of a larger technological upsurge—for example, in industrial

[15] *Britain in World Affairs*, 188ff., 233ff.

[16] (Princeton 1941). For an earlier account of the revolution in naval technology, from the standpoint of American power and policy, see our *Rise of American Naval Power* (Princeton 1939), paperback ed. (Princeton 1966).

[17] Michael Lewis, "Armed Forces and the Art of War: Navies," in *The New Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. X (Cambridge 1960), chap. 11, 274.

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chemistry (new metallurgical processes, synthetic substitutes for natural materials, and so on) and in engineering design (the steam turbine, oil-fired boiler, internal combustion engine, electric generator, and many, many others). Nearly all of the technological innovations narrowed the potential effects of future naval blockades or reduced the security of insular Britain, its oversea colonies and naval stations, and the interconnecting seaways. As is well known, submarines in the First World War and the combination of submarines and aircraft in the Second nearly brought the British people to starvation and the British economy to collapse.

Changes in the geopolitical structure of international politics also worked adversely to Britain. Japan and the United States began building modern navies in the 1880's. These expanded rapidly during the 1890's and thereafter. By 1900 control of the ocean portals of Europe no longer gave to the British navy a global command of the sea. Only by redeploying major naval units to American and Asian waters could the Admiralty have maintained its former presumptive primacy in those distant seas. And whatever the inclinations of British naval authorities, developments nearer home precluded any such redeployment. Accelerated naval building in Europe, especially in Germany after 1900, threatened Britain's historic predominance in European seas. Thus, instead of strengthening its American and Asian squadrons, the Admiralty had progressively to deplete them in its effort to maintain a margin of superiority in the narrow seas and eastern Atlantic.

Japanese, American, and German naval expansion was an outward manifestation of profound changes in international politics. The historic European states system was becoming a global system, with additional, widely separated centers of power and influence in North America and Asia. Concurrently, the scale of everything—agriculture, industry, communications, military forces—was increasing. These changes moved the British geographer, Sir Halford Mackinder, to conclude in 1902, on the final page of his book *Britain and the British Seas*, that "in the presence of vast Powers broad-based on the resources of half-continents, Britain could not again become mistress of the seas."[18]

British as well as foreign appreciation of these changes and their military-political implications lagged behind events. As late as 1948—three years after atomic bombs wrecked Hiroshima and Nagasaki—the Government's annual Statement on Defence still adhered in essential respects to the historic design. It was readily admitted that new

[18] (New York 1902), 358.

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weapons and other changes in the international milieu had rendered Britain's military problem more difficult and costly. But there was little evidence that the Defence Minister and his political and professional colleagues contemplated drastic reassessment of military objectives and strategy. It was still assumed that "balanced forces"—land, sea, and air, supplemented by suitable civilian defenses—could repel any assault on the home islands, keep open vital oversea communications, garrison the colonies, keep the economy running, and carry on offensive operations as required. Even as late as 1955, after the Soviet Union had successfully tested its own thermonuclear weapons, the traditional doctrine continued to show through a veneer of lip service to new weapons, increased vulnerabilities, and drastic changes in the international system.

Concomitant changes in economic conditions also weakened Britain's relative power position. For reasons beyond the scope of this discussion, the Industrial Revolution began earlier in Britain than elsewhere. For several decades British producers enjoyed a long head start over most foreign competitors. British imports of food and raw materials and exports of coal and manufactures came in the nineteenth century to constitute by far the largest national component of the total commerce among nations. Most of the profits from this enterprise were reinvested in Britain and also overseas. To facilitate this worldwide system of trade and investment, British bankers evolved an international monetary system based on unrestricted movement of gold and convertibility of sterling into all currencies. London became the capital, so to speak, of a commercial and financial community that came to embrace not only the British oversea colonies and dominions but also most of the politically independent communities in every continent.[19]

The deterioration of this economic order was as gradual and insidious as the erosion of Britain's military primacy upon the seas. As late as 1850 the British economy produced over half of the world's iron and steel. But before the end of the century both Germany and

[19] The standard authority on this aspect of British nineteenth-century primacy is Albert H. Imlah, *Economic Elements in the Pax Britannica* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958). In an overview of the period 1810-1850, the British historian David Thomson says: "The effect of economic changes in these four decades was that by 1850, Great Britain had triumphantly established herself both as the 'workshop of the world' and as the shipper and trader of the world. . . . Her [worldwide] interests . . . were soon to be deeply and severely affected by formidable rivals whose industrialisation had meanwhile taken place. The greatest of these were Germany and the United States. But until the decade after 1870 she continued to harvest very rich rewards, as the impetus of her growth and productivity carried her forward" ("The United Kingdom and Its World-wide Interests," in *The New Cambridge Modern History*, X, chap. 13, 333-34).

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the United States produced more than Britain. That is not to say that British production declined. On the contrary, it went on rising. What gradually declined was Britain's share of the world total. British production simply expanded less rapidly than that of the newer industrial economies. What was true of steel was true, with variations of detail, of numerous other sectors of economic activity. The picture was much the same with respect to coal production, shipbuilding, ship operation, exports and imports of commodities, and other indicators of economic activity.

The two world wars accelerated the decline of Britain's industrial, commercial, and financial primacy. The first war entailed the sale of a considerable portion of foreign investments, income from which had long helped to pay for essential imports of food and raw materials. The second war further depleted the investment portfolio, while inflicting heavy damage on productive plant and delaying replacement of obsolescent plant and equipment. The war also disrupted established trade patterns and stimulated the growth of local industries in countries previously dependent on Britain for some or most of their manufactures. Thus Britain entered the post-1945 period with heavy economic handicaps, handicaps only partially offset by large-scale loans and subsidies, chiefly from the United States.

IV

It remains to examine still another set of conditions and events, the impact of which on Britain's external power and influence has received less attention than it deserves. Few subjects have been more diligently investigated in recent years than the condition of the British common people during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but rarely in the context of international politics. In the earlier years, the picture is one of unrelieved hardships and misery, a picture of a population barely literate, ignorant of affairs, geographically immobile in the main, grossly underpaid, poorly housed and fed—*above all a population with almost no effective access to government.*[20] Judges who

[20] Among the works we have found most useful in this connection, special mention should be made of Henry Mayhew, *London Labour and the London Poor* (London 1861), 3 vols; Charles Booth, *Life and Labour of the People in London*, 17 vols., published during the final years of the nineteenth century, and a recently published abridgment in one volume, *Charles Booth's London*, edited by Albert Fried and Richard M. Elman (New York 1967); C. F. G. Masterman, *The Condition of England* (London 1909); G. D. H. and M. I. Cole, *The Condition of Britain* (London 1937); G. D. H. Cole and Raymond Postgate, *The Common People, 1746-1938* (London 1938); Phyllis Deane, *The First Industrial Revolution* (Cambridge 1965), chap. 9; Herman Ausubel, *In Hard Times* (New York 1960); L. G. Johnson, *The Social Evo-*

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administered the common law of crimes, torts, and property legitimized the existing order and denied redress of injustice to the poor. Lords and Commons resisted social reform, in part from conviction, in part from sheer parsimony. In a sense which most Americans today should comprehend, the common people of Britain were the "invisible poor"—invisible not so much in a literal as in a political sense. These were the people characterized in 1909 by C. F. G. Masterman as "that 80 percent (say) of the present inhabitants of these islands who never express their own grievances, who rarely become articulate, who can only be observed from outside and very far away."[21] This "multitude," as Masterman also called them, were more or less effectively excluded from the British *political* community of which they were nominally members.

The Pax Britannica of the mid-nineteenth century rested, in both its economic and its military aspects, upon the social order sketched above. It was a social order that encouraged saving as well as affluent living by the well-to-do upper classes and denied to the vastly more numerous manual and clerical workers a large part of the fruits of their labor. In the historic words of John Maynard Keynes, the industrial growth that supported the military power of the European states, Britain included, depended on a "double bluff or deception."

"On the one hand, the laboring classes accepted from ignorance or powerlessness, or were compelled, persuaded, or cajoled by custom, convention, authority, and the well-established order of society into accepting a situation in which they could call their own very little of the cake that they and Nature and the capitalists were cooperating to produce. And on the other hand the capitalist classes were allowed to call the best part of the cake theirs and were theoretically free to consume it, on the tacit underlying condition that they consumed very little of it in practice."[22]

Some critics have contended that Keynes exaggerated the degree of exploitation and servitude to which the common people were subjected. There clearly is room for some debate as to how large a part of the population was so enthralled. That it ran to many millions cannot be doubted. After thorough research, it has been recently reaffirmed that "destitution was still the outstanding characteristic of our [British] industrial society up to the First World War. Between a quarter and

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lution of Industrial Britain (Liverpool 1959); S. G. Checkland, *The Rise of Industrial Society in England* (London 1964); David Roberts, *Victorian Origins of the British Welfare State* (New Haven 1960).

[21] P. 85. [22] *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (New York 1920), 19-20.

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a third of the whole population still lived in 'poverty,' carefully defined . . . as 'earnings . . . insufficient to obtain the minimum necessaries for the maintenance of mere physical efficiency' . . . ."[23]

In 1920, when Keynes penned the words quoted above, the British social order was in the early stage of a nonviolent but nonetheless sweeping revolution. Progressive taxation was beginning to transfer control over accumulated wealth and income from private owners to public authorities. And concurrently, politicians of all parties were becoming more attentive to the condition of the less privileged classes.

In the space available here we can mention only some of the dimensions of a process that began in the nineteenth century, gathered momentum in the early years of the twentieth, and eventually transformed the British political community. Those dimensions included extensions of the suffrage, mitigation of the rigors of the common law, legalization of unions, recognition of the right to strike, a gradual increase in the allocations of public resources to education, old-age pensions, and other social services, development of the Labour party, and the leveling side effects of two exhausting wars. Change was rapid in some decades, dragged in others. But the secular trend has been irreversible.

As the poor have become less poor, more articulate, more politically active, their demands in Britain (as elsewhere) have risen steadily and steeply, along with those of nearly all classes of society. Expressed in terms of domestic politics, these demands have become increasingly "hard" demands—hard in the sense that politicians, even the most conservative, have rather consistently given high priority to them in recent years, either from conviction or for reasons of expediency. Indeed, "pie in the sky," *now* or *soon*, not merely in some vague "by and by," has become a prime principle of prudential statecraft in Britain as it has increasingly around the world.[24]

Anyone who doubts the thrust of this trend in Britain should consider the picture that emerges from the statistical record. As indicated in Figure 1, in the 1890's annual expenditures of public authorities for social services averaged slightly over two percent of GNP.[25] By

[23] John Burnett, *Plenty and Want* (London 1966), 93.

[24] Regarding this aspect of British political culture, see Richard Rose, *Politics in England* (Boston 1964), chap. 2; for a comparison of British and American political culture in these and other respects, see Kenneth N. Waltz, *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics* (Boston 1967), chap. 2.

[25] The category "social services" covers "education and child care, health services, national insurance (unemployment, sickness benefits, retirement pensions, etc.), national assistance (relief of the poor and family allowances), housing (subsidies and capital expenditures), and food subsidies" (Peacock and Wiseman, 183). These subcategories

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(as percentages of GNP)



Sources: 1890-1955, Peacock and Wiseman, 190-91; 1955-1966, Central Statistical Office, *National Income and Expenditure, 1967.*

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1913, the eve of World War I, these had risen to four percent. In the last year before World War II, the allocation had risen to eleven percent. In 1950, the first relatively "normal" year after the war, the allocation was eighteen percent. From that level it declined to sixteen percent in 1957 and since then has risen steadily to more than twenty-one percent in 1966.

Turning to expenditures for military purposes, Figure 1 shows that the allocation before World War I was nearly the same as for social services, except during the Boer War at the turn of the century. In the interwar period (1920-1938), the military allocation ranged from over eight percent of GNP in 1920 to less than three percent in the late twenties and early thirties to nearly nine percent on the eve of the Second World War. From 1921 to 1938, military expenditures were consistently lower than allocations to the social services. The widest spread came in the depression year of 1932, when military and social-service allocations were 2.8 and 12.9 percent respectively.

For the 1950's and 1960's, the statistical contrast is just as striking and the trend even more so. In 1950, the military services took 7.2 percent of the GNP; in 1952, 11.8 percent in response to the Korean crisis. Thereafter the allocation to military purposes declined more or less steadily to 6.9 percent in 1966, with further decline in prospect.[26] In the same period, as noted above, public expenditures for the social services stood at 18 percent of GNP in 1950, declined to 16 percent in the middle fifties, and rose steadily thereafter to 21.2 percent in 1966.

A similar picture emerges when expenditures for military purposes and for the social services are viewed as fractions *not* of GNP but of total governmental expenditures. This picture is graphically presented in Figure 2 (p. 683), and we shall have more to say on this issue later in connection with certain conclusions reached by Professor Rosecrance. We leave this picture for the moment with the observation that, no matter what prime ministers and their fellow politicians *say* about maintaining the military posture and stature of a great power, the statistics of allocation tell us that the social services during the past seventeen or eighteen years have commanded higher priority than the military services. In short, compared with social welfare, military commitments are "soft" demands in the context of electoral and

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are derived from the Central Statistical Office's annual handbook *National Income and Expenditure*. For the earlier years, many of these items were negligible or non-existent. That is to say, public expenditures for social services have expanded in scope as well as in magnitude during the past half century.

[26] Statistics for 1967 were unavailable at the time of writing in early 1968.

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parliamentary politics. Barring dire emergency, such as an all-encompassing war, it is unrealistic, in our judgment, to expect any reversal of these priorities in the foreseeable future.

V

The prospect of continuing military retrenchment is further strengthened by extending the analysis to additional dimensions of the British *political* economy. As the readers of this journal are well aware, Britain is a densely settled, heavily industrialized country, but poor in indigenous material resources. The economy depends heavily upon imports. About fifty percent of all food is imported. Coal is the only abundant indigenous raw material, and the cost of producing coal from old mines has risen sharply in recent decades. Total imports—chiefly foodstuffs and industrial raw materials—have regularly exceeded twenty-five percent of GNP in recent years.

These imports are paid for mainly by current exports of goods and services. Given Britain's dependence on imports, the nation's ability to meet the various demands for goods and services depends, first of all, on correspondingly high exports. This requires not only that goods and services be available for export, but also that they compete effectively with the offerings of foreign competitors.

In order to keep British prices competitive in foreign markets, numerous conditions are necessary. One of these is that British equipment and methods of production be kept up-to-date and efficient in a period of rapidly advancing industrial technology and consequent early obsolescence. This requirement entails large annual increments of new fixed capital. Furthermore, nearly all capital equipment manufactured in Britain—every turbine, generator, lathe, die, press, tractor, truck, and much of the rest—contains some amount, usually a good deal, of imported materials. Hence, keeping British industry abreast of foreign competitors not only requires large allocations from current output to investment, but also involves consumption of large quantities of imports. Nor is that the whole story! Most of the goods exported to pay for imports of raw materials also contain imported materials themselves. These, in turn, must be paid for by additional imports. Thus there is a sort of spiraling effect that presents special problems for an economy as dependent on imports as Britain's is these days.

Whenever the aggregate of purchases from foreign suppliers exceeds sales to foreign customers, the international account can be balanced only by some one or combination of the following: deferring payment

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or other borrowing abroad, receiving gifts from foreign governments, exporting gold or other monetary reserves, and lowering the official exchange value of sterling relative to other currencies. The problem can be severely aggravated by the traditional practice of many foreign governments as well as private individuals and companies of maintaining large sterling deposits in British banks. When international payments crises occur, as these have with painful frequency since World War II, foreign depositors are likely to withdraw some or all of their sterling deposits—that is, to sell sterling. Such withdrawals tend to depress the price of sterling, necessitating support from Britain's limited monetary reserves. Even without this added source of pressure, the British economy is extremely sensitive to changes in the international flow of goods and services.[27]

The need to expand domestic investment and to increase exports has been a continuing theme in British political debate over recent years. The links between investments, exports, imports, and the international balance of payments have been reiterated hundreds of times in Parliament and the public prints. It has also been repeatedly argued that the only *feasible* way to achieve these ends is to reduce military expenditures. This argument rests upon the important premise—a premise rarely made explicit in public—*that it is politically inexpedient to dampen private spending severely or to cut back governmental spending for the social services.*

Foreign observers, especially Americans, harshly criticize the British Government's reluctance to curtail personal consumption and social-welfare goals, if necessary, to sustain military and military-related foreign commitments. Critics have accused British Governments of timidity, of abandoning Britain's "international responsibilities," of sacrificing national security and honor for partisan advantage, and more of the same. Leaving aside the dubious propriety of foreigners' telling Britons how to manage their public affairs, such criticisms often betray ignorance of widely held values, priorities, and other features of the British political scene.

[27] Writing for the *District Bank Review* (London) in 1957, the British economist John Jewkes characterized Britain's international economic position in terms that still apply, with some changes in detail, a decade later: "Comparing 1939 with 1955, in pounds sterling of unchanged value, our gold and dollar reserves are now about five-eighths, our total overseas investments perhaps one-half, our returns on overseas investments perhaps three-fifths of what they formerly were. Hanging above our heads are the short-term external liabilities, standing mainly to the credit of sterling area countries, which are about three times as large as pre-war; and a £2,000 million of long-term dollar debts which have been incurred since 1945" (No. 121 [March 1957], 3-17).

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The average standard of living in Britain has improved considerably in the past twenty-five years.[28] Compared to people in most societies, Britons live well, though on the average less well than the average in the United States. However, British attitudes reflect bitter memories of hard times: ten years of severe depression followed by nearly twenty years of bleak austerity—the years of the Second World War, the delayed postwar recovery, and the Korean War. In those years, rationing, high purchase taxes, still higher income taxes, stringent credit restrictions, and other government-imposed controls all severely curtailed personal consumption—far more severely than anything most of Britain's American critics have ever themselves experienced.

In a masterpiece of understatement in 1957, Professor Jewkes, in the article previously quoted, observed that "efforts to cut down consumption might encounter stronger . . . psychological resistance . . . than in 1939." This was definitely our own impression during our extended residence in Britain in 1955, 1957, and 1962. Austerity had become an odious word. People everywhere were hungry for better houses, new furniture, modern kitchens, new cars, oversea vacations, and all the other amenities that middle-class Americans simply take for granted. People were not only hungry for these things, but determined to have them. Since 1962 we have had to observe the British scene from a distance. But we know of no evidence that indicates any slackening of the popular demand for goods and services. This is politically a "hard" demand, and Labour and Conservative Governments alike have so recognized it.

Under conditions prevailing since World War II, this "hard" consumer demand has put heavy pressure on the British economy. Increased spending for immediate personal consumption, like investment in new capital, increases imports of food and raw materials. The imported materials that go into personal consumption, no less than those that go into new fixed capital, must be paid for with greater exports of goods and services. And, to reemphasize a point made previously, these greater exports of goods and services require in turn still further imports, since the exports themselves contain a substantial amount of imported materials.

What we have said with regard to personal consumption applies with comparable force to governmental spending for nonmilitary purposes. It applies to the cost of administration, to modernization and rationalization of the nationalized coal and transportation industries,

[28] Burnett, chaps. 13-14.

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to the building and maintenance of modern highways and other public works. It applies in particular to subsidized housing projects, to the national health service, to education and child care, to old-age pensions and unemployment compensation, and to other social services. Anyone who follows events in Britain is familiar with the outcry that greets any proposal to cut back severely, or even marginally, in the broad sector of social services and welfare.

Finally, as has frequently been emphasized by British and foreign commentators, the military services consume both labor and materials, including imported materials, that might otherwise go into exportable goods and services. In an economy as nearly fully employed as Britain's has been most of the time in recent years, the military establishment competes with the civilian economy for manual labor, for specialized skills, and for the output of industries, especially metal-using industries upon which the export trade also heavily depends. And British military forces overseas consume foreign services (which have to be paid for with exports) just as surely as do British tourists in the Alps.[29]

In the foregoing paragraphs we have assembled a picture of the British political economy as an intricate system of capital, materials, labor, and organization, producing and distributing goods and services to several more or less distinct sets of claimants. These claimants compete in the political forum as well as in the market place for shares of a supply of goods and services—a supply that increases through time, but remains grossly insufficient in the aggregate to cover similarly increasing demands and commitments.

In times of acutely sensed peril, Britons have shown themselves as able as any nation, more able than many, to carry on under restrictions of many kinds. They did so with remarkable perseverance during World War II and for nearly a decade thereafter. But the prevailing mood in Britain, as elsewhere, has changed in recent years. Britons appear, in general, to view the world scene with less alarm. Except for the short-lived Suez crisis in 1956, local problems have tended to crowd foreign events and commitments from most people's attention. The weight of the evidence known to us suggests that Britons these days are more concerned about taxes, pay, new cars, better schools, and a host of other problems close at hand, than about Russia, China,

[29] This aspect of Britain's military problem is especially well covered in chap. 9 of Colonel Snyder's book. He also deals with the closely related issue of conscription. Growing resistance to conscription became evident in the middle fifties. Conscription was abolished after the Suez crisis of 1956-1957 by the reorganized Conservative Government headed by Harold Macmillan. Snyder covers the question of conscription in both its political and its military aspects (pp. 240-42 and elsewhere).

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communism, Vietnam, De Gaulle, or the H-bomb. If this is so, one speculates that the tenure of British cabinets is likely to depend more on maintaining and further improving the style of living than on pursuing a vigorous foreign policy, maintaining an impressive "military presence" overseas, contributing to European defense, supporting the United States, or otherwise preparing for hypothetical perils abroad.

Evidence also seems to indicate that leading politicians of both major parties clearly understand this mood of their constituents. At any rate, as previously shown, their decisions in recent years have rather consistently given high priority to personal consumption and the social services, nearly as high priority to exports and industrial modernization, and much lower priority to oversea commitments and the military establishment.

This schedule of priorities, we repeat, derives from two sets of imperatives: economic and broadly political. Domestic capital formation and exports of goods and services receive high priority because the economy's viability is at stake, and everything else depends on that. Personal consumption and the social services receive high priority because the tenure of the Government may be at stake. These imperatives take precedence over foreign commitments and military demands in the prudential calculus of contemporary British politics.[30]

Numerous American critics attribute these conditions to socialism and the welfare state. They talk as if things would be different if the Conservatives returned to power.[31] A few Tory politicians try to promote this idea both at home and abroad.[32] Such expectations seem to us unrealistic, to say the least. It was a Labour prime minister—Clement

[30] The prevailing schedule of values was clearly evident in the Government's handling of sterling devaluation in November 1967—in particular, in the prominence given to further military retrenchment in connection therewith, and the patently evident reluctance to dampen consumer spending or to cut deeply into welfare services.

[31] A typical example of this style of wishful thinking is the editorial in the *New York Times*, January 12, 1968, in which it was asserted that the Labour Government, "harassed by its left-wing and aiming to cut public spending by $1.12 billion over three years must hack at the defense budget to gain acceptance for its home-front controls."

[32] A Conservative M.P., writing for an American newspaper, observed late in January 1968 that "the cuts, except in defense, did not add up to very much, and were not accompanied by their essential corollary, the restraint on consumer demand. Instead, Chancellor [of the Exchequer] Roy Jenkins announced that he would present a budget on March 19, and the size of the taxation measure he takes then will depend on the state of the economy at that time. This is generally interpreted to mean that there will be a sharp rise in taxation on consumer goods, and the result has been totally predictable—a spending spree which is making it Christmas every day for the big stores. . . . By the time Jenkins gets around to doing anything about it, there will scarcely be any consumer durables left to send for exports" (*Trenton Evening Times*, January 31, 1968).

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Attlee—who yielded to pressure from Washington to join the United States in the costly Korean War buildup—costly for the British economy and for the future of his Government. It was a succession of Conservative prime ministers—Churchill, Eden, Macmillan, and Home—who subsequently cut back the military services year after year until a Labour Government was returned to office in 1964. In practice, if not in public posture, the Conservative party is nearly as deeply committed as Labour to the essential features of the welfare state. Richard Rose, a percipient interpreter of British "political culture," states without qualification that "attitudes toward welfare services today reflect a very high level of consensus."[33] In short, Conservative and Labour politicians are both responsive to the same economic imperatives and electoral exigencies, regardless of the personal convictions of individuals.

One of the great merits of Colonel Snyder's book is his explicit recognition and empathetic treatment of the conflicting demands to which British statesmen respond. He indulges in no polemics or recriminations. His analysis is rigorous and sophisticated, but temperate throughout. His final conclusion: "The gap between commitments and forces in being and the limited flexibility which the Government's strategy allows in Europe are serious shortcomings. These deficiencies exist, however, *because military policies conflict with other national goals*. . . . Security policies, in brief, exhibit the qualities associated with all public policies in the United Kingdom. They rest on a broad consensus, evolve slowly but constantly, and involve a compromise between many conflicting objectives . . ." (pp. 258-59, italics added).

Professor Rosecrance recognizes clearly the economic limitations on British statecraft. But we must query some of the conclusions he derives therefrom. For example, he asserts that "the reason for such rigid defense targets is provided by the *laggard domestic economy*" (p. 30, italics added). The italicized phrase seems to us debatable. We are aware that such a phrase has been used by many speakers in various contexts. We are also aware that the British economy has not expanded as rapidly as some others in recent years. But British GNP, *in real terms* (that is, allowing for inflation of prices) has increased by well over fifty percent since 1950, or better than three percent per year on the average.[34] We would suggest that the economic restriction on British spending for military purposes derives not so much from the *laggardness* as from the *structure* of the economy. That is to say, the limitation de-

[33] *Politics in England*, 43.
[34] *National Income and Expenditure*, 1967, 16-17.

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rives from the economy's heavy dependence on imports (and hence on exports and industrial efficiency) and from the economy's vulnerability to recurrent balance-of-payments difficulties, as Rosecrance himself repeatedly recognizes throughout the book.

Another interpretation that we must query is his statement that "modernization [of industry], exports, *and social welfare* have *all* suffered while the defense bill mounted" (p. 283, italics added). As previously stated in this review article and now shown graphically in Figure 2, government spending on the social services has risen since the

FIGURE 2. GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES, 1950-1966, FOR HOUSING, SOCIAL SERVICES, AND MILITARY PURPOSES

(as percentages of total government expenditures)



SOURCE: *National Income and Expenditure, 1967*, 64 ff.

early 1950's from forty percent to fifty percent of all public expenditures, while in the same period expenditures for military purposes have declined from nearly thirty to less than seventeen percent. In short, one has to turn Rosecrance's conclusion around and say that military purposes have suffered while the social services bill has mounted.

A third debatable conclusion, related to those just discussed, is the author's statement that "three arenas of commitment—strategic, European, and worldwide—together comprise Britain's financial problem." He continues: "If any one of them could be dropped or substantially reduced, the other two could be sustained with continuity and vigor" (p. 3). This conclusion cannot be categorically labelled untenable, but

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we do *not* find it convincing, for reasons previously stated. The core of "Britain's financial problem" in recent years, we repeat, has been the *concurrence* of two sets of nonmilitary demands: *economic imperatives* and *prevailing social priorities*.

Hypothetically, more rapid expansion of GNP might overcome to some degree the currently severe pinch imposed by the structure of the economy and by social values and selective priorities. However, our present inclination is to anticipate that British economic productivity will continue to expand at about the recent rate, that social goals and priorities are unlikely to change quickly, that the demands for nonmilitary goods and services will continue to rise, and that these demands will soak up most of any future increase in economic productivity. These, we must emphasize, are only surmises, but we doubt that events will run a different course—barring all-encompassing war or other catastrophe.

VI

We turn now to the general pattern that emerges from the foregoing review of British experience with the dilemma of rising demands and insufficient resources. In the introductory paragraphs we suggested that certain relatively new dimensions of politics might be endowing this age-old dilemma with fresh salience, not only for Britain but for all, or nearly all, political communities as well.

One of these newer dimensions is the progressive enlargement in greater or lesser degree of the effective political community, in many if not most countries, by the processes sometimes called politicization. Until quite recent times, most of the population in nearly all countries were illiterate or barely literate, immobile and unorganized, ignorant and politically powerless. Britain's ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill-housed, long-suffering poor typified the condition of all but tiny privileged elites in even the most affluent and powerful societies of the past. It was a condition of virtual servitude, in effect if not in law, a servitude that more or less rigorously excluded large segments of the population from effective access to those who ruled in the name of the community. In the judgment of Keynes and other eminent authorities, such servitude was a requisite of rapid industrialization. Comparable servitude, with many local variations, was widely imposed on non-European populations, sustaining for a time the historic colonial empires and expediting the production of primary resources that contributed to the rapid industrial development of Europe and the societies of European origin overseas.

These conditions have changed in radical respects during the past

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seventy-five years. Nearly everywhere today, common folk, though far from well informed, are more aware of the gap between relative poverty and affluence both inside their own country and between their own country and others. Spreading knowledge has stimulated demands, gradual and hesitant at first, then insatiable. Less privileged classes have gained greater access to government, greater ability to articulate their felt needs and to compel the society's rulers to pay attention. In the main this process has proceeded further in the democratic and quasi-democratic societies of the West, but the weight of the evidence known to us suggests that it is actually or potentially a universal phenomenon.

Increasing access to government derives in part from education, the spread of information, and better leadership and organization, but also in part from the extreme vulnerability of complex modern societies to disaster in case of any prolonged interruption of essential services. This vulnerability has been driven home with increasing frequency in many countries, but never more dramatically than by the menace of an epidemic of typhoid and other diseases posed by the sanitation workers' strike in New York City in January 1968.

For these and other reasons, governments are giving more heed than formerly to the demands of their less favored constituents. Frequently, from conviction or expedience, politicians have promised much more than can be delivered at existing or prospective levels of production and within existing frames of priorities and commitments. In some instances, as currently within the United States, such overcommitment has led to cutting back social programs already begun—with results dramatically comparable to the menacing behavior of a dog deprived of a partly eaten bone.

The second complicating dimension is related in various ways to these expanding and intensifying demands from the lowly. This second dimension is the rising cost and widening scope of activities required to keep mature urban societies viable as well as to sustain the processes of modernization in the underdeveloped countries. These expanding activities reach into every sector of society. They include, among many other things, more and better education and social services, ever-increasing outlays for environmental services of all kinds, and, in some countries, enlarged expenses for public order and military defense.

In certain respects the environmental services are becoming the most critically important. Man is the "dirty animal" and destructive beyond any other species.[35] Whether he is so by nature or by culture may be

[35] If anyone doubts this statement let him read one or more of the following: Henry

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debatable; in any case it is beside the point at issue here. It is no longer debatable that destructive human activities produce insidious as well as dramatic effects on the physical and social milieu. Nearly every society is accumulating vast and incredibly costly arrears of restoration and maintenance in consequence of the human propensity and ever-enlarging capacity to pollute air and water, to transform verdant landscapes into arid and often noisome wastelands, and otherwise to desecrate and foul the physical habitat.

Varied and costly services are also required to operate and maintain the ever more complex technology of contemporary urban civilization. More costly education is required for adults as well as for children and youth. Greater outlays are required to protect health and maintain mobility, as well as to police congested cities and countrysides. Politicians and civil servants in most of the mature societies, as well as in the modernizing ones, shrink from facing the staggering cost of checking decay, restoring damage, and maintaining a milieu in which people can continue to live a civilized existence. And all this is in addition to the rising cost of military defense and (in the case of numerous states) large nonmilitary as well as military-related external commitments.[36]

Available goods and services in any political community are allocated in accord with more or less discernible patterns and priorities. Allocations are determined in various ways, depending in part on the ideological format, in part on the traditional mores, of the society. But decisions of public authorities (the legitimate rulers) affect in some degree, usually in large degree, who gets what share of what is available; and the role of public authorities tends everywhere to expand.

Still, *The Dirty Animal* (New York 1967); William L. Thomas and others, *Man's Role in Changing the Face of the Earth* (Chicago 1956); Fairfield Osborn, *Our Plundered Planet* (Boston 1948); William Vogt, *Road to Survival* (New York 1948); Stewart L. Udall, *The Quiet Crisis* (New York 1965); George R. Stewart, *Not So Rich As You Think* (Boston 1967).

[36] Failure to give attention to the newer limiting dimensions of domestic politics is widespread among theorists of international politics. Nowhere is this weakness more starkly displayed than in the essay by George Liska, *Imperial America* (Baltimore 1967), sponsored by the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research and warmly endorsed by its director, Robert E. Osgood. In Liska's recipe for a global American imperialism that would cost incalculable billions for an indefinite future, the author gives no attention whatever to the worsening racial and other conflicts that are tearing American society apart or to the dangerous and accelerating deterioration of our physical habitat. Our query to Liska, Osgood, and others of their persuasion is whether they *really* find it credible that even the United States can pay the astronomical price of the new-style imperialism that they advocate, without eroding, progressively crippling, and perhaps eventually destroying the domestic society from which all power and influence are derived.

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Public authorities affect allocations *directly*, by their own expenditures from funds derived from taxation, and/or borrowing, and/or profits of state-owned industries, and/or expropriation of private property, and/or subsidies (gifts) received from abroad. In most countries most of the time, taxation in various forms provides the bulk of the funds expended by public authorities; and taxation nearly everywhere serves the additional purpose of redistributing income in accord with some scheme of values and priorities.

Public authorities also affect allocations of goods and services *indirectly*, by taxation, as indicated just above, by rationing of commodities, by wage and price controls, by restrictions on private borrowing, by foreign exchange controls, import and export restrictions, and central bank interest rates, and by still other means.

The allocation of resources in any political community in any statistical period can be represented in various ways, provided, of course, that necessary data are accessible. One graphic device for this purpose is the "pie" diagram, as shown for Britain in Figure 3. This diagram enables one to visualize at a glance the allocations to specified standard categories, or sets of claimants. The area enclosed by the perimeter represents the total value of goods and services distributed in a specified year. The wedge-shaped segments of the "pie" represent the shares allocated to specified categories of claimants.

In general, the dilemma of insufficient resources to cover rising demands and ongoing commitments is managed (when it is effectively managed at all) by changing the relative value of the respective shares or by increasing the total size of the "pie" to be distributed—or usually by some combination thereof. In Britain during the past fifteen years or so, as previously indicated, successive Governments (Labour and Conservative alike) have striven to expand the economy (that is, increase the "pie"), while concomitantly reducing gradually the allocation to military and military-related purposes and increasing proportionately the share to public-financed social services.

The format of national accounting varies slightly from country to country, but in general, as previously indicated with respect to Britain, the categories widely used include (1) *personal consumption*: the goods and services consumed directly by members of the community; (2) formation of *domestic fixed capital*: investments in new equipment or other fixed capital within the community; (3) *exports*: goods and services sent to foreign markets; and (4) the share claimed by *public authorities* and reallocated in part to other sectors of the economy.

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FIGURE 3. DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES (INCLUDING IMPORTS) WITHIN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND TO FOREIGN CONSUMERS, 1966*



* The enclosed circle (the "pie" as a whole) represents the total of goods and services distributed at home and abroad, including imports. Additional arcs and broken lines indicate overlapping sectors. Several minor overlaps have been omitted, slightly distorting certain sectors but not significantly affecting relative magnitudes. The purpose of this diagram is *not* to depict shares in the GNP, but simply to identify allocations of goods and services distributed. To make the "pie" equivalent to GNP would require subtracting taxes on expenditures and value of imports.
SOURCE: *National Income and Expenditure, 1967.*

In the case of Great Britain, and for the purposes of our model in general, it is desirable to subdivide category (4) into resources allocated by public authorities to *nonmilitary* and *military* purposes. The reason for doing so is that in Britain, as in many other countries, military and military-related commitments, on the one hand, and demands for education, housing, pensions, and other subsidized social services, on the other hand, pose the dilemma of insufficient resources in one of the more acute and intractable forms. However, one must take care not to focus too exclusively on this particular version of the dilemma.

It must be emphasized that this dilemma exhibits many variations and degrees of severity. It appears in several variants within the mod-

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ernizing societies; in rather different forms within mature industrial societies, including the former Great Powers that have been or are being "priced out" of the international power market; in still different forms within the Soviet Union and the United States. It is impossible in this limited space to explore these variants in detail. But we do suggest that running through the spectrum of variant forms of the dilemma, two broad types of cases are especially notable: (1) cases in which the primary focus is the conflict between demands for immediate consumption and the need for new capital, complicated in some instances by substantial military and foreign commitments; and (2) cases in which the primary focus is the conflict between domestic demands and external commitments. The first pattern is well exemplified in the cases of India, China, and certain other modernizing societies. The United States is perhaps the foremost exhibit of the second pattern, which is manifested in the many-sided American debate over the priorities of fighting Communist guerrillas in Asia, maintaining a military presence and sustaining client regimes around the world, assisting the processes of modernization, supporting a massive military establishment, landing an American upon the moon, supporting research and development on scores of technological frontiers, *and* getting ahead with alleviating poverty in America, abolishing urban and rural slums, cleaning up and protecting our rapidly and dangerously deteriorating physical habitat, and a host of other pressing and likewise costly tasks at home.

The severity of the dilemma of insufficient resources depends on various conditions—among others, the size of the gap between disposable resources and competing demands and commitments, the nature and intensity of disagreement among competing claimants and between private claimants and public authorities, the ability of various claimants (including those within as well as those outside the structure of government) to exert effective influence on the ultimate determiners of policy, and the state and trend of the economy.

In general, the greater the degree of consensus within the society on goals and priorities, the milder is the political impact of the insufficiency dilemma. A relatively high degree of consensus on goals has kept the struggle in Britain at a relatively low level in recent years. But the reverse is evident in many societies these days. In some instances, probably in more than most students of politics are yet willing to admit, the dilemma reveals starkly a society internally torn and deeply eroded, possibly on the road to large-scale civic disorder and even to

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anarchy and revolutionary transformation in the image of radical Left or radical Right.

Confronted with grossly insufficient resources and intractable public resistance to the priorities set by the society's rulers, the latter may try to cope with the dilemma in various ways, usually by some combination of the following modes of action.[37]

First, efforts may be made to *expand the economy* sufficiently to narrow the gap between the demands and commitments on the one hand and the disposable resources on the other. Such efforts may include replacement of obsolescent equipment, more efficient use of human skills, and other innovations. This was the strategy followed in the United States with substantial success during the Korean War (1950-1952) and in Britain with very little success during the same period. Optimistic technocrats rise on all sides these days to predict that the continuing stream of technological innovations will enable everyone—at least within the United States—to have plenty of "butter" on top of astronomical outlays for military and military-related commitments. Events may confirm this optimism; but in our view this is an issue to be researched, not an assumption to be uncritically taken for granted.

Second, the rulers may prudentially *revise their order of priorities*, either to bring the commitments and demands and the resources more nearly into balance or to relieve pressure in the domestic political boiler, so to speak. The process of revision may be abrupt and drastic or gradual and moderate. As noted above, gradualness and moderation have characterized the recurrent downward adjustments of British military and foreign commitments and the concomitant gradual rise in allocations to the social services. Change of administration (Government, in British parlance) often expedites revision of priorities. It was manifestly easier for the newly elected President and his Secretary of State to negotiate the truce in Korea in 1953 than it would have been for their predecessors who had invested a lot of "face" in a stern, intransigent posture. In general, short of discontinuity resulting from revolution, military defeat, or other disaster, nations' images of their international role (like most other deeply rooted attitudes) change very slowly and, chronically, lag far behind events in periods of rapid and pervasive change and transformation.

Third, the rulers may resort to ploys of various kinds to *divert public*

[37] Some of the techniques noted in the next few paragraphs have been identified and analyzed by Harry Eckstein in an essay "On the Etiology of Internal War," *History and Theory*, IV, No. 2 (1965), 133 ff.

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attention to other values and thereby tacitly increase tolerance for official priorities. Such ploys include, for example, public spectacles such as carefully staged appearances by the head of state or government, with or without accompanying ritualistic oratory. There are many kinds of diversionary ploys, summed up in the classic expression "bread and circuses."[38] Diversionary strategems have often proved very effective *for a limited time*, especially when conducted by strongly charismatic leaders. It is relevant, however, to query whether citizens in most countries are any longer as divertable and as malleable as many public relations experts seem to believe.

Fourth, the men in power may try to *change the opinions of dissenters*, and thereby achieve consensus, either by reasoned argument or, more typically, by selection, arrangement, and presentation of alleged facts that the audience is not sufficiently informed to evaluate. A striking example of the latter procedure was the contrived effort of the Johnson Administration in 1967 to convince the divided American public that military and political successes in Vietnam were much greater than these subsequently turned out to be. The more divided the national constituency, the greater usually is the effort devoted to "selling" the government's policies. Such efforts, even in tightly censored societies, tend these days to boomerang, producing rising distrust when official representations fail repeatedly to square with later revelations—a distrust aptly called the "credibility gap" in the United States today.

Fifth, and finally, the rulers may try to *silence dissent and opposition* to their commitments and priorities by threat or exercise of coercion or even of death. Temptation to resort to repression is strong, especially in deeply divided societies, when articulate and potentially powerful dissident groups seem to threaten not only official policies but even public order. The line between maintaining public order and repressing dissent is notoriously flexible and easily shifted toward repression, especially in societies with traditional proneness to violence.

The dilemma of rising demands and insufficient resources evokes many questions for students of comparative and international politics. In the remaining space we can mention only a few of these. For example, does the form of government affect management of the dilemma? Is it plausible, as is often urged, that dictatorships are inherently superior to democratic systems in this respect? Statement of the dilemma also evokes questions regarding the requisites of imperial

[38] "Duas tantum res anxius optat,/Panem et circenses" (Juvenal, *Satires*, X, 80).

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viability. The British Empire was maintained as long as lowly folk in the United Kingdom and in the colonies could be controlled and kept working at relatively low cost in money and violence. The British Empire became progressively insupportable as rising demands within Britain and resistance to imperial rule in the colonies coincided with escalating costs of maintaining Britain's historic role in international politics. The British experience also suggests to us the possible utility of thinking about imperialism in terms of viable and unviable types—the former evolving into the latter when erosion of the imperial power's *moral* claims ("civilizing mission," "white man's burden," superior rule, and so on) necessitates progressively heavier reliance on violence to sustain the imperial authority. In other words, do empires—including the new-style imperial patterns exhibited by the Soviet Union and the United States—become increasingly unviable in the face of concurrent peaking of internal and external costs? Under such conditions, imperial rulers may try to repress internal dissent in order to carry external commitments. Alternatively, they may curtail or abandon external commitments in order to cope more effectively with rising domestic demands. Or, what is more likely, they may search for some workable compromise between the two extremes.[39]

The current strategy of the United States, as everyone knows, is to evade the dilemma by the route of economic expansion—to provide "guns" and "butter" simultaneously in unprecedented quantities. At first glance, this strategy seems to have succeeded phenomenally. But the dilemma is becoming painfully evident here too, and in the particularly nasty context of worsening racial conflict. Unless the American *political* economy is qualitatively as well as quantitatively different from all others, continuation of present policies seems likely to reveal still more starkly the conflict between massive foreign and military commitments and escalating domestic demands and requirements.

As our previous writings attest, we do not underrate the past effects and enormous future potentialities of the continuing technological revolution. But to those who preach the optimistic gospel of salvation by technology, we must reply that politics everywhere entails a great deal besides an endless stream of inventions and innovations. Much depends also on what is happening concurrently in other salients of the domestic and international arenas. How many scores of billions of dollars will it cost to catch up with environmental arrears and then

[39] We are indebted to our colleague, Professor Oran R. Young, for suggesting that we try utilizing the dilemma of rising demands and insufficient resources to establish some of the requisites of viable, conditionally viable, and unviable imperial systems.

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even minimally maintain our depreciating habitat? How many billions of dollars will it cost to bring depressed segments of the political community to an acceptable level of social usefulness as well as personal comfort?[40] Will military and military-related commitments level off or continue to escalate as the rival holders of superpower strive vainly to outwit and outbuild each other? Will governments spend more, or less, on future probes of outer space and other fantastically expensive projects on the scientific and engineering frontiers? Will the fruits of research be channeled predominantly toward violence and destruction or toward alleviating and improving the human condition? Will growth of population around the world soak up increases in economic productivity? And for how long? Will human demands for material goods and services—in particular, the enormous latent demand in most of the heavily populated modernizing societies—respond temperately or explosively to awakening and spreading visions of plenty?

These are some of the questions evoked by reflection on the British experience and by reconnaissance of a few other societies. These are questions about which, with some notable exceptions, students of comparative and international politics seem to be remarkably reticent. We doubt that any political community, even the most productive and affluent, can evade or avoid these issues that are everywhere implicit in the dilemma of insufficient resources to cover rising and proliferating demands and commitments.

[40] A recent study of American goals and resources, carried out by Leonard A. Lecht for the National Planning Association of Washington, D. C., presents minimum and maximum estimates of "The Dollar Cost of Our National Goals" (Report No. 1 [May 1965], of the Center for Priority Analysis). A fuller statement of this project and of the data and assumptions upon which the estimates are based is published in Leonard A. Lecht, *Goals, Priorities, and Dollars* (New York 1966). Lecht's estimates rest, in our view, upon overoptimistic assumptions regarding the intensity of domestic social demands exacerbated by worsening racial conflict. But even if Lecht's optimistic assumptions are correct, American society is clearly headed for trouble. This NPA project points to the need for analysis based upon different sets of political assumptions regarding domestic and international conditions and for comparable studies of the Soviet Union, China, Britain, France, India, and other nations.

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A PSYCHOANALYST LOOKS AT POLITICS

A Retrospective Tribute to Robert Waelder

By MORTON A. KAPLAN

Robert Waelder, *Progress and Revolution: A Study of the Issues of Our Age*, New York, International Universities Press, 1967, ix, 372 pp. $7.00.

IF Ambrose Bierce were writing his *Devil's Dictionary* today, he would probably define psychology as the science that predicts that Russian leaders will behave the same way during a missile crisis that a female sophomore does on a date. If this is a caricature, it is only mildly so, as one would quickly learn by reading the testimony on psychology and international relations during the hearings in 1967 of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

It is common knowledge that the great length of Freudian analyses is required for patients to acquire self-insight. It is also true that the numerous case studies produced by leading psychoanalysts would not be possible on the basis of short analyses. The textbooks provide us with schemata for psychological mechanisms, neuroses, and more serious distortions of the personality. But whether a given individual projects, introjects, abreacts, operates on the reality principle, sublimates, or does one of various other things depends upon a very complicated interrelationship between his personality, the information available to him and the interpretation he places upon it, and the situation in which he finds himself and its relationship to his past experiences. No intelligent psychoanalyst would attempt to find his way in this confused labyrinth in the absence of an extremely detailed case study. Psychological or Freudian generalizations may be necessary aids to insight or to evaluation, but, in the absence of detailed individual analysis, they are merely patent nostrums used by quacks.

To predict behavior in an institutional setting requires detailed knowledge of that institutional setting, its history, and relevant technical expertise, for these shape beliefs, motivations, and expectations in ways that are most likely quite different from those of the personal setting the analyst is familiar with. In short, just as the analysis of a person must be placed within the context of his life pattern and its meaning, so the analysis of political decision-making must be placed within the context of institutional life. Unfortunately, when most

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psychologists, psychiatrists, or psychoanalysts turn to political subjects, they employ the maxims of psychoanalysis as patent nostrums and are thus indistinguishable in manner from the itinerant hucksters of Indian snake oil.

When, in 1960, I was looking for a psychoanalyst or psychiatrist capable of writing a paper on revolutionary protest movements, I turned in despair to Edward Shils for advice. I need an intelligent man, I told Shils, one who understands that he cannot derive politically relevant generalizations from psychoanalytic models, one who understands that at best he will be able to apply psychiatric insights to political problems and who will also be aware of the problematic nature of his conclusions.

I was not unfamiliar with the psychiatric literature, but I had very few prospects in mind for the article. Shils, almost without hesitation, responded, Write to Robert Waelder—he is the man you want. Seldom has such confidence been so justified. The late Robert Waelder turned out to be a man of great humanistic learning, of intelligence, and of humility. He knew that he could not explain politics through using a psychoanalytic or psychiatric lens, although he also knew very well how to use concepts from psychology in the interpretation of politics. He also knew how to reason, *mirabile dictu*, for this is a skill rare in men. If he, as is true of the rest of us, could not eliminate his prejudices, he was in control of them. He was tough-minded but not unkind. He was generous but not to fools. Trained in Europe, he had a sense of the past and also had contemporary alternatives with which to contrast the United States. Although aware of the faults of the United States, he was impatient with those of us who criticized it from a utopian standpoint.

I

Progress and Revolution: A Study of the Issues of Our Age represents Dr. Waelder's last effort to bring his encyclopedic knowledge to bear on the major factors producing transformation in the world in which we live. As a person aware of the complexities and interrelations of many of the aspects of the contemporary world, he correctly points out that even social scientists sometimes make half-considered proposals. Thus, in a discussion of social change, he refers to the proposal by Arthur Waskow and Stanley Newman to dismantle the military establishment and to put the personnel to work in think tanks for economic development. Waelder points out that if this proposal for rapid economic development succeeded, the rate of human obsolescence

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would increase rapidly. Waelder points out that although technological advances may create greater numbers of jobs, they do so only in the long run and that, moreover, people must be trained for the skills required. The individuals in mid-career, who must be retrained and who may no longer have the plasticity or desire that permits such retraining, might view such progress as a tragedy.

Waelder is not opposed to change. He wants us to recognize, however, that one cannot "pioneer safely." Risks can be cut down, but only at the price of slowing advances. The use of thalidomide provides an example of unanticipated deleterious side effects that cannot be anticipated: what is true of experimental animals is not necessarily true of human beings. While some are inclined to place the blame for the thalidomide disaster on the greed of pharmaceutical producers, Waelder points out that "whenever new products are being developed —regardless of the political system of the country—those who have had a hand in their development will be interested in seeing them succeed. Such interest may be rooted, apart from the promise of monetary returns, in the prospect of honor, fame, increased influence, or the satisfaction of creative achievement. One should remember, however, that this interest, whether of the monetary or of the nonmonetary varieties, may not only make a man enthusiastic but may also make him cautious; it is not a trifling thing for a pharmaceutical producer to have his name associated with grave damage . . ." (p. 68). If new drugs were tried on fewer people, it would cut down the number of victims at the price of cutting down the number of those who are helped.

Waelder also points out that one of the perils of a universalistic, achievement-oriented society is that an equal opportunity to produce may reveal to too many people that they produce in an inferior fashion. When success is open only to a few, the rest can argue that they have not had a chance. When success is open to all, the failure to achieve becomes personal failure. On the other hand, "egalitarianism may threaten the selection, the development, and the functioning of the leadership elites which the community needs" (p. 78).

Moral issues are complex: "One can feel sympathetic understanding for the desire of parents living in slums who want their children to get out and to attend school together with children from more advanced environments in what would presumably be a better learning experience; but one can also feel sympathetic understanding for parents in more favorable social and cultural conditions who resist

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arrangements which they fear would depress the educational and behavioral level of their children" (pp. 79-80). Each value is obtained at the expense of some other value.

Those who bewail modern culture should recognize that ending poverty "*requires mass production and mass production requires, or produces, a kind of mass man.* It does not follow from the considerations presented . . . that progress, scientific-technological, libertarian or egalitarian, is not worth while. I do wish to suggest, however, that progress, on whatever line, is more complex than its devotees seem to assume. Progress has *its costs, its dangers, and its victims*" (p. 83).

According to Waelder, there is a common tendency to overestimate what can be done by institutional change when the problems have deep roots in intractable circumstances. Waelder is deeply suspicious of Ernst Haas's proposal to set up a United Nations licensing commission for technological change. According to Waelder, "The control of innovations which the Church had to abandon after Galileo is to be reintroduced, with the College of Cardinals, who had at least a common ideology, replaced by a committee representing a variety of ideologies, most of them intensely anti-Western" (p. 94). Waelder points out that danger is inherent when one advances into the unknown and that the vote of a committee does not change unknown consequences into known consequences.

Hand-in-hand with the illusions about easy solutions go attempts to find scapegoats for the problems we face: society, culture, the establishment, the bourgeoisie, world Jewry, or Western imperialism. Waelder argues that it would be difficult to underestimate the extent to which illusions about change and attempts to find scapegoats for the frustrations of the present are responsible for the opinions of many so-called enlightened people and for their willingness to perceive certain facts and to ignore others.

It is a tribute to Waelder that he does not present us with a psychodynamic model for the causes of the illusions and scapegoatings. It would be easy, too easy, to formulate theories based on guilt or self-hate. Such formulations, however, would caricature the variety of illusions and of scapegoating. There could be, and undoubtedly are, a multitude of psychodynamic causes for the distortions of reasoning, of perception, and of human empathy. Moreover, the distortions may reflect anything from mere rationalizations for the frustrations of life in complex society to neurotic or psychotic disturbances. The disturbances could represent many different kinds of gains for the

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psyches of the individuals involved, ranging from efficiency in the pursuit of daily tasks and the raising of self-esteem to very deep-seated libidinal needs.

Waelder, of course, does not find it necessary to point out why he does not resort to psychological generalizations to explain distortions of personality; it is inconceivable to him that any psychiatrically trained person would require such an explanation. He also fails to mention, although aware of it, that certain kinds of institutional changes do meet genuine needs and that some kinds of scapegoatings are eufunctional in accomplishing these changes, even though irrational in explaining them. The Meiji reforms in Japan were essential if Japan were to escape the fate of China. And the hysterical outbursts that accompanied these revolutionary changes, even though they may have involved long-term costs, nonetheless lubricated changes that were necessary. One cannot say that the problems in Japan were reduced by the Meiji reforms, but they were surely different from what they were previously, and, in terms of the desires of those who brought about the reforms, preferable.

II

Waelder distinguishes among democratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian governments in terms of their ability to command obedience. Totalitarian governments alone attempt to coerce belief. In some people, the superego does not become completely separated from outside authorities, but remains plastic enough to receive new impressions from outside; such people are in any case plastic to the demands of external authorities. Even autonomous people, however, can be coerced if the pressure is great enough. Coercion makes the subject do or say things for which he will feel either ashamed or guilty. An inner conflict is produced between the demand for self-preservation and the feelings of shame or guilt. Inner peace is lost and can be regained only if the subject can convince himself that the ruler's request was actually right. According to Wilhelm Röpke, those who collaborated with the Nazi regime in order to prevent it from doing worse things were forced to descend to lying and to hypocrisy, thus becoming accomplices of the regime. They had only three alternatives: to make the decision to break with the regime; to increase their load of self-contempt; or to persuade themselves that their judgment of National Socialism must have been a little mistaken. Few had the courage for the first alternative. The second was more than they could bear. Most accepted the third. Waelder gives an account of the visit of the Russian

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film director Eisenstein to Isaac Babel. Eisenstein's film had just been turned down by the party authorities. Babel felt that he should help him, but he could not. After first complaining that he should help but couldn't, Babel then became resentful: " 'Why does he torment me, why does he humiliate me by making me the impotent witness of the injustice which he has suffered?' " But only a few moments later Babel said, " 'Eisenstein is a genius, but particularly with men of genius the danger of grave errors is very great. I have often mused about Eisenstein taking the wrong direction and neglecting important points of view which might have been considered, which indeed should have been considered' " (pp. 160-61).

Intellectual liberals, according to Waelder, do not understand the role of violence in life. Totalitarian societies, through the process of the education of children, through the device of encouraging children to report on their parents, and through the disruption of the institutional means whereby citizens can communicate with one another and manifest their common opposition to the regime, are able to some extent to coerce the beliefs of the population.

Waelder does not discount the force of ideas, but he believes new ideas do not triumph as long as the ruling strata are solidly arrayed against them. Moreover, many of the ideas that triumph, such as that of German nationalism, are transformed in disconcerting ways upon their success.

When Waelder talks of the power of the state to transform the ideas of man, he is not taking the Pavlovian view that man is infinitely malleable by a conditioning process. He accepts the orthodox Freudian position that man has deep-seated needs which, if interfered with, will manifest themselves in other ways. He refers to the ascetics' denial of their sensual needs, which then returned in the form of hallucinatory temptations. He does not believe it possible for human beings entirely to overlook their own needs, whether sexual, economic, or status, without producing disturbances of personality. He does not think that any social or political doctrine that calls for such renunciation corresponds to the reality principle. Even totalitarian regimes could neglect this only at their own peril.

Utopian expectations may also neglect the human substratum. Although utopian expectations, like all very high goals, have fired the enthusiasm of man and have led him to great exertions, they also carry severe costs along with them by placing uncommon demands on men. Those who strive for an ideal society quite often would appear to themselves cowardly if they hesitated because of conventional

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morality when so much was at stake. Utopianism may weaken moral inhibitions or serve as an ideology "by means of which ruthlessness and cruelty can masquerade as idealism" (p. 216). Or, if utopian hopes are disappointed, at least some utopians may lay the rebuff to the designs of others and pursue them as scapegoats. Waelder accepts the dictum of Francis Bacon that nature, to be commanded, must first be obeyed.

III

The preceding views are so much prolegomenon to Waelder's discussion of the revolutionary wave of violence that characterizes the years we are passing through. Waelder contemptuously dismisses what he calls the devil theory of revolution: that agitators from foreign parts descend upon an otherwise peaceful country to promote discontent and to stimulate the people into revolutionary actions. He points out that the theory is old: King Frederick William IV of Prussia believed that the 1848 revolution had been engineered by foreigners—that is, by Germans, Poles, and Jews. Waelder notes that the devil theory is widely held in the South of the United States and in South Africa and that it is also the official Soviet version of the Hungarian revolution of 1956. Waelder points out that if there were not some responsiveness to the agitation, it could not succeed. On the other hand, he regards as equally mythical the widely accepted theory that the cause of revolution lies in social injustice, oppression, and poverty. Although there are examples that will support it, he says, this theory overlooks that for centuries men have quietly borne misery as great as or greater than that which has sometimes promoted revolution; that revolutions as a rule break out not in countries with the greatest poverty or the most oppression but in countries with relatively higher standards of living, social mobility, and freedom; that they are carried out not by the poorest but by groups belonging to relatively higher strata of social order; that they occur while conditions are improving markedly; and that they often succeed in part through the use of terror.

Waelder did not note the many examples of bomb-throwing terrorist youths in Venezuela roaring away in expensive sports cars. Many of these youths are protected from reprisals by the influence of their parents and relatives in the existing regime. A cynic, given to a conspiratorial view of history, might adduce from this that as improving conditions begin to constitute a threat to the elite by producing the conditions in which democracy can develop, the elite sponsors a

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totalitarian revolution in order to maintain its ascendency in the social structure. In its conspiratorial form, this theory would be incorrect. It would ignore the case of Vietnam, where the counterelite, although middle class in origin, is not tightly integrated into the existing governmental elite. It would oversimplify and unify too many diverse motivations. Yet, in an area such as Latin America, where the ruling elites lack faith in the continuity of their regimes, where the career lines for some of the aspiring elites in the current situations are not clear or appear blocked off, and where romantic notions combine with a need to control, the manipulation of the masses by the elite for elite ends should not be discounted.

Waelder notes the double standard of many American intellectuals, which serves the cause of revolution, but he does not attribute this to any particular motivation. He quotes Irving Howe: " 'What is this "West" that is to be saved? The Salk vaccine or Jim Crow, anesthesia or torture, Shakespeare or Spillane, the seven-hour day or child labor?' " (p. 315). As Waelder states, Howe has lumped Western achievements together with common human failings and sins. The Salk vaccine, as scientific medicine, is exclusively Western, while caste distinctions are found in all civilizations and in some in much more extensive form than in the West. Torture has occurred in all societies. The seven-hour day is a product of modern technology, while child labor is recorded in all societies. If an attitude like Howe's is particularly true of the New Left, Waelder points out, it is also characteristic of many of those who claim they are opposed to communism and support democracy. It leads to a condemnation of the use of force or threat of force in international relations and to the propagation of force in domestic affairs, that is, in civil war.

As he reads Dr. Waelder's analysis, the reader will no doubt recall Senator Fulbright's characterization of the arrogance of the United States. He may wonder why it is that a senator who during most of his career voted with the racists in Congress and who supported an elitist view of the political process should, after a feud with the President of the United States, suddenly become the leader of "liberal" forces in the United States.

Although restrained by the decorum of the Senate, the Senator has in recent months come perilously close to justifying violent dissent against the American constitutional system. According to Fulbright, "In making the distinction between orderly dissent, of which *it professes* to approve, and disorderly dissent, of which we all disapprove,

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the Administration seems unable to understand that it is the futility of the one that has given rise to the other."[1] There are many in the United States who think that their recent verbal expressions have been futile—Southern racists protesting integration, advocates of escalation in Vietnam, those who would like to attack Communist China, those opposed to the progressive income tax, and so forth. Would their resort to disorder receive sympathetic understanding from the Senator?

According to Senator Fulbright, "The dissenters do not dissent for the *mere* pleasure of hearing themselves orate . . . or of enjoying the democratic right of free speech. They dissent because they wish to have an impact on events, because they wish to bring about changes in their government's policies. Some of the more dogmatic, it is true, probably could not be satisfied with anything less than total compliance with their wishes, but most of us who regard this war as a tragic mistake would settle for a good deal less."[2] In other words, as a responsible and moderate dissenter, Senator Fulbright does not believe that he should get his way entirely, but he believes that he should get his way at least partly. And if a compromise is not reached, although the Senator professes to disapprove of violence, he understands the incentive.

It is possible to understand and to sympathize with dissent by those who feel the war is a tragedy—despite the impact of dissent upon North Vietnamese willingness to continue the struggle—as the lesser of competing evils. It is not possible to sympathize with or to respect denials of this impact or complaints that those who point out the relationship are either attempting to interfere with the democratic rights of dissenters or acting from other extremist or reprehensible motives. Those who object to the consequences of the war on moral grounds have the duty to consider the consequences of their dissent. To deny this is to apply a double standard.

It would be a mistake to attempt to psychoanalyze Senator Fulbright and to characterize the reasons for the positions he takes. But he is a living embodiment of Dr. Waelder's thesis of the moral and intellectual sickness that pervades the West, of the disorders of reasoning, of the failures to apply the reality principle, and of the willingness to justify force against democratic and nontotalitarian governments.

I do not wish to imply that either Dr. Waelder or the author of this review article has a pipeline to truth such that the specific policies

[1] *New York Times*, December 9, 1967, italics added. [2] *Ibid.*, italics added.

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we advocate may be identified with the reality principle. The political process is much too complex for this, our information is much too meager, and our ability to see into the future is much too limited. The characterization being applied is a characterization not of specific policies but of arguments used to support them, of the double standard applied, of the inversions and perversions of reasoning that are used. The fallible but important judgment of history may be that the Vietnamese war, for instance, is a tragic mistake. It is possible to understand both the strong feelings of those who believe this and their frustrations in failing to achieve their policy aims under these conditions. What is difficult to understand is the inability of a great number of such people, including the Senator from Arkansas, to understand that moral, intelligent, and responsible men may believe that failure to prosecute the war or to escalate is tragic. It is the assurance of people such as the Senator from Arkansas that they possess the truth, that the concessions must be made to them, and that they cannot abide the democratic processes of our government without concessions that is typical of the malaise to which Dr. Waelder calls our attention. It is the capacity of men like the Senator to center their attention upon the defects, which are real, of the Saigon regime, while ignoring the terror of the Vietcong, which fits the symptoms Waelder has noted.

It is possible to understand the view that negotiation or withdrawal, although either would be a tragedy involving serious costs both for American diplomacy and for hundreds of thousands and perhaps millions of people in South Vietnam, is necessary. One might argue that these human costs are outweighed by other costs inherent in prosecution of the war. What is so difficult to understand in rational terms is the moral enthusiasm of Fulbright's supporters for their cause, for their employment of cliches even more obtuse than those employed by the Secretary of State. (The latter could at least argue privately that he is constrained in what he can say by the nature of his official position.) None of this is intended to deny that some of those who support the war may be equally sick.

IV

Progress and Revolution deserves to be placed on the shelves of political scientists next to the works of Nathan Leites. Together, these are among the very few works in the literature that use psychiatric insights effectively for purposes of political analysis. In neither case do psychiatric insights form the core for political analysis or serve as

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substitutes for it; but this is as it should be. Although no problems of policy would be solved by their doing so, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee might well ponder this book. Dr. Waelder would not simplistically have asserted, as some Committee consultants do of others, that the Committee was exercising the mechanism of projection when it ascribed arrogance to the American nation, but he does in his book provide a framework for analysis that may help both Senate and administration find a humility based on adequate knowledge of themselves in the world we all face. Psychoanalysts and psychiatrists should read this book to see how an intelligent psychoanalyst has applied his tools to the subject matter of politics.

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ON THE PRESENT STATE AND THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

By F. H. HINSLEY

Robert E. Osgood and Robert W. Tucker, *Force, Order, and Justice*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 374 pp. $10.00.

MORE sharply now than ever before, the world is divided into its more and its less developed parts—into relatively stable and fundamentally unstable communities—and the prospect before it is one of unavoidable but limited disturbance in and between its less developed societies, for as long as makes no matter, and of inescapable choice for its more advanced states between uncontrollable violence and abstention from war.

This is a prediction—reliable if somewhat imprecise. Let me add to it a judgment—or, if you prefer it, a guess. As between peace or uncontrollable violence among themselves, the choice of the developed societies will continue to be peace for some more years, perhaps until the end of this century, and the decision thereafter, peace or war, will follow inexorably from the dispositions that they will have adopted meanwhile.

Various objections will be made to these propositions. Idealists will be impatient of their pessimism, for which their optimism will provide inadequate compensation. To the speculative, the philosophically inclined, their compound of determinism and choice will be disturbing. Above all, their dogmatism will be resented. Most men—concrete, sober minds especially—will prefer the approach outlined by Professors Osgood and Tucker when they claim in their recent book to be "more interested in explaining the nature of the problem of order and how it has arisen than in expounding either predictions or hopes" (p. 39). Let us first notice, therefore, that Professors Osgood and Tucker do not entirely abide by their own claim. On a point that is basic to my propositions they predict as confidently as I do, and in the same sense.

The autonomous state has not become obsolete; on the contrary, it is still expanding its functions and increasing its powers. The autonomous state, at work in a system of autonomous states, is unable

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to abandon its primary concern with the ends of statecraft: survival, security, and power. The existing historical system of states will not be much modified, let alone superseded, in our time. As for the means most widely advocated for achieving its improvement or supersession, these authors are no less emphatic. Such means are either impractical or doomed to be ultimately ineffective except in a structure of world government that is unattainable—as is the case with disarmament, arms control, world peace through law, world peace under the United Nations—or else, like pacifism and nonviolence, they are incompatible with any political structure whatever, and thus irrelevant. Of all such measures the best that can be said is this: they "are almost certainly unattainable in time to save us" (p. 29).

This part of their argument is so widely accepted in some circles that the authors may be forgiven for feeling that in advancing it they are not so much making a prediction as stating a truth. In other circles, however, it is not yet accepted. Professor Morgenthau was writing as recently as 1964 that "instead of trying in vain to assimilate nuclear power to the purposes and instrumentalities of the nation-state, we ought to have tried to adapt these purposes and instrumentalities to the potentialities of nuclear power."[1] If this remark indicates that at least a realist had recognized by then that no such effort would be undertaken or could succeed, it also reveals that even a realist once concluded that a radical transformation of the system of states became feasible after the emergence of the nuclear weapons. For every man who has abandoned this vision, moreover, or who never indulged in it, thousands still cling to it as the only way to safety and progress. These thousands include men in governments who, while they do not seek to transform the states-system that they serve, have an exaggerated faith in the practicability or the effects of measures—disarmament, arms control—that they push. Truth or prediction, therefore—and perhaps one kind of prediction consists only in insisting on truths that men are unwilling to accept or on implications that they are unable to see—this point is worth making.

It is a point that is worth repeating. At any rate this side of international catastrophe, no supersession or radical transformation of the states-system will take place—no break or leap forward that will entirely unanchor that system from its characteristic resources and modes of operation, as they have evolved through time. Problems in the international field will continue to be problems confronting autono-

[1] Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Four Paradoxes of Nuclear Strategy," *American Political Science Review*, LVIII (March 1964), 35.

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mous states; and it will be by autonomous states, working in the system of states, that, if they can be solved at all, they will be solved.

Among the resources of autonomous states the ultimate one has historically been reliance on force; and among their modes of operation the resort to war has historically occupied a central place. Hence the central concern of Professors Osgood and Tucker. Not whether the state and the system of states can be replaced, but whether force and war are now obsolete between autonomous states—this is the issue to which they chiefly address themselves.

We must next notice that their general conclusion about this issue—or, as I would say, their prediction—is almost as confident as their insistence on the future of the states-system. Neither force nor war has been deprived of its function or its utility in the relations between states in consequence of the nuclear revolution. On the contrary, there is an "inextricable connection between autonomous states and the war system" (p. 20), an "integral relationship of force to international politics" (p. 13). Most states have been at peace most of the time and many states have been at peace all the time during modern history, but these facts make no difference: "war and the threat of war are endemic in international relations" (p. 13). The explanation "lies in the nature of the international system . . . in the conflicts among autonomous but interdependent political units that are organized for their own protection and advancement but that are not subordinate to a central political authority and police force. In this anarchical system . . . armed coercion necessarily has a distinct utility that persuasion, negotiation, adjudication, and even nonviolent forms of coercion lack" (p. 10). "Given the . . . primary loyalty to autonomous states, the need for force springs from compelling functional needs—most fundamentally, from the need of states to rely primarily on self-help in order to secure the conditions of their survival and welfare. This functional need is not ephemeral or atavistic. . . . Force has a deep-seated functional relationship to particular forms of social and political relations . . ." (p. 7). So much is this so that "even if all states were purely defense-minded—a utopian supposition—there would still be need for force. The very search for security in a system of politics without government compels reliance upon military self-help, which, in turn, fosters conflict and a competition for military power" (p. 11). And this being the case, the possibility that all states can dispense with force all the time is excluded by the fact that the international system will persist. It is theoretically possible that "independent states could

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learn to wage their conflicts without reference to military power"—that "regular war and the threat of war would wither away." But this proposition "strains the conventional imagination" no less than does the prospect of a radical transformation of the international system. It also ignores the lessons of history: "The history of international politics gives us no reason to suppose that all major states . . . can pursue their interests without exploiting force and, occasionally, resorting to war" (pp. 4-5).

In reaching this conclusion the authors are not content merely to cite the lesson of history in its support. A good deal of their book consists of an analysis of the history of force and war and of the international system which is excellent in many ways. All the more surprising, therefore, are the two most prominent features of the argument: its failure—despite an initial recognition that "military power . . . 'force,' broadly defined . . . includes more than the obsolescence or utility of war" (p. 3)—to distinguish between, to separate, force and war; and its emphasis on the functional relationship of war to the system of autonomous states. The evidence of history provides little support at these two points.

The first part of the argument runs counter to the outstanding development of modern history in this connection. This is the fact that a huge expansion of the range and scale of force at the disposal of states has been accompanied by a marked reduction in the frequency of resort to war. Until the eighteenth century, in Europe no less than in the rest of the world, war remained a normal social activity, a virtually continuous if fluctuating undertaking and one in which official and unofficial hostilities, international and civil violence, were inextricably mingled. Not all the states were at war all the time—for war chests quickly emptied and recuperation was required—but some of the states were at war with each other almost annually, if only in the campaigning season. From the eighteenth century—at least in the European area, which alone underwent rapid development from that time—this condition was replaced by the pronounced alternation of periods of peace with periods of war which has distinguished the modern international system. After the 1760's there were nearly thirty years of total peace between the more advanced states before the French revolutionary wars. There were nearly forty years of peace between these states between 1815 and 1854; forty-three years between 1871 and 1914; twenty-one years between 1918 and 1939. Since 1945, in the same way, there have now been another twenty-three years of peace between the leading powers.

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Professors Osgood and Tucker do not single out this change in the incidence or frequency of the resort to war which emphasizes the need to distinguish between war and force. They by no means neglect the expansion of force from which, at least in part, the change resulted. On the contrary, their insistence on the functionalism of war results from an undue concern with the effects of the expansion of force on the character of war and of international relations at the expense of the influence of other changes. It is clear that there was a direct connection between the onset and the prolongation of the modern pattern of conflict and the expansion of force that came with the advance of science and technology—an advance that has made war between developed states ever more hazardous and destructive since the first Industrial Revolution. But it is equally clear that this change of pattern was also a response to other advances, as was the expansion of technology and force itself.

Until the eighteenth century, even in Europe, the division of territory, state frontiers, internal social structures, forms of rule, organizational ability, bureaucratic control—all these things remained insufficiently consolidated for peace and stability to be even the aim, let alone the achievement, of the international system. As no community was fully fused with any state, no state possessed either the power or the will to control either its own or a community's warlike tendencies. Imperialism—the desire to bring all the communities in a single cultural area under single political control—was the overriding and inescapable aim of any state that happened to secure a relative superiority of power. Coexistence had not been discovered. The idea of the balance of power, in so far as it existed at all before the eighteenth century, conveyed only the argument that it was in the interest of all other states to combine against this threat of hegemony. Ever since the eighteenth century, in contrast, if only in Europe and the Europeanized areas of the world, political frontiers have been slowly acquiring greater rigidity, political societies have been slowly moving toward greater complexity and integration, and governments that have become increasingly anchored to territorial societies have been steadily adding to their efficiency in controlling their communities. And in the wake of these developments there has followed not only a reduction in the frequency of war, associated with the expansion in its scale and intensity, but other shifts in the character of the international system, associated with the shifts in the character of the states of which the system was composed. It is not for nothing that the beginnings of modern international law, of the modern concept of the balance of

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power, of modern forms of international collaboration and of the modern peace movement go back to this turning point that also saw the introduction of the modern alternation between long periods of peace and spasms of war.

In the light of this evidence the possibility cannot be overlooked that after the eighteenth century war continued to recur not because it retained a function that could not otherwise be served between modern states, but because in altered social and international conditions men in sufficient numbers continued to live by the habits and with the aspirations appropriate to their earlier social and international systems. If we pursue this question that has little relevance to international history before the beginning of the nineteenth century, but that has acquired added significance with every subsequent generation—if we ask why war was not now avoided—this possibility asserts itself still more powerfully.

I have argued elsewhere[2] that among the causes of modern wars at least some importance must be given to the failure of altered social and international conditions entirely to eradicate older habits and conditions in which war had appropriately been regarded as an unavoidable, not to say a welcome, method of settling conflicts between communities. Even if this factor can be exaggerated, no one who has studied the origins of recent wars could fall in with the opposite views expressed by Professor Osgood and Tucker. It is a misrepresentation of the situation that existed before 1914, and especially of the turmoil that prevailed in Germany, to claim for modern states that "unlike the motives of men waging war in behalf of primitive tribes and medieval kingdoms [and, one might add, early modern states] . . . personal and socioeconomic motives are readily distinguished from the determining, highly rationalized, officially sanctioned motives of nations and governments" (pp. 9-10). To say that with modern states "it is principally *after* nations have reluctantly become engaged in war that honor, glory, and revenge . . . have acted as mass catalysts of unrestrained bellicosity" (p. 10)—this is to forget Hitler. I have also argued, in the same place, that another source of modern war which cannot be ignored has been the continuing failure of men to understand, and thus to be able to control, the forces that were integrating their communities, producing their modern government, and issuing, with their great technological advance, in the huge expansion of force. Professors Osgood and Tucker at least share this opinion despite their

[2] "Reflections on the History of International Relations," in Martin Gilbert, ed., *A Century of Conflict 1850-1950: Essays for A. J. P. Taylor* (London 1966).

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emphasis on the functionalism of war. Their able analysis of the huge expansion of force after the 1860's attributes the outbreak of the First World War at least in part to the fact that the states remained too much concerned to utilize the increased force for efficiency in war and too little concerned to erect the effective system of deterrence that was now for the first time rendered feasible. In the same way, they attribute the outbreak of the Second World War at least in part to the failure of the majority of states to understand that against aggression the defensive utility of the deterrent, of force short of war, had already become much greater than it was before 1914 (pp. 85-96, 105).

It may be that I am too quick to detect in these judgments about the management of force up to 1939 a contradiction of the authors' own belief in the functionalism of war. They may certainly retaliate by reminding me that I have myself concluded that these failures were unavoidable, and that in the years up to 1939 "war was in general inevitable but no particular war was inevitable."[3] The problem is, What bearing does the evidence have upon the more immediate question of whether war still maintains its utility between advanced states since 1945? On this there is no mistaking their hesitation—even their inconsistency. On the one hand, they insist more than once that there is no evidence that this utility has been destroyed: ". . . Our ignorance of nuclear war . . . should warn us against assuming that any use of nuclear weapons must inevitably and automatically lead to unrestricted devastation. . . . It would be worse than silly to assume that any nuclear war must necessarily become a general nuclear war" (pp. 189-90). The assumption that a nuclear war "will do irreparable damage to those values in defense of which force is presumably undertaken" and that, "at worst, it will result in the common suicide of the contestants . . . may or may not be true . . . it is not self-evident" (p. 245). On the other hand, they confess to grave doubts as to the utility of wars and the possibility of controlling war in the nuclear age: "The utility of war between the superpowers is very doubtful, chiefly because it is doubtful whether such wars could be limited and controlled for a useful political purpose" (p. 25). ". . . The scope and complexity of planning and . . . the great destructiveness of a few nuclear weapons and the complete lack of experience with nuclear war compel skepticism about the feasibility of controlling the impetus of nuclear exchanges" (p. 189). "The concept of a controlled strategic nuclear war, a war in which the great nuclear powers might still lose several million in casualties, is . . . the most spectacular, though

[3] *Ibid.*, 28.

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also the most debatable, manifestation of . . . confidence in men's ability to regulate violence" (p. 343).

Their leaning toward the first of these positions springs partly from their interests in the history of the expansion of force, of which the nuclear weapons are but the latest stage in a long process. In all studies of the continuity of successive situations there is some temptation to minimize the extent of the discontinuity. The position is buttressed in their minds by what can safely be called an error of fact. It is not true that "uncertainty about the consequences of prospective warfare has increased immensely because of the expanded spectrum of potential violence . . ." and that "the chance of miscalculating the magnitude and consequences of war [is] much greater than before the nuclear age" (p. 144)—or if true, it is not relevant when it is at least obvious that a nuclear war will be more destructive than any previous war. It is not true—or, if true, it is for the same reason irrelevant—that the "residual uncertainty" of the nuclear situation results even in part from "men's inability to predict with any real confidence what the consequences will be of using nuclear weapons . . ." (p. 314). The uncertainty that underpins the nuclear balance is only the uncertainty as to whether the bombs will be used. Above all, however, the attempt to maintain that war still keeps its utility, even between the most advanced of states, is an extension of the argument that war has always had a functional relation to the system of states in the past. It is perhaps worth noticing, therefore, that this attempt is not a necessary or logical extension of that argument.

Even if it could be established beyond doubt that war had continued to fulfil a necessary function between states up to 1945, it would still be impossible to overlook the fact that in the expansion of force—as in the process underlying it which we have discussed: the advance of science and technology, the consolidation of communities, the increasing resources of governments—there has taken place since the Second World War in the developed area of the world a further acceleration of such monumental proportions as to dwarf all the development in these directions that was achieved throughout history up to that time. If not for the first time, then at least for the first time in a form so acute that they cannot be escaped, this fact has raised two questions: Can force continue to function between states that have been involved in this acceleration? Can such states ever again resort to war against each other without destroying themselves in the process?

The simple answers to these two questions are, successively, Yes,

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force will continue to function since force and the weapons that express it cannot be eliminated; and, No, in another war, as nearly as makes no matter, the developed states will destroy themselves. In their inconsistency, in their hesitation, on the second question Professors Osgood and Tucker indeed go some way toward accepting the truth of this answer to it. They also conclude that the history of war is "not a conclusive forecast of the future if nuclear weapons constitute a radical qualitative change in the nature of military power" (p. 5). On a different understanding of the history of war this concession is replaced by a warning. It does not follow that the developed states will avoid further war and, with it, massive destruction. Although substantial peace between them has now been preserved for over twenty years, they now stand at a point in international history at which either one of two outcomes may still ensue. The alternation of periods of peace with periods of war which has characterized the modern system of international relations in the more developed parts of the world may be prolonged. The present period of peace may once again terminate in a return to war that would be conducted, as always before, at a previously unparalleled level of violence. Alternatively, this alternation may itself be terminated. The phase in the development of the international system which succeeded in the eighteenth century to a structure of relations in which warfare had been limited but persistent may be replaced by another—by one in which international relations, while continuing to be relations between autonomous states, would take their character from the fact that the states had attained to the responsible control of force short of war.

As between these two possible futures no evidence that has accumulated or that may accumulate can indicate which will materialize. The responsible control of force will require continuous effort. It will remain subject to breakdown if the effort is not constantly renewed. The only prediction that can be made is that it will depend on the dispositions and the policies of the states whether this effort is maintained. But this may be added: of all the issues that will affect those dispositions none is more crucial, for better or worse, than that of the feasibility of nuclear war. The one certainty available to us is that catastrophe will one day result if even one state comes to believe that it can contain nuclear exchanges within tolerable and manageable limits.

Professors Osgood and Tucker point out the striking change that has taken place in this connection in the past few years in the United

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States. "As late as the middle 1950s the nation's President . . . could still declare that force has no limitations save those imposed 'by the limitations of force itself' . . . . This view may still find expression among the general public. It would come as a shock, however, if expressed today by a high government official. A view that appeared almost unchallenged . . . is now regarded by those who are concerned . . . as dangerously naïve. From the conviction that force, once employed, imposes its own limits we have turned almost full circle to . . . a marked confidence in man's ability to control force" (pp. 343-44).

They leave us uncertain whether this confidence extends beyond a belief in the possibility of controlling force short of war to a conviction that war can be limited and escalation controlled between nuclear states—as uncertain as we are whether they themselves would approve of or deplore this extension. In fact, it does not yet do so. In the nuclear age, massive resistances, psychological and technical, prevent governments from coming to this conviction as easily as do the more academic, not to say the more scholastic, among their advisers. These resistances include the impossibility of knowing whether the conviction would be shared by other states. It takes all the parties even to try to limit a war, although a single power is able to start one. If this striking change is also the most potentially dangerous development of recent years, it does not constitute an immediate danger for these reasons.

It will become dangerous only if it persists until the return to disturbed international conditions from the basically stable international situation that has prevailed since 1945. If we look closely at the modern history of war we shall see that wars have arisen not only because of the persistence of older habits and aspirations in changing circumstances, and not only because of men's failure to understand those changing circumstances. Equally important has been the human propensity to rationalize imprudence in periods of international dislocation. If we look closely at the history of international dislocation we shall see that in the modern age of continuing revolution in technology, of continuing integration in communities, and of continuing increase in the efficiency of government, dislocation has arisen from the disproportionate or uneven advance of these processes in the various communities of which the international system has been composed. But if we look closely at the present situation we shall also see that it is possible to reach a further conclusion. In all probability, the return

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to seriously disturbed conditions between the leading states is by no means imminent.

During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and even more intensely during the first half of the twentieth century, disproportionate relative growth produced a condition of increasing international instability. Since 1945 disproportionate growth has produced a marked return to balance, as it did in the hundred years up to the last quarter of the nineteenth century. It makes no difference that the current balance is one within a wider frame than that of the nineteenth century: the delayed emergence of the United States and the delayed development of Russia were among the basic causes for the instability that prevailed between the 1890's and 1945. It makes no difference that the balance rests on marked discrepancies of power. Balance must not be confused with equality. The world distribution of power has been more stable since 1945 than at any time since the 1890's. Other developments since 1945 have, moreover, made the present stability more solid than that of earlier times. For one thing, the huge technological advances of the nuclear age have erected a threshold of absolute power—a threshold that has been crossed already by several states and will in due course be crossed by others—beyond which changes in relative power have been largely deprived of their significance. As these authors say, "For the first time in history the prospect arises of a physical security that need no longer prove dependent on time-honored calculations of a balance of power" (p. 278). For another thing, these changes have conspired with the emergence of states of a continental size to establish massive discrepancies of strength that will not be so easily eroded by the rise of new centers of power as were those of the nineteenth century in Europe. It may even turn out to be the case that the most serious source of future erosion will be not the rise of new power but the onset of divisiveness in the continental structures that now lead the world.

In these circumstances, while the timing can only be a matter of opinion, it is unlikely that there will be an early return to disturbed conditions between the developed states, comparable to those that formed the backcloth to the two world wars. In my judgment, the present phase of international stability that was ushered in in 1945 is likely to last at least as long as those that prevailed between 1815 and the 1850's and between 1871 and the 1900's; and the first real danger signals will probably not be hoisted before the 1980's. It is no mere matter of opinion, on the other hand, but rather a necessary

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calculation, that in one way or another at some time to come, sooner or later than this date, dislocation will begin to reappear.

It is at that point that the views the leading states will by then have formed with regard to the utility and the feasibility of war, as well as the stances they will have adopted in conformity with these views, will exert a decisive effect. It is not too much to say that one of two preconditions must be satisfied if the international system is to be more permanently stable in the future than it has been in the past. Either states must learn so to control technological and other growth in a variety of communities that they can prevent serious changes from slowly occurring in the distribution of power, or they must learn so to control themselves and their power that they do not revert to the rationalization and the justification of imprudence whenever this distribution becomes unstable. It is not too much to add that they are unlikely to be able to make progress by the first of these two routes. If they are to avoid the recurrence of war they must learn in advance to control themselves when relative strengths begin to alter and unstable relationships return.

It is difficult to decide at this stage whether the developed states, confronting this problem, will be helped or hindered by the fact that, to an extent that was never experienced in the past, they must coexist in future with areas less developed than themselves. What is not in doubt is that for these other areas the problem has little relevance.

The present condition of this other world springs from its resemblance, in different degrees in its different parts, to the preindustrial Europe we have already considered. It is basically because no society there is fully anchored to any state, no government to any one community, that this vast area lacks "the material and political ingredients"—in the words of this book—"of a fully developed state system" (p. 166). This is why no government in the undeveloped world has either the power or the will to resist its own or its community's divisive tendencies. This is why sentiment in each of the communities oscillates easily between pan-nationalism and tribal chauvinism; why some of its communities—Egypt and Syria, for example, or Tanganyika and Zanzibar—easily go through the motions of merging, associating, or federating, but do no more than go through the motions; why some of its leaders, already enmeshed in associations that they cannot properly control, talk of achieving still wider structures like that Muslim commonwealth of Asian and African Islamic nations which is the dream of man in Malaysia and elsewhere. This is why

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imperialism is endemic in the area, though limited by lack of power: should any of its states acquire predominance relative to its neighbors, these states will become expansionist at least in intent. We should not expect these areas to achieve internal consolidation or international stability unaided, with their own resources, for a long time to come. The undeveloped societies of today cannot heave themselves quickly over the hump that those of Europe began to cross two hundred years ago, which even they crossed very slowly despite even longer years of steady previous development.[4]

All the more is this the case on account of additional complications that beset the backward countries. Unlike early modern Europe, they must live with another world that is immensely more sophisticated. This other world provides them with technologies and techniques that they cannot effectively use—except, as with modern means of communication, for sustaining hysteria that would not otherwise exist or, as with modern public medicine, for achieving increases of population that they cannot feed or employ. It gives them ideas and ideologies like nationalism and socialism which they are in no shape to resist—but which they are also in no condition to understand or implement, and which thus compound the chaos. It educates their leaders to want programs and to nurse aspirations which cannot be achieved in the time that these leaders have at their disposal and which consequently force them into frustration and despair.

It is some compensation for these complications that coexistence with a vastly more advanced world prevents these societies from behaving in full freedom according to their real natures at the historical stage of development that they have reached. The more advanced world restricts the consequences, picks up the pieces, restrains the excesses as a result of containing the less developed societies by its mere existence alongside them. It is this fact, however, that hides from us their true condition and prospects—the true scale of the historical time lag that divides them from us as societies. For all the setbacks and disillusionments of recent years, we have yet to learn an important lesson. If these societies cannot with their own resources quickly ad-

[4] Even as I write, this point is illustrated in a letter from Mr. Musa Mazzawi, to the editor of *The Times* (London), January 24, 1968: ". . . The oil revenue of the Gulf shaikhdoms is large, and expected to increase. The population of the area is . . . about one-thousandth of the entire Arab nation. . . . The Arabs maintain that the Gulf is traditionally part of the Arab world, and that the Arab nation is in essence a single nation. It is wrong to continue artificial divisions and distribute among a small minority the wealth which morally belongs to the whole nation. . . . The people of Britain would not like it if a small and rich part of these islands were to seek independence and arrogate for themselves their local wealth. . . ."

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vance beyond their present stage, neither can the more advanced world, whatever its efforts, quickly develop them beyond that stage or easily change their natures—the more so since it no longer needs and can no longer practice the method of direct imperial control. It is plain already that the gap between the developed and the undeveloped world is increasing. It is not to be excluded that at least some parts of the undeveloped world are deteriorating absolutely.

There can be no quarrel, then, when Professors Osgood and Tucker write that "the most general conclusion that may safely be made is that the peace and order of the whole world will depend heavily upon the interaction of two quite different modes of international politics . . . —that of the old and advanced states and that of the new and poor states" (pp. 168-69). There can be no quarrel, either, with their warning of the consequences that will flow if this interaction is mishandled. They do not exaggerate when they say that in that event "large parts of the Third World could become areas of chronic chaos and predatory struggle between the major world powers," and that "this course might lead to competitive interventions that could expand into major—possibly even nuclear—wars" (p. 169). When they outline the policies that must be followed if this worst of outcomes is to be avoided, on the other hand, their assessment is less realistic.

They require, first, "a modicum of political prudence and internal order among the new states" and "constructive initiatives toward regional and local systems under the leadership of indigenous centers of power," so that "more stable regional balances of power" may be established (p. 169). This is to require much more than the new states will be able to provide. They require, next, that the major world powers "limit their contest for power and influence in the Third World to relatively benign forms of competition" while they provide "a stabilizing framework for local competition through the selective use of economic and military assistance, informal political guarantees, mutual abstention from intervention, the insulation and mediation of conflicts, and other forms of international pacification" (p. 169). This is to require somewhat less than the major states must provide if the situation is to be held.

In the relations between themselves it will be sufficient if the developed states abstain from folly. If they are to succeed in containing the pressures and the fissures of the undeveloped world they must, indeed, do most of the things that are here outlined. But they will effectively do none of these things unless they take a preliminary, more positive but more difficult step. If, adopting the forms, methods,

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and attitudes of the concert system of nineteenth-century Europe, they would make them the basis of a closer and more continuous collaboration among themselves than the powers of the nineteenth century were able to achieve and would apply that to this problem which is wider than any those powers were ever faced with, they would not solve the problem—this will in any case grow with the passage of time—and they would not eliminate differences and competition among themselves. They would, however, establish a framework for the problem and a regulator of their competition in the only way in which it is possible to do this. If they reject this course, then not rapidly, but by the end of this century, there will come about a convergence of their irresponsibility in face of the third world with dislocation in the balance between themselves which may persuade them to believe what at present is plainly untrue: that they have no choice but to accept a nuclear war. In that event they would be sure to convince themselves of something that would even then be implausible: that a nuclear war can be limited and controlled.

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FEDERAL POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND FEDERAL SOCIETIES

By MICHAEL B. STEIN*

William H. Riker, *Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1964, 169 pp. $2.30 (paper).
R. L. Watts, *New Federations: Experiments in the Commonwealth*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1966, 417 pp. $11.75.
Aaron Wildavsky, editor, *American Federalism in Perspective*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1967, 277 pp. $3.50 (paper).

UNTIL these recent studies by Riker, Watts, and Wildavsky appeared, the theory of federalism was embodied largely in the work of K. C. Wheare. Wheare published the first truly pathbreaking book in the comparative study of federalism shortly after World War II.[1] He defined federalism as that system of government in which the federal and regional governments are both coordinate and independent. In applying this definition, he stressed the sharp division in the powers and functions of two coequal sovereignties as a basis for classifying systems of government as federal. Wheare's definition was derived primarily from his analysis of the American Constitution and, in particular, its formally sharp division of powers between national and state governments.

Wheare also compared the constitutions of governments with their actual workings in order to classify such governments as federal or nonfederal in practice. He found that only three constitutions then existing met his criteria of "federal"—those of the United States, Australia, and Switzerland. Canada, the fourth system that he analyzed in depth, did not qualify as having a federal constitution, primarily because the powers of disallowance and reservation of provincial legislation accorded the federal government effectively nullified the coequal status of the provincial governments. Wheare then turned to the actual workings of these governments and found that the governments of the United States, Australia, Switzerland, and Canada all more or less fulfilled his criteria of a working federal government. Wheare

* I am indebted to Professor Robert J. Jackson of McGill University, Professor Donald C. Rowat of Carleton University, and Mr. Peter H. Solomon, Jr., of Columbia University for their comments on this review article. In addition, I am grateful to the students in my seminar on federalism at Carleton University for clarifying some of my ideas on these new approaches to federalism.

[1] *Federal Government* (Oxford 1946); the fourth edition, cited hereafter, was published in 1963.

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

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justified his inclusion of Canada as an operative federal system by noting that the powers of disallowance and reservation had been very infrequently applied, especially since the turn of the century.

Wheare recognized that his criteria of coordinate, but independent, status for the two levels of government and his implicit notion that the functions of government should somehow be carried out independently by the two different levels of government were only components of an ideal-typical definition. His discussion of the evolution of a preponderant financial position of the federal government over provincial governments as a result of depression and postwar economic strains reveals this.[2] Nevertheless, Wheare optimistically believed that the approximate coordinate and independent relationship between the two levels of government would continue into the post–World War II period, with some modifications in the financial and administrative sphere. He also was confident of the continuing utility of federal forms of government under post–World War II conditions. His ideal-typical definition of federalism became the most widely accepted basis for a classificatory scheme and for comparing federal systems of government in such problem areas as financial and administrative relations between the two levels of government, relationships between the court systems of both levels, and the composition of legislatures at the two levels of government.

Wheare, however, neglected several important problem areas that are vital to the working of any federal government. Among them are the party system, the role of pressure groups and political movements, and the effect of political attitudes on the system. Probably the most important of these, as both William H. Riker and Aaron Wildavsky argue, is the political party system. The relationships between the two levels of government are dependent on the kinds of relationships that members of political parties at both levels establish with one another. Often in a federal system the party members operating governments at the regional level are co-partisans of those operating governments at the federal level. In such instances, informal party relationships become important to federalism. At other times, the governing parties at the regional level may be opponents of the governing party at the national level. The rivalry between the parties can be an important factor in determining legislative and administrative relations between the two governments. The federal structure of government also affects the pattern of organization of these different parties, the relationships between the extraparliamentary party and the parliamentary caucuses

[2] *Ibid.*, chaps. 6-8.

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at both levels of government, and the organization of election campaigns. The parties in turn affect not only the pattern of relationships between the two levels of government, through the internal relationships of their members, but also the patterns of party finance from region to region. These are only a few of the similarities between the pattern of relationships of political parties operating within federal structures which can be illuminated by comparative analysis.

For almost two decades Wheare's definition of federalism stood unaltered in the textbooks of political science and in numerous government documents. However, not long after his book first appeared, several scholars began to cite some shortcomings in what seemed to be an overnarrow definition of federalism based on legal and juridical writings. Several of these often-neglected essays, written in the 1950's and early 1960's, are reprinted in the first three sections of Wildavsky's *American Federalism in Perspective*. One of them, by W. S. Livingston, is worthy of special attention.

Livingston's critique is directed at the limitations that a formal-legal definition of federalism imposes on solving the kinds of problems with which students of federalism concern themselves. In his perceptive view, "The essential nature of federalism is to be sought for not in the shadings of legal and constitutional terminology, but in the forces—economic, social, political, cultural—that have made the outward forms of federalism necessary. Federalism, like most institutional forms, is a solution of, or an attempt to solve, a certain kind of political organization. Federal governments and federal constitutions do not grow simply by accident. They arise in response to certain stimuli; a federal system is consciously adopted as a means of solving the problems represented by these stimuli" (Wildavsky, p. 36).

According to Livingston, the stimuli for the outward forms of federalism are the forces he describes as "the federal quality of the society." A federal society is one in which diversities are grouped territorially (p. 37). Where societies exist in which diversities are grouped in some other way, then the society is not federal, and there is little likelihood that its political institutions will be federal in form. On the other hand, where diversities are grouped territorially, the likelihood is that these territories will be assigned functions appropriate to their diversities, and federal forms will be established.

Livingston is careful to point out that these diversities may not be precisely translated into political forms that follow the strict boundary lines of the principal geographic cleavages in the society.

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Administrative and historical considerations generally weigh most heavily in determining how political boundaries defining the regional units in a federal system should be drawn. For example, in Canada the federal form of government established in 1867 was primarily the product of a compromise between French- and English-speaking groups in the then united Province of Canada. Two separate provinces, Ontario and Quebec, were established, in each of which one of the two principal language groups constituted a majority. In each, however, there was still a large minority group concentrated along the border. The provincial boundaries were not redrawn to encompass these groups.

In defining his concept of "federal society," Livingston does not make clear precisely what kinds of diversities he thinks are crucial. He seems to be speaking of differences in language, religion, ethnicity, or historical tradition which distinguish groups of people living in one concentrated area from those of neighboring areas. These differences form the basis of federalism when such groups attain sufficient power to permit their political representatives to insist upon retaining important functions in those geographic areas in which the groups constitute an overall majority.

Can Livingston's concept of federal society be made more precise? Can one distinguish between a society that is federal and one that is not? And what utility is there in identifying a federal society, assuming that some consensus can be reached on what is meant by the term?

It seems to me that some degree of consensus has already been reached on the meaning of "federal society." Several other students of federalism, including R. L. Watts and Wildavsky, have adopted Livingston's terminology and applied it in their own writings. In his *New Federations*, Watts limits Livingston's use to "that segment of the spectrum [of societies] in which the pressures for unity and diversity are fairly closely balanced" (p. 95). Watts introduces here a notion of equilibrium, which is absent from Livingston's analysis. He defines a federal society as that kind of inclusive social system in which social forces making for diversity among differentiated communities are in approximate balance with forces making for unity. He does not, however, suggest indices that might permit the student of federalism to identify the kind of society and the type of equilibrium that he envisages. Nor does he provide a list of criteria that distinguish federal societies from other kinds of societies. Are the United States and Australia, despite the comparative homogeneity of social groups in their

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

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respective societies, to be characterized as federal societies? If not, what kind of societies are they? And how does one account for the adoption and continued operation of federal political forms in these systems?

Wildavsky deals with this problem in his own contribution to *American Federalism in Perspective*. He distinguishes between what he calls "structural federalism" and what he refers to as "social federalism" (p. 178). For Wildavsky, structural federalism exists today in societies like Australia largely because a structural framework of federalism was originally adopted and has created vested interests that support its retention, rather than because of the social makeup of territorially based groups. The political framework of federalism is no longer a minimum condition for the survival of Australia as a nation-state, as it apparently once was.

Surprisingly, Wildavsky considers the United States, despite the relative homogeneity of its territorially concentrated communities in terms of language, religion, and historical experience, to represent a type of social federalism rather than structural federalism. Wildavsky disagrees with writers such as Riker who see the United States as sufficiently integrated at present to abandon federalism if its national political leaders choose to do so. The disagreement between Wildavsky and Riker demonstrates how important it is to define the concept of federal society with greater precision.

It seems to me that the concept of federal society can be most usefully applied if it is confined to a society that is both polyethnic and multilingual in makeup. The major cleavage defining societies of this type is a product of ethnic and linguistic differences. Where a society is constituted of territorially based communities that are clearly differentiated by language and ethnicity, then one can expect to find a federal society. The cleavage defining such a federal society may be reinforced by other factors such as religion, geography, and economics, which also help to create a sense of distinctive communities. However, the ethnic and linguistic factors are determining ones in the decision concerning the nature of the larger political order that each community wishes to establish in union with other communities. If ethnic and linguistic differences are present, then the political leaders of the distinctive communities will "bargain" for sufficient autonomy for themselves and their followers to prevent the establishment of a system more centralized than a federal union.

Once the "federal bargain is struck," to use Riker's phrase, then forces in the society will again operate on and be shaped by the political structure. Here the concept of "federal political system" be-

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comes relevant. The first student of federalism to use this concept in conjunction with "federal society" was Watts, who borrowed the concept from the writings of David Easton and others. In *New Federations*, he extends Wheare's definition of federal government to subsume all political systems in which jurisdictions and functions are divided between central and regional governments so that neither is totally subordinate to the other. He includes systems in which one level of government is stronger or more powerful than the other (p. 13).

Watts does not really apply the concept of political system in a systematic manner. He focuses almost exclusively on the formal structures of government which manifest federal features. He does not include those political or power relationships outside the formal structures of authority which ultimately produce authoritative decisions for the members of a society. In particular, he does not deal systematically with those aspects of political parties, interest groups, elite groups, and political attitudes which are shaped by, and in turn shape, the operation of federal political systems.[3]

Watts also does not distinguish between the more inclusive aspects of a society's political behavior encompassed by the concept of political system and those aspects that are peculiarly influenced by and influence the federal structure. The concept of federal political system is narrower in meaning and scope than is the general concept of political system.

A federal political system, then, in my view, is that form of political system (of a nation-state) in which the institutions, values, attitudes, and patterns of political action operate to give autonomous expression both to the national political system and political culture and to regional political subsystems and subcultures (defined primarily by ethnic-linguistic factors). The autonomy of each of these systems and subsystems is counterbalanced by a mutual interdependence. This balance maintains the overall union.

The concepts used by Livingston and Watts can be fruitfully combined with those of Riker. In his *Federalism*, Riker focuses on the specifically "political" variables in any federal arrangement. A desire on the part of the community offering the bargain for territorial expansion by means other than conquest and an interest on the part of the community accepting the bargain in security against an outside neighbor are for Riker the two major factors producing a "federal bargain." Once the bargain is struck, a number of other vari-

[3] Watts was hamstrung by lack of information about informal political processes within the new federations. This point is made below.

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

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ables come into play in maintaining the federal system. Riker explores the relationship between fiscal and administrative arrangements (which he refers to as the "administrative theory of federalism"), the influence of the federal institutions of government, and the pattern of political attitudes (which he describes as "patriotism") as they relate to the maintenance of federalism. He concludes that none of these factors is crucial to the maintenance of federalism. Rather, the pattern of relationships operating within the party system is the key factor preserving the federal bargain over time. In his words, "Whatever the general social conditions, if any, that sustain the federal bargain, there is one institutional condition that controls the nature of the bargain in all the instances here examined and in all others with which I am familiar. This is the structure of the party system, which may be regarded as the main variable intervening between the background social conditions and the specific nature of the federal bargain" (p. 136).

Riker considers his approach to be a more purely political one than the sociological approaches adopted by such writers as Karl Deutsch (p. 16). However, there is nothing, in my opinion, that prevents a synthesis of the two approaches in comparing certain federal systems. The concept of federal political system can incorporate both pure power political relationships and more inclusive sociopolitical patterns of action.[4] The patterns of political relationships in polyethnic federal systems which are comparable are those that operate within the limits set by the federal bargain. They also emanate from comparable territorially based cleavages in these societies. Thus, in the same way that one speaks of the interactions between societies and their political systems, one can speak of the interaction between the "federal" or polyethnic factors in a society and the "federal" patterns of power political relationships that operate in any federal political system.

By "federal" patterns of power political relationships I mean simply those bargains, compromises, and balances in power relationships among the representatives of the major ethnic-linguistic communities that operate within formal and informal structures (such as the executive, legislature, judiciary, political parties, and political groups). Within the legislature a compromise might be arranged through special representation provisions or through linguistic guarantees. Within the

[4] The distinction between pure power political relationships and sociopolitical patterns of action is often blurred in the literature. By sociopolitical patterns of action I mean all those behavior patterns that, directly or indirectly, contribute to authoritative decision-making in a society. Pure power political relationships are those that specifically involve power, authority, and rule, defined in a coercive sense.

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COLUMBIA 

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executive a bargain may exist in the representation of different regions in choosing a cabinet. Within the judiciary the scope of different legal systems and the representation by judges of the different communities and legal traditions strengthen the bargain. Within political parties, an agreement to give representation on party executive committees to different communities—or an arrangement to separate national and regional party structures in parties that bear the same name and are part of the same tradition—would also involve implementation of the federal bargain. These delicate compromises are worked out in part through common adherence to the strict terms of the original constitution and in part through informal understandings between the representatives of the member communities in the federal society.

It seems to me that Watts, implicitly rather than explicitly, has confined his concepts and his analyses to just such types of federal systems and societies. Watts compares societies that manifest aspects of federalism both in their social structure and in their political structure. The patterns of political relationships are sufficiently similar to lend themselves to comparison. Thus Watts selects such widely divergent political systems as India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Nigeria, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and the West Indies Federation for comparison in his *New Federations*.

Watts applies the concepts of federal society and federal political system in answering two major questions: (1) What causes new nations to adopt federal forms? and (2) How well have these forms worked once they have been adopted? The focal point of his analysis of the first question is the federal society, or the forces of unity and diversity in these six societies which influenced them to strike a federal bargain. These forces include a balance between desire and capacity for both unity and diversity on the part of different ethnic-linguistic groups; a balance between the economic goals and capabilities of the negotiating communities; a balance between shared historical traditions and those historical memories making for differentiation of these communities; a balance between the desire to achieve political independence from the colonial power and the realization of the limited possibilities of achieving such independence except under a federal system; and so forth. After comparative analysis, Watts argues that the factors making for federation in the six societies he compares vary from federation to federation (pp. 65ff., 90ff.). Despite the large number of factors that he lists, Watts's analysis of the forces in a federal society is, in my opinion, still incomplete. It is not sufficiently multidimensional to encompass other societal factors that might have

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COLUMBIA  COLUMBIA

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been even more important in producing the federal bargain. For example, a balance between social and economic transactions and a balanced set of mutual perceptions between the negotiating communities may also have influenced them to negotiate the bargain. Karl Deutsch gives these factors special prominence in his discussion of the preconditions for security-communities, of which a federal system is one subtype.[5]

Watts also neglects to weight his factors in terms of their relative importance. Riker, on the other hand, gives two factors, the desire for security against external attack and the desire for territorial expansion through diplomatic negotiation, a major place in his analysis. This weighting may be true for some communities but not for others.[6] Wheare, Watts, and Deutsch all emphasize nonpolitical factors, which may be more important than the political factors as preconditions for the bargain in some federal systems. What is needed, then, is a technique for measuring the relative weights of the variety of factors impinging on the federal bargain.

In his second question, namely, how well the forms work once applied in practice, Watts claims to focus on the interactions within what he calls the federal political system. In fact, however, because so little information is available about the federal institutions of the new federations other than those falling strictly within the formal governmental sphere, Watts is forced to confine his analysis to the formal distribution of legislative and executive authority in the new federations.

In most cases, however, political scientists have now come to include the informal political structures in their analyses of political systems. Concepts have been developed in comparative politics which give some precision to discussions of such institutions and patterns of action as political parties, pressure groups, political movements, cliques, and factions; competing elites; and political cultures and subcultures. This is particularly the case in developed and westernized political systems, where the informal institutions, informal patterns of political action, and patterns of political attitudes that compose the infrastructure of any political system show striking similarities, particularly as they relate to the federal political structure.

What kinds of questions might one ask about the relationship between the aforementioned patterns of action and the federal structure?

[5] Deutsch and others, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton 1957), 58.

[6] A. H. Birch makes this point in his excellent review of Riker (Wildavsky, pp. 59ff.).

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I have already listed several problem areas involving the relationship between political parties and the federal structure.[7] In the case of pressure groups and other competitive structures, one might investigate the following: What kinds of pressure groups and political movements are formed for the specific purpose of representing one of the ethnic-linguistic communities? How do they act on the central and regional decision-making centers? Are their activities and influence concentrated more on the central government or on the regional governments? How intense are these pressures on the two levels of government? What is the internal structural pattern of these groups—unitary, federal, or confederal?[8] How well-represented are the different ethnic-linguistic communities in the internal decision-making processes of such groups? What overall role do such groups play in preserving or destroying the federal bargain?

With regard to competing elites, one might explore the following: Are the ethnic-linguistic communities equally represented within the society's "power elite"? When their representatives join the power elite, do they continue to champion their community's interests? Or do they abandon their community ties and become part of a "national" political community? What role do they play in decisions made by the central government affecting the demands and interests of the ethnic-linguistic communities? Are they deliberately recruited from their ethnic-linguistic community in order to strengthen the federal bargain?

Finally, one can investigate some questions relating political cultures and subcultures to the federal structure: What are the major subcultures within the federal society? Do they correspond to the various ethnic-linguistic communities? What are the comparative loyalties felt toward the central and regional governments of the federal political system? How efficacious a role do the individual members of the major communities feel they perform in the national and regional political systems and subsystems? How do changing perceptions about the national and regional governments affect the behavior of the various ethnic-linguistic communities toward these governments?

In which federal systems might these questions be investigated? There are several contemporary federal systems that fall easily into

[7] See above.

[8] A *confederal* structure is one in which the central decision-making authority is subordinate in power political terms to the regional or local decision-making units. A *unitary* structure is one in which regional and local units are subordinate to the central authority. In a *federal* structure the two authorities are in approximate power balance.

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the category of federal societies (defined in terms of polyethnicity and multilingualism) and that also have federal governmental structures. Most of them, however, have had very little experience as operative political systems. Among the mature federations, Switzerland and Canada are the outstanding examples. The former system has achieved a considerable success as a model of a stable federalism. The latter is now experiencing serious strains after one hundred years of what seemed to most outside observers to be a highly stable and durable federalism. I shall use Canada, then, as a laboratory for applying some of the concepts I have discussed above.

At present, after one hundred years of what seemed a firmly established and stable federal political system, Canada is undergoing what the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism aptly referred to as a "crisis in the Confederation partnership" in its Preliminary Report published less than three years ago.[9] There has been a growing realization among politically aware Canadians that the Commission's diagnosis was correct. The federal bargain between French- and English-speaking Canadians struck one hundred years ago is in serious danger of coming unhinged.

What tools can political scientists apply to explain why this bargain is now endangered? Why has it been maintained for one hundred years, seemingly without a threat to its continued existence? And what are the possibilities for its future maintenance, if reforms are introduced? Where are the changes most needed—at the constitutional level, within formal governmental institutions, within informal political institutions such as the political party system and the pressure groups, or in the political attitudes that French- and English-speaking Canadians have toward each other?

As has been previously mentioned, Riker argues that the crucial factor maintaining the federal bargain in any political system is the party system. In the case of Canada, I think his argument is correct. However, writers on Canadian federalism have not given much attention to the relationship between the Canadian party system and federalism. We know very little about the power relationships and bargains struck between French- and English-speaking Canadians within the parliamentary caucuses and extraparliamentary parties, between members of each language group belonging to the same political

[9] *A Preliminary Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism* (Ottawa 1965), 13. The Preamble reads: "Canada, without being fully conscious of the fact, is passing through the greatest crisis in its history. The source of the crisis lies in the Province of Quebec." It is also interesting that the Commissioners describe Canada as a nation-state containing "two societies" (*ibid.*, chap. 6.).

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party at the provincial and national levels, and so on. Such aspects are just beginning to be systematically studied by these political scientists. But the study of these aspects can be facilitated by the application of some of the hypotheses suggested in the Wildavsky reader by David B. Truman and Morton Grodzins in the case of the American party system, by Wildavsky himself in the case of the Australian party system (which, because Australia has a parliamentary cabinet type of government, is more similar to the Canadian case than is the United States), by Steven Muller in the case of the Canadian system itself, and by Riker (Wildavsky, pp. 23-29, 51-59, 81-181).

It seems to me that one of the prime factors that will determine whether the federal bargain will endure in Canada is the accommodation that will be worked out between French- and English-speaking Canadians in the two major parties at the federal and provincial levels, as well as the accommodation between French- and English-speaking Canadians in the minor parties, the New Democratic party and the Social Credit party. If, for example, arrangements can be made for French-speaking Canadians living outside the Province of Quebec to be educated in and retain their own language (and if these arrangements are negotiated both within the cabinet and upper levels of the administration and within the caucuses of the federal and provincial parliamentary parties), then the possibilities for maintaining the federal bargain are enhanced. This proposition assumes that the major negotiating communities, the French- and English-speaking communities, are willing to maintain their electoral confidence in these long-standing parties and that the leading partisan representatives of both major communities are also willing to preserve the federal bargain.

In a similar manner, the composition, structure, and bargaining within the leading pressure groups will affect the durability of the federal bargain. For example, the major union in Canada, the Canadian Congress of Labour (CLC), is a confederation of provincial and locally organized unions. One of these provincial unions is the Quebec Federation of Labour (QFL), which represents a substantially larger proportion of the working class in Quebec than its major competitor, the Confederation of National Trade Unions (CNTU). The CNTU, however, has adopted a more radical stance with regard to the role of Quebec in Confederation. Consequently it has expanded its membership at the expense of the QFL. This has caused the QFL to demand a more sympathetic attitude on the part of Canadian labor as a whole to such questions affecting the French-Canadian com-

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munity as its representation in the decision-making processes of the union, use of the French language at work, and so forth.

Other subjects of crucial importance in this negotiating process are the entire array of federal and provincial powers and the linguistic and regional composition of the federal and provincial courts, the ethnic-linguistic composition of the federal administration, and the bicultural composition of a national capital district.

However, all this discussion assumes that the two dominant ethnic-linguistic communities retain their confidence in the traditional parties and pressure groups. The existence of different types of structures of political competition, such as political movements within French Canada opposed to the existing bargain, threatens to undermine the prospects for a negotiated settlement. Here the analysis of the major political movements dedicated to the independence of Quebec becomes relevant. Comparative analysis has something to contribute to the question of whether such movements of independence can make sufficient headway in the Province of Quebec to undermine the federal bargain.

It has been found by students of political movements that under conditions of severe deprivation (of an economic, status, or other sort) and psychological strain, individuals in any society will seek outlets in the form of some episode of collective protest behavior.[10] In a society in which one party has been dominant for a long period of time, so that the major opposition party is no longer seen as a credible alternative to the dominant party, people will tend to vote for third-party alternatives that appeal to their discontent.[11] In the case of Quebec, the independence parties of both the Right and Left, the Ralliement National (RN) and the Rassemblement de l'Indépendence Nationale (RIN) have competed in one provincial election, in 1966, and together gained only about ten percent of the vote.

The Union Nationale party, one of the major parties provincially, is at present still committed to maintaining the Confederation pact, although it seeks significant reforms in the federal structure. It succeeded in capturing power from the Liberals, who had also pledged to maintain the bargain. Federally, all the major and minor parties have agreed to support the Confederation settlement. Much depends, then, on whether the two major parties provincially can hold the electorate to a program of reform within the existing federal structure. The attitude of the electorate depends largely on the fluctuating economic

[10] Neil J. Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior* (New York 1963), 14ff.; also Maurice Pinard, "One-Party Dominance and Third Parties," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, XXXIII (August 1967), 358-73.

[11] *Ibid.*, 361.

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and social conditions in the province. If conditions worsen, French-Canadians may be attracted to parties opposed to the existing system. Given the fact that a predominance of force is in federal hands, the most likely way that independence can be achieved for Quebec is by election to power of an independence party (or the achievement by such a party of sufficient leverage, through a balance-of-power position, to win the major parties away from their pledge to maintain the bargain).

Alternatively, one of the major provincial parties might unilaterally decide to opt out of the federal bargain. It seems to me that this is at present not a likely possibility. Premier Johnson of Quebec, leader of the Union Nationale party, has expressed his desire to maintain the Confederation pact if certain reforms favorable both to the Province of Quebec and to French-Canadian interests are enacted. The provincial Liberal party, the other major party, has recently had a showdown within its ranks in which the *indépendentistes*, led by the colorful René Lévesque, were defeated in their bid to commit the party to separatism.[12] The party now appears to be firmly under the control of those pledged to retain the federal bargain.

What would be the signs of changing French-Canadian attitudes toward the federal pact? Clearly, public opinion polls and studies of changing attitudes of Quebeckers toward the pact are important indicators. A recent poll revealed that whereas seventy percent of Quebeckers favor some constitutional change, only seven percent are committed to outright separatism.[13] Of course the attitudes of English-speaking Canadians toward implementing the kind of reforms that French-speaking Canadians are now demanding must also be studied.

The use of these tools of analysis cannot give us more than a very rough approximation of what is likely to occur in Canada. We cannot know for sure whether the bargain will be maintained or not. Its preservation will depend on the willingness of French- and English-speaking Canadians to retain their trust in the federal pact. This trust rests, ultimately, on mutual understanding and confidence on the part of the leading representatives of both communities. They must agree that their welfare can best be enhanced through a willingness to let the members of the other community live in the enjoyment of their "full personality as a community" (to use a common French-

[12] M. Lévesque has since formed his own independence movement, Le Mouvement Souveraineté Association (MAS). It is presently in the process of negotiating an alliance with the other two independence parties, the RN and RIN.

[13] This poll, which has not yet been published, was conducted by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.

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Canadian phrase). It seems to me probable that such a confidence will be maintained over the long run in Canada.

The questions concerning the relationship between the informal political structures of a society and federalism are, as stated earlier, relevant to other systems besides that of Canada. In particular, where modern societies have ethnic-linguistic cleavages that reinforce each other, creating distinct communities along territorial lines, similar problems related to the structure of the political system arise. If such societies have adopted federal forms as a minimum condition for the formation of political communities, then it is likely that conflicts will arise which will translate themselves into federal political problems. Ethnic-linguistic differences between separate communities tend to polarize around the federal structure because political power, both potential and actual, exists for these communities within the spheres of jurisdiction and functions assigned them by the federal legal-political structure. Thus the problems that have been discussed in relation to the federal society and federal political system of Canada exist in similar form in other clearly federal societies such as Switzerland, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union, among developed systems, and India, Pakistan, and Nigeria, among less developed systems.

It is also possible to apply these concepts comparatively to multicultural societies that do not have federal structures (for example, Belgium) in order to assess the possibilities for the adoption and workability of federal forms. And comparatively homogeneous societies with federal structures, such as Australia and the United States, can be analyzed to assess whether federalism can survive over the long run in a system that lacks the solid underpinnings of distinct communities within federal structures.

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